The original version of footnote 8 (relating to how the narrative of the Weapon of Openness interacts with secrecy in private enterprise):
“There are various possible answers to this I could imagine being true. The first is that private companies are in fact just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of secrecy as governments are, and that technological progress is much lower than it would be if companies were more open. Assuming arguendo that this is not the case, there are several factors I could imagine being at play:
Competition (i.e. the standard answer). Private companies are engaged in much more ferocious competition over much shorter timescales than states are. This provides much stronger incentives for good behaviour even when a project is secret.
Selection. Even if private companies are individually just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of secrecy as state agencies, the intense short-term competition private firms are exposed to means that those companies with better epistemics at any given time will outcompete those that do not and gain market share. Hence the market as a whole can continue to produce effective technology projects in secret, even as secrecy continuously corrodes individual actors within the market.
Short-termism. It’s plausible to me that, with rare exceptions, secret projects in firms are of much shorter duration than in state agencies. If this is the case, it might allow at least some private companies to continuously exploit the short-term benefits of secrecy while avoiding some or all of the long-term costs.
Differences in degrees of secrecy. If a government project is secret, it will tend to remain so even once completed, for national security reasons. Conversely, private companies may be less attached to total, indefinite secrecy, particulary given the pro-openness incentives provided by patents. It might also be easier to bring external experts into secret private projects, through NDAs and the like, than it is to get them clearance to consult on secret state ones.
I don’t yet know enough economics or business studies to be confident in my guesses here, and hopefully someone who knows more can tell me which of these are plausible and which are wrong.”
Regarding the footnote issue, it sounds like maybe you had the same issue I had, so I’ll share the fix I found in case that helps.
Standard footnotes on EAF and LessWrong only work for one paragraph. If you have a second paragraph (or dot points) that you want included, it just disappears.
To fix that, use “bignotes”, as described here and here. (And it still works with dot points; just put 4 spaces before the dot point, as you would before any other paragraph.)
Also, as a general point, it seems there’s little info on how writing posts/comments works on EAF, but there is for LessWrong, and a lot of that applies. So when I get stuck, I search on LessWrong (e.g., here). (And if that fails too, I google my problem + “markdown”, as that’s the syntax used).
It might be that you knew all that and your issue was different, but just thought I’d share in case it helps.
It might also be easier to bring external experts into secret private projects, through NDAs and the like, than it is to get them clearance to consult on secret state ones.
It seems to me that it’s also possible that that’s more of a symptom than a cause of the secrecy being less corrosive/corrupting in private than state projects (if indeed that is the case). That is, perhaps there’s some other reason why secrecy leads to less corruption and distortion of incentives in businesses than in governments, and then because of that, those in-the-know in business are more willing to let external experts get NDAs-or-similar and look at what’s going on than are those in-the-know in government.
The original version of footnote 8 (relating to how the narrative of the Weapon of Openness interacts with secrecy in private enterprise):
“There are various possible answers to this I could imagine being true. The first is that private companies are in fact just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of secrecy as governments are, and that technological progress is much lower than it would be if companies were more open. Assuming arguendo that this is not the case, there are several factors I could imagine being at play:
Competition (i.e. the standard answer). Private companies are engaged in much more ferocious competition over much shorter timescales than states are. This provides much stronger incentives for good behaviour even when a project is secret.
Selection. Even if private companies are individually just as vulnerable to the corrosive effects of secrecy as state agencies, the intense short-term competition private firms are exposed to means that those companies with better epistemics at any given time will outcompete those that do not and gain market share. Hence the market as a whole can continue to produce effective technology projects in secret, even as secrecy continuously corrodes individual actors within the market.
Short-termism. It’s plausible to me that, with rare exceptions, secret projects in firms are of much shorter duration than in state agencies. If this is the case, it might allow at least some private companies to continuously exploit the short-term benefits of secrecy while avoiding some or all of the long-term costs.
Differences in degrees of secrecy. If a government project is secret, it will tend to remain so even once completed, for national security reasons. Conversely, private companies may be less attached to total, indefinite secrecy, particulary given the pro-openness incentives provided by patents. It might also be easier to bring external experts into secret private projects, through NDAs and the like, than it is to get them clearance to consult on secret state ones.
I don’t yet know enough economics or business studies to be confident in my guesses here, and hopefully someone who knows more can tell me which of these are plausible and which are wrong.”
Regarding the footnote issue, it sounds like maybe you had the same issue I had, so I’ll share the fix I found in case that helps.
Standard footnotes on EAF and LessWrong only work for one paragraph. If you have a second paragraph (or dot points) that you want included, it just disappears.
To fix that, use “bignotes”, as described here and here. (And it still works with dot points; just put 4 spaces before the dot point, as you would before any other paragraph.)
Also, as a general point, it seems there’s little info on how writing posts/comments works on EAF, but there is for LessWrong, and a lot of that applies. So when I get stuck, I search on LessWrong (e.g., here). (And if that fails too, I google my problem + “markdown”, as that’s the syntax used).
It might be that you knew all that and your issue was different, but just thought I’d share in case it helps.
Thanks, I’ll try this out next time!
Interesting points, thanks for sharing!
One minor thought, in response to:
It seems to me that it’s also possible that that’s more of a symptom than a cause of the secrecy being less corrosive/corrupting in private than state projects (if indeed that is the case). That is, perhaps there’s some other reason why secrecy leads to less corruption and distortion of incentives in businesses than in governments, and then because of that, those in-the-know in business are more willing to let external experts get NDAs-or-similar and look at what’s going on than are those in-the-know in government.