Hi Vasco! Thanks for the comment. I agree with you that switching is not necessarily worse (depending on your goals and principles) then just pursuing one uncertain intervention. I also agree with you that research is important when you find yourself in such a positionâitâs why Iâve dedicated my career to research :) And critically, I appreciate the clarification that âdecreasing uncertaintyâ is your priorityâI didnât realize that from past posts, but I think your most recent one is clear on that.
One thing Iâll just mention as a matter of personal inclinationâI feel unenthusiastic about precise probabilities for more reasons than just the switching issue (I pointed it out just to add to the discourse about things someone with that view should reflect on). Personally, it just doesnât feel accurate to my own epistemic state. When I look at my own uncertainties of this kind, it feels almost like lying to put a precise number on them (Iâm not saying others should feel this way, just that it is how I feel). So thatâs the most basic reason (among the other sort of theoretic reasons out there) that I feel attached to imprecise probabilities.
And critically, I appreciate the clarification that âdecreasing uncertaintyâ is your priorityâI didnât realize that from past posts, but I think your most recent one is clear on that.
Yes, I think I could have been clearer about it in the past. Now I am also more uncertain. I previously thought increasing agricultural was a pretty good heuristic for decreasing soil-animal-years, but it looks like it may easily increase these due to increasing soil-nematode-years.
When I look at my own uncertainties of this kind, it feels almost like lying to put a precise number on them (Iâm not saying others should feel this way, just that it is how I feel). So thatâs the most basic reason (among the other sort of theoretic reasons out there) that I feel attached to imprecise probabilities.
Makes sense. However, I would simply assign roughly the same probability to values (of a variable of interest) I feel very similarly about. The distribution representing the different possible values will be wider if one is indifferent between more of them. Yet, I do not understand how one could accept imprecise probabilities. In my mind, a given value is always less, more, or as likely as another. I would not be able to distinguish between the mass of 2 objects with 1 and 1.001 kg by just having them in my hands, but this does not mean their masses are incomparable.
Hi Vasco! Thanks for the comment. I agree with you that switching is not necessarily worse (depending on your goals and principles) then just pursuing one uncertain intervention. I also agree with you that research is important when you find yourself in such a positionâitâs why Iâve dedicated my career to research :) And critically, I appreciate the clarification that âdecreasing uncertaintyâ is your priorityâI didnât realize that from past posts, but I think your most recent one is clear on that.
One thing Iâll just mention as a matter of personal inclinationâI feel unenthusiastic about precise probabilities for more reasons than just the switching issue (I pointed it out just to add to the discourse about things someone with that view should reflect on). Personally, it just doesnât feel accurate to my own epistemic state. When I look at my own uncertainties of this kind, it feels almost like lying to put a precise number on them (Iâm not saying others should feel this way, just that it is how I feel). So thatâs the most basic reason (among the other sort of theoretic reasons out there) that I feel attached to imprecise probabilities.
Yes, I think I could have been clearer about it in the past. Now I am also more uncertain. I previously thought increasing agricultural was a pretty good heuristic for decreasing soil-animal-years, but it looks like it may easily increase these due to increasing soil-nematode-years.
Makes sense. However, I would simply assign roughly the same probability to values (of a variable of interest) I feel very similarly about. The distribution representing the different possible values will be wider if one is indifferent between more of them. Yet, I do not understand how one could accept imprecise probabilities. In my mind, a given value is always less, more, or as likely as another. I would not be able to distinguish between the mass of 2 objects with 1 and 1.001 kg by just having them in my hands, but this does not mean their masses are incomparable.