That does seem true that I am making the case against negative hedonic utilitarianism seem stronger than it is by conflating the moral and axiological claims.
Nevertheless, I absolutely do stand by my claim that the axiology (state of calculated value) of negative hedonic utilitarianism is very wrong.
Negative hedonic utilitarianism fails because it says a universe with no suffering but also no richness, no narrative, no diversity, no generative potential is better than a universe with all of those things plus some suffering.
My intuition is: that’s axiologically backwards. The rich universe is better even though it contains suffering. Not despite the suffering, but in a way that’s inseparable from it.
That does seem true that I am making the case against negative hedonic utilitarianism seem stronger than it is by conflating the moral and axiological claims. Nevertheless, I absolutely do stand by my claim that the axiology (state of calculated value) of negative hedonic utilitarianism is very wrong.
Negative hedonic utilitarianism fails because it says a universe with no suffering but also no richness, no narrative, no diversity, no generative potential is better than a universe with all of those things plus some suffering. My intuition is: that’s axiologically backwards. The rich universe is better even though it contains suffering. Not despite the suffering, but in a way that’s inseparable from it.