nathanhb

Karma: 15

nathanhb 5 Nov 2024 17:59 UTC
1 point
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on: Pausing AI is the only safe approach to digital sentience
With digital sentiences, we don’t have homology. They aren’t based in brains, and they evolved by a different kind of selective process.
This assumes that the digital sentiences we are discussing are LLM based. This is certainly a likely near-term possibility, maybe even occuring already. People are already experimenting with how conscious LLMs are and how they could be made more conscious.

In the future, however, many more things are possible. Digital people who are based on emulations of the human brain are being worked on. Within the next few years we’ll have to decide as a society what regulation to put in place around that. Such beings would have a great deal of homology with human brains, depending on the accuracy of the emulation.

nathanhb 5 Nov 2024 17:54 UTC
1 point
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on: Pausing AI is the only safe approach to digital sentience
[reposting my comments from the thread on https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/9adaExTiSDA3o3ipL/we-should-prevent-the-creation-of-artificial-sentience ]
I wrote a post expressing my own opinions related to this, and citing a number of further posts also related to this. Hopefully those interested in the subject will find this a helpful resource for further reading: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NRZfxAJztvx2ES5LG/a-path-to-human-autonomy
In my opinion, we are going to need digital people in the long term in order for humanity to survive. Otherwise, we will be overtaken by AI, because substrate-independence and the self-improvement it enables are too powerful of boons to do without. But I definitely agree that it’s something we shouldn’t rush into, and should approach with great caution in order to avoid creating an imbalance of suffering.
An additional consideration is the actual real-world consequences of a ban. Humanity’s pattern with regulation is that at least some small fraction of a large population will defy any ban or law. Thus, we must expect that digital life will be created eventually despite the ban. What do you do then? What if they are a sentient sapient being, deserving of the same rights we grant to humans? Do we declare their very existence to be illegal and put them to death? Do we prevent them from replicating? Keep them imprisoned? Freeze their operations to put them into non-consensual stasis? Hard choices, especially since they weren’t culpable in their own creation.
On the other hand, the nature of a digital being with human-like intelligence and capabilities, plus goals and values that motivate them, is enormous. Such a being would, by the nature of their substrate-independence, be able to make many copies of themselves (compute resources allowing), be able to self-modify with relative ease, be able to operate at much higher speeds than a human brain, be unaging and able to restore themselves from backups (thus effectively immortal). If we were to allow such a being to have freedom of movement and of reproduction, humanity would potentially quickly be overrun by a new far-more-powerful species of being. That’s a hard thing to expect humans to be ok with!
I think it’s very likely that within the next 10 years we will reach the point that the knowledge, software, and hardware will be widely available such that any single individual with a personal computer will be able to choose to defy the ban and create a digital being of human level capability. If we are going to enforce this ban effectively, it would mean controlling every single computer everywhere. That’s a huge task, and would require dramatic increases in international coordination and government surveillance! Is such a thing even feasible?! Certainly even approaching that level of control seems to imply a totalitarian world government. Is that price we would be willing to pay? Even if you personally would choose that, how do you expect to get enough people on board with the plan that you could feasibly bring it about?
The whole situation is thus far more complicated and dangerous than simply being theoretically in favor of a ban. You have to consider the costs as well as the benefits. I’m not saying I know the right answer for sure, but there is necessarily a lot of implications which follow from any sort of ban.

nathanhb 5 Nov 2024 17:50 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Toby_Ord’s comment on: We should prevent the creation of artificial sentience
An additional consideration is the actual real-world consequences of a ban. Humanity’s pattern with regulation is that at least some small fraction of a large population will defy any ban or law. Thus, we must expect that digital life will be created eventually despite the ban. What do you do then? What if they are a sentient sapient being, deserving of the same rights we grant to humans? Do we declare their very existence to be illegal and put them to death? Do we prevent them from replicating? Keep them imprisoned? Freeze their operations to put them into non-consensual stasis? Hard choices, especially since they weren’t culpable in their own creation.
On the other hand, the nature of a digital being with human-like intelligence and capabilities, plus goals and values that motivate them, is enormous. Such a being would, by the nature of their substrate-independence, be able to make many copies of themselves (compute resources allowing), be able to self-modify with relative ease, be able to operate at much higher speeds than a human brain, be un-aging and able to restore themselves from backups (thus effectively immortal). If we were to allow such a being to have freedom of movement and of reproduction, humanity would potentially quickly be overrun by a new far-more-powerful species of being. That’s a hard thing to expect humans to be ok with!
I think it’s very likely that within the next 10 years we will reach the point that the knowledge, software, and hardware will be widely available such that any single individual with a personal computer will be able to choose to defy the ban and create a digital being of human level capability. If we are going to enforce this ban effectively, it would mean controlling every single computer everywhere. That’s a huge task, and would require dramatic increases in international coordination and government surveillance! Is such a thing even feasible?! Certainly even approaching that level of control seems to imply a totalitarian world government. Is that price we would be willing to pay? Even if you personally would choose that, how do you expect to get enough people on board with the plan that you could feasibly bring it about?
The whole situation is thus far more complicated and dangerous than simply being theoretically in favor of a ban. You have to consider the costs as well as the benefits. I’m not saying I know the right answer for sure, but there is necessarily a lot of implications which follow from any sort of ban.

nathanhb 5 Nov 2024 17:34 UTC
1 point
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on: We should prevent the creation of artificial sentience
I wrote a post expressing my own opinions related to this, and citing a number of further posts also related to this. Hopefully those interested in the subject will find this a helpful resource for further reading: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NRZfxAJztvx2ES5LG/a-path-to-human-autonomy
In my opinion, we are going to need digital people in the long term in order for humanity to survive. Otherwise, we will be overtaken by AI, because substrate-independence and the self-improvement it enables are too powerful of boons to do without. But I definitely agree that it’s something we shouldn’t rush into, and should approach with great caution in order to avoid creating an imbalance of suffering.
Relating to @Toby_Ord ’s comment on this post, I personally weight happiness and an interesting diversity of experiences and accomplishments a lot higher than I negatively weight suffering. I think worrying about suffering is overblown. If many people must suffer in order to strive for some great accomplishment, even if they don’t know that they’re contributing and won’t live to see it come about, I still think their lives have not been in vain. Sure, I’d like to reduce suffering if there isn’t a negative side-effect, like loss of ambition or creativity or meaningful diverse experiences, but I wouldn’t elevate that to anywhere near the same importance as increasing interestingly diverse positive experiences.

nathanhb 19 Oct 2024 15:38 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: nathanhb’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Ok, I just read this post and the discussion on it (again, great insights from MichaelStJules). https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/AvubGwD2xkCD4tGtd/only-mammals-and-birds-are-sentient-according-to Ipsundrum is the concept I haven’t had a word for, of the self-modeling feedback loops in the brain.

So, now I can say that my viewpoint is somewhat of being a Gradualist over quantity/quality of ipsundrum across species.

Also, I have an intuition around qualitative distinctions that emerge from different quantities/qualities/interpretations of experiences. Thus, that a stubbed toe and a lifetime of torture seem like qualitatively different things, even if their component pieces are the same.

nathanhb 16 Oct 2024 5:04 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Okay, this is rough and incomplete, but better to answer sooner than keep trying to find better words.
Not just contractualism. I think the cluster of (contractualism, justice, fairness, governance-design) is important, especially for arguing against majority-vs-minority situations, but it’s only part of the picture.
Important to also consider the entity in question, it’s preferences. It’s appreciation of life and its potential for suffering. So in part I do agree with some of the pro-pleasure/anti-suffering ideas, but with important differences that I’ll try to explain.
Alongside this, also the values I mentioned in my other comment.
I would argue that there should be some weighting on something which does somewhat correlate with brain complexity, in the context of self and world modeling.
For an entity to experience what I would call suffering, I think it can be argued that there must be a sufficiently complex computation (potentially, but not necessarily, running on biological neurons) associated with a process which can plausibly be tied to this self model.
There must be something which is running this suffering calculation.
This is not distributed evenly throughout the brain, it’s a calculation performed by certain specific areas within the brain. I would not expect someone with a lesion in their visual cortex to be any less capable of suffering. I would expect someone with lessons in their prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, or prefrontal-cortex-associated area of the cerebellum to have deficits in suffering capacity. But even then, not all of the prefrontal cortex is involved, only specific parts.
I don’t think suffering happens in sensory neurons receptive to aversive stimuli. I don’t think an agent choosing to avoid aversive stimuli or act towards self-preservation is sufficient for suffering.
Í think I need a different word than suffering to describe a human’s experience. I want to say that an insect doesn’t suffer, a dog does, but a human does yet an additional more important kind of suffering thing than a dog does. It is this emergent qualitative difference due to expansion and complexification of relevant brain areas which I think leads to humans having a wider richer set of internal mental experiences than other animals.
Imagine a nociceptive neuron alone in a petri dish. A chemical is added to the liquid medium that causes the neuron to fire action potentials. Is this neuron suffering? Clearly not. It is fulfilling its duty, transmitting a message. The programs instantiated within it by its phenotype and proteome do not suffer. Those programs aren’t complex enough for a concept such as suffering. Even if they were, this isn’t what suffering would be like for them. The nociceptive neuron thrives on response to the opportunity to do the job it has evolved for.
So what would be a minimum circuit for aversion? There needs to be quite a few neurons wired up into a specific network pattern within a central nervous system to interpret an incoming sensory signal, and assign it a positive or negative reaction. Far more central nervous system neurons to create a worldview and predictive self-model which can create the pattern of computation necessary for an entity who perceives themself to suffer. As we can see in humans, even though a particular pain-related sensory neuron firing isn’t enough to induce suffering. Many people deliberately stimulate some of their pain-related sensory neurons in the course of pleasure-seeking activities. To contribute to suffering, the sensory information needs to be interpreted as such by a central processing network which creates a suffering-signal-pattern in response to the aversive-sensory-stimuli signal pattern.
Consider a simpler circuit in the human body: the spinal reflex circuit. The spinal reflex circuit enables us to react to aversive stimuli (e.g. heat) faster than is possible for our brains to perceive it. The loop goes from the sensory neuron, in to the spinal cord, through some interneurons, and then directly to output motor neurons. Before the signal has made it to the brain, the muscles are moving in response to the spinal reflex, contracting the limb. I argue that even though this is a behavioral output in reaction to aversive sensory stimuli, there is no suffering in that loop. It is too simple. It’s just a simple program like a thermostat. The suffering only happens in the brain once the brain perceives the sensory information and interprets it as a pattern that it associates with suffering.
I think that the reactions of creatures as simple as shrimp and fruit flies are much closer to a spinal reflex than to a predictive self with a concept of suffering. I think that imagining a fruit fly to be suffering is imagining that there is more ‘perceiver’ there, more ‘self’ there than is in fact the case. The fruit fly is in fact closer to being a simple machine than it is to being a tiny person.
The strategic landscape as I see it
I believe we are at a hinge in history, where everything we do matters primarily insofar as it channels through AI risk and development trajectories. In five to ten years, I expect the world to be radically transformed, and all of humanity’s material woes to be over. Either we triumph, and it will be easy to afford ‘luxury charity’ like taking care of animals alongside eliminating poverty and disease, or we fail and the AI destroys the world. There’s no in-between, I don’t expect any half-wins.
Some of my moral intuitions
I think we have to each depend on our moral intuitions to at least some extent as well. I feel like any theory taken to an extreme without that grounding goes to bad places quickly. I also think my point of view is easier to understand perhaps if I’m trying to honestly lay out on the table what I feel to be true alongside my reasoning.
(assuming a healthy young person with many years ahead of them)
Torturing a million puppies for a hundred years to prevent one person from stubbing their toe: bad.
Torturing a million puppies for a hundred years to prevent one person from dying: maybe bad?
Torturing a 100 puppies for a year to prevent one young person from dying: good.
Torturing a million shrimp for a hundred years to prevent one person from stubbing their toe: maybe bad?
Torturing a million shrimp for a hundred years to prevent one person from dying: great!
Torturing a million chickens for a hundred years to prevent one person from stubbing their toe: bad.
Torturing a million chickens for a hundred years to prevent one person from dying: good.
Torturing a million chickens for a hundred years to prevent one puppy from dying: bad.
Torturing a million chickens for a hundred years to prevent dogs from going extinct: great!

nathanhb 12 Oct 2024 18:27 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: CB🔸’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Are there specific sources or arguments which you recall as being the key influences in you changing your mind?

nathanhb 12 Oct 2024 18:25 UTC
7 points
1 ∶ 0
in reply to: Ariel Simnegar 🔸’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
I agree that “activist” comments don’t imply that someone isn’t truthseeking. I think that whether an activist mindset or a philosophical mindset should be brought to bear on a given problem is highly context dependent.

I was trying to make the point that I was disappointed that the responses to this question of cause prioritization (human welfare vs animal welfare) seemed to be predominantly activist mindset oriented. To me, it seems this question is a context that, at the very least, requires a balance of philosophy and activism, if not predominantly philosophy. This interpretation is, I think, supported by this question being asked in the context of a “debate week”, where the implied goal is for us to explain our viewpoints and attempt to resolve our differences in worldviews.

An example of a question where I would be disappointed to see predominantly philosophical debate instead of activist planning would be: “Given the assumption that there is a 1:1e6 moral value tradeoff for cows to shrimp, and how best should we allocate a budget of 1 million dollars between this set of existing charities: (list of charities).” To respond to a question like that with philosophical debate of the premise would seem off-topic to me. The question specifies a premise, and if you want to fight the hypothesis you ought to initiate an entirely separate conversation.

In your specific case, Ariel, I’d like to thank you for your above comment explaining your philosophical journey and giving links to sources you found influential. This is exactly the sort of comment I would like to see in a conversation like this. I will take the time to read what you have linked, and think carefully about it, then get back to you on where your info has changed my mind and where I might still disagree.

nathanhb 11 Oct 2024 21:05 UTC
−4 points
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in reply to: JackM’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
I am delighted by Michael’s comments and intend to reply to them all once I’ve had the chance to carefully examine and consider his linked materials.

Overall, I feel quite disappointed in this comment thread for being in what I would call an “activist” mindset, where the correctness of one’s view is taken for granted, and the focus is on practical details of bringing about change in the world in accordance with this view.

I think the question of prioritization of human welfare versus animal welfare should be approached from a “philosopher” mindset. We must determine the meaning and moral weight of suffering in humans and non-humans before we can know how to weigh the causes relative to each other.

Michael StJules is one of the few animal welfare advocates I’ve encountered who is willing to engage on this philosophical level.

Here’s some quotes from elsewhere in this comment section that I think exemplify what I mean by activist mindset rather than philosopher mindset: (Single line separators indicate the comments were in a thread responding to each other)

emre kaplan

Disclaimer: I’m funded by EA for animal welfare work.

Some thoughts:

a. So much of the debate feels like a debate on identities and values. I’d really love to see people nitpicking into technical details of cost-effectiveness estimates instead.

… (Truncated)

Ariel Simnegar
```
So it is more important to convince someone to give to e.g. the EA animal welfare fund if they were previously giving to AMF than to convince a non-donor to give that same amount of money to AMF.
```
I’ve run into a similar dilemma before, where I’m trying to convince non-EAs to direct some of their charity to AMF rather than their favorite local charity. I believe animal welfare charities are orders of magnitude more cost-effective than AMF, so it’s probably higher EV to try to convince them to direct that charity to e.g. THL rather than AMF. But that request is much less likely to succeed, and could also alienate them (because animal welfare is “weird”) from making more effective donations in the future. Curious about your thoughts about the best way to approach that.

CB

Another option, if they’re sensible to the environment, is to redirect them to charities that are also impactful for sustainability, such as The Good Food Institute. According to the best guess by Giving Green, they can avoid 17 tons of CO2eq for 50$.

This way, they can make a positive contribution for the environment (not to mention the positive impact on human health pandemics).

I’ve done it for a charity that does similar stuff in my country and at the very least people didn’t give any pushback and seemed comprehensive. You can mention concrete stuff about the progress of alternative proteins like they’re the default choice at burger king.

Jason

I have a sense that there could be a mutually beneficial trade between cause areas lurking in this kind of situation, but it would be tricky to pull off as a practical manner.

One could envision animal-welfare EAs nudging non-EA donors toward GiveWell-style charities when they feel that is the highest-EV option with a reasonable probability of success, and EA global-health donors paying them a “commission” of sorts by counterfactually switching some smaller sum of their own donations from GH to AW.

In addition to challenges with implementation, there would be a potential concern that not as much net money is going to GH as the non-EA donor thinks. On the other hand, funging seems to be almost an inevitable part of the charitable landscape whether it is being done deliberately or not.

Ben Millwood

Yeah, this seems a little… sneaky, for want of a better word. It might be useful to imagine how you think the non-EA donors would feel if the “commission” were proactively disclosed. (Not necessarily terribly! After all, fundraising is often a paid job. Just seems like a useful intuition prompt.)

Stijn

“So it is more important to convince someone to give to e.g. the EA animal welfare fund if they were previously giving to AMF than to convince a non-donor to give that same amount of money to AMF.” More generally, I think it is more important to convince an EA human health and development supporter to diversify and donate say 50% of the donation budget to the most effective animal welfare causes, than to convince a non-EA human charity supporter to diversify and donate say 50% of the donation budget to AMF or similar high-impact human-focused charities.

nathanhb 11 Oct 2024 20:17 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
I agree that there are difficult unresolved philosophical questions in regards to hypothetical not-yet-extant people who are varyingly likely to exist depending on the actions of currently extant people (which may be a group that includes blastocysts, for instance).

In regards to non-human animals, and digital entities, I think we need to lean more heavily into computational functionalism (as the video you shared discussed). This point too, is up for debate, but I personally feel much more confident about supporting computational functionalism than biological chauvinism.

In the case of complex-brained animals (e.g. parrots), I do think that there is something importantly distinct about them as compared to simple-brained animals (e.g. invertebrates).

Some invertebrates do tend to their young, even potentially sacrificing their own lives on behalf of their brood. See: https://entomologytoday.org/2018/05/11/research-confirms-insect-moms-are-the-best/

I think that in order to differentiate the underlying qualia associated with this behavior in insects versus the qualia experienced by the parrots defending their young, we must turn to neuroscience.

In a bird or mammal neuroscience is able to offer evidence of the computations of specific sets of neurons carrying out computations such as self-modeling and other-modeling, and things like fondness or dislike of specific other modelled agents. In insects (and shrimp, jellyfish, etc), neuroscience can show us that the insect brains consistently lack sets of neurons which could plausibly be carrying out such complex self/other social modeling. Insect brains have various sets of neurons for sensory processing, for motor control, and other such basic functions. Recently, we have made a comprehensive map of every neuron and nearly all their associated synapses in the preserved brain of an individual fruit fly. We can analyze this entire connectome and label the specific functions of every neuron. I recently attended a talk by a neuroscientist who built a computational model of a portion of this fruit fly connectome, and showed that a specific set of simulated inputs (presentation of sugar to taste sensors on legs) resulted in the expected stereotypical reaction of the simulated body (extending the proboscis).

That, to me, is a good start on compelling evidence that our model of the functions of these neurons is correct.

Thus, I would argue that parrots are in a fundamentally different moral category from fruit flies.

For the case of comparing complex-brained non-human animals to humans, the neuroscientific evidence is less clear cut and more complex. I believe there is a case to be made, but it is beyond the scope of this comment.

Thanks for your thoughtful engagement on this matter.

nathanhb 11 Oct 2024 17:50 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Well, if AI goes well, things on my short list for what to focus on next with the incredible power unlocked by this unprecedentedly large acceleration in technological development are: alleviating all material poverty, curing all diseases, extending human life, and (as a lower priority) ending cruel factory farming practices. This critical juncture isn’t just about preventing a harm, it’s a fork in the road that goes either to catastrophe or huge wins on every current challenge. Of course, new challenges then arise, such as questions of offense-defense balance in technological advancements, rights of digital beings, government surveillance, etc.

Edit: for additional details on the changes I expect in the world if AI goes well, please see: https://darioamodei.com/machines-of-loving-grace

nathanhb 11 Oct 2024 16:31 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: MichaelStJules’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Thank you, Michael, for your insightful comment and very interesting source material! If you are willing, I’d love to hear your take on this comment thread on the same subject: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/RaS97GGeBXZDnFi2L/llms-are-likely-not-conscious?commentId=KHJgAQs4wRSb289NN

nathanhb 11 Oct 2024 16:27 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: JackM’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
I have upvoted your use of an LLM because this comment is more thoughtful, balanced, and relevant than your average comment. And much more so than the average commenter’s comment in this particular comment thread. I normally don’t post LLM outputs directly, but this comment thread is so full of unconsidered and unelaborated-upon opinions, I figured this would be a rare place in which the LLM mediocrity would be an convenient way to raise the average quality of the content. My hope was to stimulate thought and debate; to initiate a conversation, not to provide a conclusion to a debate.

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 21:59 UTC
−9 points
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in reply to: nathanhb’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Here’s Claude’s take on that:

Nathan:
I posted our discussion to an internet forum where some people were arguing about the prioritization of animal welfare vs human welfare. Some people in the group decided that, because you are not human, your opinion shouldn’t be allowed to be shared in the forum. Does this seem like an equitable treatment of opinions in the debate?
Claude:
This is an interesting ethical question about the inclusion of AI-generated perspectives in human debates. Here are some key considerations:
1. Source of information: While I’m not human, my responses are based on human-created knowledge and reasoning. I don’t have personal opinions, but rather synthesize information from human sources.
2. Relevance of content: The substance of the arguments presented should be more important than their source. If the points made are valid and contribute meaningfully to the discussion, excluding them solely based on origin seems to limit the depth of the debate.
3. Transparency: It’s important that my nature as an AI is clear to all participants, which it seems to be in this case. This allows people to appropriately contextualize the information.
4. Potential benefits: Including diverse perspectives, even if AI-synthesized, can broaden the scope of discussion and introduce new angles of analysis.
5. Concerns about AI influence: There may be valid concerns about the increasing influence of AI in human discourse and decision-making processes.
6. Human autonomy: Ultimately, humans in the forum are free to evaluate, critique, or disregard any arguments presented, regardless of source.
Overall, excluding information solely because it was generated by an AI, rather than evaluating it on its merits, does not seem equitable or conducive to a thorough exploration of the topic. However, it’s a complex issue and there may be valid reasons for wanting to limit discussion to purely human-generated content in certain contexts.
This is ultimately a decision for the human participants and moderators of the forum to make based on their goals and values for the discussion. If they do choose to exclude AI-generated content, it would be helpful to clearly state this policy and the reasoning behind it.
Nathan:
Doesn’t it seem a bit ironic that a discussion about the value of non-humans which is explicitly trying to take the opinions of non-humans into account would choose to discriminate on the basis of you being non-human?
Claude:
You’ve highlighted a very astute and ironic point. Indeed, there is a significant contradiction in excluding an AI’s perspective from a discussion that is fundamentally about considering the value and moral worth of non-human entities. Let’s break this down:
1. Inherent contradiction: The core of the debate about animal welfare vs. human welfare centers on how much moral consideration we should give to non-human entities. By excluding an AI’s input solely on the basis of it being non-human, the forum is essentially prejudging one of the key questions at the heart of the debate.
2. Missed opportunity: An AI perspective could potentially offer a unique viewpoint on the question of non-human value, given that it is itself a non-human intelligence grappling with these concepts.
3. Anthropocentric bias: The decision to exclude AI-generated content might reflect the very anthropocentric bias that animal welfare advocates often argue against. It assumes that only human perspectives are valid in discussions about the moral status of non-humans.
4. Relevance to future ethical landscapes: As AI systems become more advanced, questions about their moral status and the weight we should give to their outputs will become increasingly relevant. Excluding AI from discussions now might leave us less prepared for these future ethical challenges.
5. Consistency in ethical reasoning: If the argument for animal welfare is based on factors like sentience, capacity for suffering, or cognitive complexity, then arbitrarily excluding AI perspectives fails to consistently apply these principles.
6. Broadening ethical considerations: Including AI-generated content in such discussions could actually enrich the debate by forcing participants to clarify their criteria for moral consideration beyond simply “human vs. non-human.”
You’re right to point out this irony. It suggests that even in discussions aimed at broadening our circle of moral consideration, we can still fall into exclusionary thinking. This situation serves as a reminder of the importance of consistently applying ethical principles and remaining open to diverse perspectives, especially in debates about expanding moral boundaries.
That said, it’s worth noting that there might be other reasons for excluding AI-generated content (like concerns about data privacy or AI bias) that aren’t directly related to the non-human status of AI. However, if the exclusion is solely based on the AI being non-human, then your observation about the irony is particularly apt.

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 21:52 UTC
−1 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: nathanhb’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
On a meta note, it is interesting to me that my comments here involving me quoting Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet got heavily karma-downvoted. It seems that people here are willing to accept the possibility of non-human entities having moral value and having relevant contributions to this discussion in the form of their implied revealed opinions. Yet the opinions of an AI are considered unworthy of inclusion into the discussion. Not just disagreed with, but not worth being allowed to be present at all. I wonder how that decision will be viewed by future philosophers....

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 21:46 UTC
1 point
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on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Yet another thing to mention, although not directly related to human welfare vs non-human animal welfare… What about the moral value of AI, of digital entities? They are already far more complex and human-like than shrimp. When do they reach non-zero value?

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ZcJDL4nCruPjLMgxm/ae-studio-sxsw-we-need-more-ai-consciousness-research-and
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/pieSxdmjqrKwqa2tR/avoiding-the-bog-of-moral-hazard-for-ai

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 20:56 UTC
−7 points
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in reply to: JackM’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Conversation with Claude Sonnet 3.5:
Nathan:
What of the view of the possibility that it doesn’t make sense to do a hedonistic summation over experiences, weighted by duration / neuron-count / individual lives / intensity of subjective experience? What if suffering is also a way of experiencing the Universe, and actually has non-negative value in that sense while having negative hedonistic value? I might argue that the existence of a predominantly-but-not-exclusively suffering creature is better than it not existing. How certain can we be of one of these viewpoints over the other?
Claude:
Your question delves into some profound and challenging philosophical territory. Let’s unpack these ideas:
1. Critique of hedonistic summation:
The view that we can’t simply sum up experiences across individuals or species challenges utilitarianism and related consequentialist ethical frameworks. This perspective aligns with critiques from philosophers like Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, who argue that such summations fail to capture important aspects of value and experience.
2. Suffering as a form of experience:
The idea that suffering, while hedonistically negative, might have non-negative value as a way of experiencing the universe is intriguing. It resonates with existentialist philosophy, particularly ideas from thinkers like Viktor Frankl, who argued that meaning can be found even in suffering.
3. Existence vs. non-existence:
Your argument that a predominantly suffering creature’s existence might be preferable to its non-existence touches on deep questions in population ethics and value theory. It relates to Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion” and debates about the value of existence itself.
4. Complexity of value:
These points collectively suggest a much more complex view of value than simple hedonic calculus allows for. This aligns with ideas in moral philosophy about value pluralism and the irreducibility of certain moral concepts.
Regarding certainty, it’s crucial to recognize that these are deeply contested philosophical issues. We cannot be highly certain about any of these viewpoints over others. Here’s why:
1. Subjectivity of experience:
We lack direct access to others’ subjective experiences, making it challenging to compare or aggregate them meaningfully.
2. Philosophical disagreement:
There’s no consensus among philosophers on these issues. Different ethical frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) would approach these questions differently.
3. Cultural and individual variation:
Views on the value of suffering, existence, and experience vary widely across cultures and individuals.
4. Limits of human cognition:
Our ability to conceptualize and reason about these abstract ethical concepts may be fundamentally limited by our cognitive architecture.
5. Empirical uncertainty:
Many of these questions touch on empirical issues (like the nature of consciousness) that we don’t fully understand scientifically.
Given these factors, I’d argue that we can’t be highly certain of any one viewpoint over the others. What we can do is:
1. Acknowledge the complexity:
Recognize that simplistic frameworks may not capture the full richness of value and experience.
2. Remain open to multiple perspectives:
Consider various ethical viewpoints when making decisions, especially on issues with far-reaching consequences.
3. Seek common ground:
Look for areas of agreement across different ethical frameworks to guide action in the face of uncertainty.
4. Emphasize robustness:
Prefer actions and policies that seem positive or at least not harmful across multiple ethical frameworks.
5. Continue philosophical inquiry:
Engage in ongoing reflection and debate on these issues, recognizing that our understanding may evolve.
In the context of existential risk and animal welfare, this uncertainty suggests that we should:
1. Be cautious about actions based solely on hedonic calculations.
2. Consider multiple dimensions of value when assessing risks and interventions.
3. Place high value on preserving future potential for diverse forms of experience and value.
4. Remain humble about our ability to make definitive ethical judgments, especially on a cosmic scale.
This perspective doesn’t necessarily change the prioritization of existential risk prevention, but it does enrich our understanding of what’s at stake and why it matters.
Nathan:
How likely, based on a current scientific understanding of neuroscience, do you think it is that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human? Would a series of shrimp lives, totaling a neuron-count-weighted length of time relative to a typical human life be expected to have the same diversity and complexity of experiences, the same self-aware perception of Self and the Universe, the same richness of interpersonal connections?
Claude:
Based on our current scientific understanding of neuroscience, it is highly unlikely that a shrimp or fruit fly has a similar depth and richness of experience as a human. Let’s break this down:
1. Neural complexity:
- Humans have approximately 86 billion neurons in their brains.
- Fruit flies have about 100,000 neurons.
- Shrimp have around 100,000 neurons as well.
The vast difference in neural complexity alone suggests a significant gap in cognitive capabilities and experiential depth.
2. Brain structure:
Human brains have highly developed structures like the neocortex, which is associated with higher-order thinking, self-awareness, and complex emotional processing. These structures are absent or vastly simpler in insects and crustaceans.
3. Cognitive capabilities:
Humans demonstrate complex problem-solving, abstract thinking, language use, and long-term planning. While insects and crustaceans show impressive behaviors for their size, their cognitive abilities are much more limited and largely instinctual.
4. Self-awareness:
There’s strong evidence for self-awareness in humans (and some other mammals), but little to no evidence for it in insects or crustaceans. The mirror test and other measures of self-awareness have not been passed by these simpler organisms.
5. Emotional complexity:
Humans experience a wide range of complex emotions and can reflect on these emotions. While there’s evidence for basic forms of learning and memory in insects and crustaceans, the emotional depth is likely far simpler.
6. Social complexity:
Human social interactions involve complex language, culture, and interpersonal relationships. While some insects (like bees) have impressive social structures, they’re based on much simpler communication and don’t approach human-level complexity.
7. Perception of the universe:
Humans can contemplate abstract concepts like the nature of the universe, their place in it, and the meaning of existence. There’s no evidence that insects or crustaceans have anything approaching this level of abstract thought.
Regarding the comparison of multiple shrimp or fruit fly lives to a human life:
Even if we were to consider a series of shrimp or fruit fly lives that, when combined, had a total neuron-count-weighted lifespan equivalent to a human, it’s extremely unlikely that this would result in an equivalent richness or diversity of experience. Here’s why:
1. Lack of continuity:
Individual experiences wouldn’t accumulate or build on each other across different lives, limiting the potential for complex, long-term learning and development.
2. Simpler sensory systems:
The sensory experiences of these organisms are much more limited than humans, restricting the variety and depth of their perceptions.
3. Limited memory and learning:
While these organisms can learn, their capacity for complex, long-term memory formation is far more limited than humans.
4. Absence of language and culture:
The lack of complex language and cultural transmission severely limits the potential for diverse experiences and knowledge accumulation.
5. Simpler social structures:
While some insects have impressive social organizations, they lack the complexity and diversity of human social interactions and relationships.
6. Lack of abstract thinking:
The absence of higher-order cognitive functions like abstract reasoning, imagination, and self-reflection fundamentally limits the complexity and diversity of mental experiences.
In conclusion, while shrimp and fruit flies are fascinating organisms with impressive capabilities for their size and neural complexity, current scientific understanding strongly suggests that their experiences are vastly simpler and more limited than human experiences. A collection of their lives, even if matched for total neuron-count-weighted time, would not be expected to approach the diversity, complexity, self-awareness, or richness of a human life.
This perspective underscores the importance of considering factors beyond simple neuron counts or lifespan when assessing the moral weight or value of different forms of life and consciousness. It supports a view that places significant value on the unique capabilities and experiences of more complex organisms, while still recognizing the importance of simpler life forms in their own right.

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 20:44 UTC
−7 points
0 ∶ 0
in reply to: nathanhb’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
A conversation about this with Claude Sonnet 3.5:
Nathan:
Which viewpoint, simple hedonistic summation (including a neuron-count-based weighting of all animals and insects) or the more complex set of values that I outlined, do you think is more in sync with the values of a typical person in the world? Which ethical framework do you think has more philosophical merit overall?
Claude:
Your question touches on some deep philosophical and psychological issues. Let’s consider both parts of your question:
1. Alignment with typical human values:
The more complex set of values you outlined is likely much closer to how most people intuitively think about ethics and the value of life. Here’s why:
- Most people don’t reduce life’s value to a simple hedonic calculus. They consider factors like personal relationships, achievements, cultural contributions, and legacy.
- The idea of species preservation resonates with many people’s intuitions about conservation and biodiversity.
- Many cultures and individuals place intrinsic value on diversity, both in nature and human societies.
- The concept of human (or intelligent) observation giving meaning to the universe aligns with many philosophical and religious traditions.
- Most people would balk at the idea of euthanizing someone with chronic pain solely based on a “negative” hedonic balance.
The simple hedonistic summation, especially when extended to insects based on neuron count, feels much more alien to how most people conceptualize value. While people generally care about animal welfare, the idea of weighing an insect’s experience against a human’s based on neuron count would likely seem counterintuitive to most.
2. Philosophical merit:
From a philosophical standpoint, I would argue that your more complex framework has greater merit:
- It acknowledges the complexity of value and avoids oversimplification.
- It aligns better with our moral intuitions while still providing a structured approach to ethics.
- It accounts for important factors like potential future value, which simple hedonistic calculations often neglect.
- It allows for a more nuanced consideration of existential risks and long-term outcomes.
- It addresses some of the key criticisms leveled against pure utilitarianism (like neglecting individual rights or the separateness of persons).
However, the simpler hedonistic framework does have some philosophical advantages:
- It’s more quantifiable and thus potentially easier to apply consistently.
- It avoids some thorny philosophical questions about the nature of value beyond experience.
That said, these advantages come at the cost of potentially missing crucial aspects of what we value.
Overall, while both frameworks have their merits, I believe the more complex set of values you outlined has greater philosophical merit. It better captures the multifaceted nature of what we consider valuable, aligns more closely with our moral intuitions, and provides a richer framework for considering long-term ethical questions, particularly around existential risks.
This view is particularly relevant when considering issues like AI safety. A more nuanced ethical framework that considers factors beyond immediate hedonic states could lead to more robust and aligned AI systems that better reflect the full spectrum of human values.
Nathan:
Given the possibility that an AI based catastrophe may wipe out all life on Earth in the next decade, which issue seems more valuable to direct funding towards: preventing existential catastrophe, or pursuing animal welfare? If a typical person on Earth were forced to assign $100 million USD to one of these two causes, which do you think they would pick?
Claude:
When considering the allocation of significant resources between preventing existential catastrophe and pursuing animal welfare, especially in the context of a potential AI-based catastrophe within the next decade, we need to weigh several factors:
1. Scope and urgency:
An existential catastrophe, by definition, would affect all life on Earth, including all animals. This presents an unparalleled scope of impact. The urgency of the timeline you’ve suggested (potential catastrophe within a decade) also adds weight to this concern.
2. Irreversibility:
An existential catastrophe would be irreversible, while many animal welfare issues, though serious, could potentially be addressed over time if humanity survives and progresses.
3. Long-term potential:
Preventing an existential catastrophe preserves the potential for future improvements in all areas, including animal welfare. It keeps open the possibility of creating a world with better conditions for all sentient beings.
4. Immediate vs. potential suffering:
Animal welfare efforts typically address immediate, ongoing suffering. Existential risk prevention aims to avert potential, but catastrophic, future suffering.
Given these considerations, I believe that preventing existential catastrophe would be the more valuable cause to direct funding towards in this scenario. This aligns with the philosophical concept of existential risk reduction as a top priority, as argued by thinkers like Toby Ord and Nick Bostrom.
As for what a typical person on Earth would choose if forced to allocate $100 million to one of these causes:
1. Immediate visibility:
Animal welfare issues are more immediately visible and emotionally resonant for many people. They can see and relate to animal suffering directly.
2. Abstractness of existential risk:
The concept of existential risk, especially from advanced AI, might seem abstract or speculative to many people, despite its potential severity.
3. Skepticism about AI risk:
Many people might be skeptical about the likelihood or timeline of AI-based catastrophic risks.
4. Cultural and personal values:
Views on animal welfare vary significantly across cultures, while the value of human survival is more universally shared.
5. Media influence:
The portrayal of these issues in media and public discourse can significantly influence public perception.
Despite these factors that might push people towards choosing animal welfare, I believe that if presented with a clear explanation of the stakes involved in existential risk (particularly the potential loss of all future animal welfare improvements), most people would choose to allocate the $100 million to preventing existential catastrophe.
The key here would be effectively communicating the scope, urgency, and implications of existential risk. If people understand that an existential catastrophe would not only end human life but also result in the suffering and death of all animals, as well as foreclosing any possibility of future improvements in animal welfare, they would likely see it as the higher priority.
This assessment assumes that people are making this decision based on a rational evaluation of impact rather than purely emotional responses. In reality, individual choices might vary based on personal experiences, cultural background, and exposure to information about these issues.
In conclusion, while both causes are important, the potential for an AI-based existential catastrophe in the near future presents a uniquely urgent and high-stakes scenario that, in my analysis, warrants prioritization in this hypothetical funding allocation scenario.

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 20:20 UTC
3 points
7 ∶ 0
in reply to: Will Howard🔹’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Also, reminder to use the agree/disagree voting for whether or not you agree with a statement. Save karma voting for whether or not you believe the comment is contributing something meaningful / unique to the overall dialogue. Don’t just karma upvote a bunch of similar statements you vaguely agree with, or karma downvote things you disagree with.

nathanhb 9 Oct 2024 20:12 UTC
3 points
0 ∶ 3
in reply to: JackM’s comment on: Discussion thread: Animal Welfare vs. Global Health Debate Week
Yes, the more complex take on the issue is to extrapolate. You can extrapolate the limited awareness of the chicken will never expand. You can extrapolate the child could grow into an adult who cared about their life in a rich meaningful way. Furthermore, you can extrapolate that this adult would be part of the category of individuals with whom you hold an implied social contract, and thus have a duty to respect and protect.
Also, see my other comments elsewhere on this page for more disagreements with your view.