Thanks for the insight. Fortunately, you don’t have to agree with this disclaimer in my post for the rest of the argument to remain sound.
That being said, I find it perfectly reasonable for one’s actions to be primarily (or even almost entirely) guided by consequentialist reasoning. However, I cannot understand never considering reasons stemming from deontology or virtue ethics. For example, it’s impossible for me to imagine condemning a gross rights violation purely based on its consequences without even considering that perhaps violating personal rights has some intrinsic dis-value.
I believe that rights have value insofar as they promote positive conscious states and prevent negative conscious states. Their value or disvalue would be a function of whether they make lives better. Assigning weight to them beyond that is simply creating a worse world.
I do, however, find the assignment of intrinsic value,
imaginable, though mistaken. I do not take umbrage so much at you disagreeing with me so much as you finding my view unimaginable.
That’s a very fair point—unimaginable is the wrong word. I guess I’ll say I find it curious.
To use a stronger example, suppose a dictator spends all day violating the personal rights of her subjects and by doing so increases overall well-being. I find it curious to believe she’s acting morally. You don’t need to believe in the intrinsic badness of rights violations to hold this point of view. You just have to believe that objective moral truth cannot be fully captured using a single, tidy theory. Moral/ethical life is complex, and I think that even if you are committed to one paradigm, you still ought to occasionally draw from other theories/thinkers to inform your moral/ethical decision making.
This agrees with what you said in your first comment: “We need many other areas of study and theory to guide in specific areas.” As long as this multifaceted approach is at least a small part of your overall theory, I can definitely imagine holding it, even if I don’t agree.
I think the complexity arises in evaluating the value and disvalue of different subjective states as well as determining what courses of action, considering all aspects involved, have the highest expected value.
You discuss the example of the despot regularly violating rights of subjects, yet increasing utility. Such a scenario seems inherently implausible, because if rights are prudently delineated, general respect for them, in the long run, will tend to cultivate a happier, more stable world (I.e, higher expected utility). And perhaps incursions upon these rights would be warranted in some situations. For instance, perhaps the public interest may allow someone’s property rights to be violated if there is a compelling public interest (eminent domain). This is why we have exceptions to rights (I. E.- free speech and instigating imminent violence). If the rights you are advancing tend to lower the welfare of conscious beings, I would think such formulation of rights is immoral.
You are correct that moral life is complex, but I think the complexity comes down to how we can navigate ourselves and our societies to optimize conscious experience. If you are incorporating factors into your decisions that don’t ultimately boil down to improving conscious experience, in my view, you are not acting fully morally.
Thanks for the insight. Fortunately, you don’t have to agree with this disclaimer in my post for the rest of the argument to remain sound.
That being said, I find it perfectly reasonable for one’s actions to be primarily (or even almost entirely) guided by consequentialist reasoning. However, I cannot understand never considering reasons stemming from deontology or virtue ethics. For example, it’s impossible for me to imagine condemning a gross rights violation purely based on its consequences without even considering that perhaps violating personal rights has some intrinsic dis-value.
I believe that rights have value insofar as they promote positive conscious states and prevent negative conscious states. Their value or disvalue would be a function of whether they make lives better. Assigning weight to them beyond that is simply creating a worse world.
I do, however, find the assignment of intrinsic value, imaginable, though mistaken. I do not take umbrage so much at you disagreeing with me so much as you finding my view unimaginable.
That’s a very fair point—unimaginable is the wrong word. I guess I’ll say I find it curious.
To use a stronger example, suppose a dictator spends all day violating the personal rights of her subjects and by doing so increases overall well-being. I find it curious to believe she’s acting morally. You don’t need to believe in the intrinsic badness of rights violations to hold this point of view. You just have to believe that objective moral truth cannot be fully captured using a single, tidy theory. Moral/ethical life is complex, and I think that even if you are committed to one paradigm, you still ought to occasionally draw from other theories/thinkers to inform your moral/ethical decision making.
This agrees with what you said in your first comment: “We need many other areas of study and theory to guide in specific areas.” As long as this multifaceted approach is at least a small part of your overall theory, I can definitely imagine holding it, even if I don’t agree.
I think the complexity arises in evaluating the value and disvalue of different subjective states as well as determining what courses of action, considering all aspects involved, have the highest expected value.
You discuss the example of the despot regularly violating rights of subjects, yet increasing utility. Such a scenario seems inherently implausible, because if rights are prudently delineated, general respect for them, in the long run, will tend to cultivate a happier, more stable world (I.e, higher expected utility). And perhaps incursions upon these rights would be warranted in some situations. For instance, perhaps the public interest may allow someone’s property rights to be violated if there is a compelling public interest (eminent domain). This is why we have exceptions to rights (I. E.- free speech and instigating imminent violence). If the rights you are advancing tend to lower the welfare of conscious beings, I would think such formulation of rights is immoral.
You are correct that moral life is complex, but I think the complexity comes down to how we can navigate ourselves and our societies to optimize conscious experience. If you are incorporating factors into your decisions that don’t ultimately boil down to improving conscious experience, in my view, you are not acting fully morally.