I believe that rights have value insofar as they promote positive conscious states and prevent negative conscious states. Their value or disvalue would be a function of whether they make lives better. Assigning weight to them beyond that is simply creating a worse world.
I do, however, find the assignment of intrinsic value,
imaginable, though mistaken. I do not take umbrage so much at you disagreeing with me so much as you finding my view unimaginable.
Thatâs a very fair pointâunimaginable is the wrong word. I guess Iâll say I find it curious.
To use a stronger example, suppose a dictator spends all day violating the personal rights of her subjects and by doing so increases overall well-being. I find it curious to believe sheâs acting morally. You donât need to believe in the intrinsic badness of rights violations to hold this point of view. You just have to believe that objective moral truth cannot be fully captured using a single, tidy theory. Moral/âethical life is complex, and I think that even if you are committed to one paradigm, you still ought to occasionally draw from other theories/âthinkers to inform your moral/âethical decision making.
This agrees with what you said in your first comment: âWe need many other areas of study and theory to guide in specific areas.â As long as this multifaceted approach is at least a small part of your overall theory, I can definitely imagine holding it, even if I donât agree.
I think the complexity arises in evaluating the value and disvalue of different subjective states as well as determining what courses of action, considering all aspects involved, have the highest expected value.
You discuss the example of the despot regularly violating rights of subjects, yet increasing utility. Such a scenario seems inherently implausible, because if rights are prudently delineated, general respect for them, in the long run, will tend to cultivate a happier, more stable world (I.e, higher expected utility). And perhaps incursions upon these rights would be warranted in some situations. For instance, perhaps the public interest may allow someoneâs property rights to be violated if there is a compelling public interest (eminent domain). This is why we have exceptions to rights (I. E.- free speech and instigating imminent violence). If the rights you are advancing tend to lower the welfare of conscious beings, I would think such formulation of rights is immoral.
You are correct that moral life is complex, but I think the complexity comes down to how we can navigate ourselves and our societies to optimize conscious experience. If you are incorporating factors into your decisions that donât ultimately boil down to improving conscious experience, in my view, you are not acting fully morally.
I believe that rights have value insofar as they promote positive conscious states and prevent negative conscious states. Their value or disvalue would be a function of whether they make lives better. Assigning weight to them beyond that is simply creating a worse world.
I do, however, find the assignment of intrinsic value, imaginable, though mistaken. I do not take umbrage so much at you disagreeing with me so much as you finding my view unimaginable.
Thatâs a very fair pointâunimaginable is the wrong word. I guess Iâll say I find it curious.
To use a stronger example, suppose a dictator spends all day violating the personal rights of her subjects and by doing so increases overall well-being. I find it curious to believe sheâs acting morally. You donât need to believe in the intrinsic badness of rights violations to hold this point of view. You just have to believe that objective moral truth cannot be fully captured using a single, tidy theory. Moral/âethical life is complex, and I think that even if you are committed to one paradigm, you still ought to occasionally draw from other theories/âthinkers to inform your moral/âethical decision making.
This agrees with what you said in your first comment: âWe need many other areas of study and theory to guide in specific areas.â As long as this multifaceted approach is at least a small part of your overall theory, I can definitely imagine holding it, even if I donât agree.
I think the complexity arises in evaluating the value and disvalue of different subjective states as well as determining what courses of action, considering all aspects involved, have the highest expected value.
You discuss the example of the despot regularly violating rights of subjects, yet increasing utility. Such a scenario seems inherently implausible, because if rights are prudently delineated, general respect for them, in the long run, will tend to cultivate a happier, more stable world (I.e, higher expected utility). And perhaps incursions upon these rights would be warranted in some situations. For instance, perhaps the public interest may allow someoneâs property rights to be violated if there is a compelling public interest (eminent domain). This is why we have exceptions to rights (I. E.- free speech and instigating imminent violence). If the rights you are advancing tend to lower the welfare of conscious beings, I would think such formulation of rights is immoral.
You are correct that moral life is complex, but I think the complexity comes down to how we can navigate ourselves and our societies to optimize conscious experience. If you are incorporating factors into your decisions that donât ultimately boil down to improving conscious experience, in my view, you are not acting fully morally.