I think two things are being conflated here into a 3rd position no one holds
-Some people donât like the big R community very much.
-Some people donât think improving the worldâs small-r rationality/âepistemics should be a leading EA cause area.
Are getting conflated into:
-People donât think itâs important to try hard at being small-r rational.
I agree that some people might be running together the first two claims, and that is bad, since they are independent, and it could easily be high impact to work on improving collective epistemics in the outside world even if the big R rationalist community was bad in various ways. But holding the first two claims (which I think I do moderately) doesnât imply the third. I think the rationalists are often not that rational in practice, and are too open to racism and sexim. And I also (weakly) think that we donât currently know enough about âimproving epistemicsâ for it to be a tractable cause area. But obviously I still want us to make decisions rationally, in the small-r sense internally. Who wouldnât! Being against small-r rationality is like being against kindness or virtue; no one thinks of themselves as taking that stand.
I. - Some people donât like the big R community very much.
AND
2a. - Some people donât think improving the EA community small-r rationality/âepistemics should be one of top ~3-5 EA priorities. OR 2b. - Some people do agree this is important, but donât clearly see the extent to which the EA community imported healthy epistemic vigilance and norms from Rationalist or Rationality-adjacent circles
=>
- As a consequence, they are at risk of distancing from small r rationality as a collateral damage /â by neglect
Also I think many people in the EA community donât think itâs important to try hard at being small-r rational at the level of aliefs. No matter what is the actual situation revealed by actual decisions, I would expect the EA community to at least pay lip service to epistemics and reason, so I donât think stated preferences are strong evidence.
âBeing against small-r rationality is like being against kindness or virtue; no one thinks of themselves as taking that stand.â Yes I do agree almost no one thinks about themselves that way. I think it is maybe somewhat similar to âBeing against effective charityââI would be surprised if people though about themselves that way.
Eh, I agree with you that LW-style rationalists are far from sinless in this regard, but itâs hard to not notice that many people, including on EAF, seem to have a strong revealed preference for irrationality.
Iâm not sure why; one guess I have is that people (subconsciously) correctly identify rational irrationality as the best strategy to come across as loyal to oneâs tribe. I find this sad, but I donât have a real answer here; the incentives are strong and point in the wrong direction.
In my ideal culture, everybody will be polite about it, but sloppy thinking will still be heavily censured, rather than rewarded.
(slightly feverish, apologies if Iâm not making as much sense, ironically).
On LW, I thought comments here were very poor, with a few half-exceptions. It wasnât even a controversial topic!
On EAF, I pragmatically am not that interested in either starting new fights, or relitigating past ones. I will say that making my comment here solely about kindness, rather than kindness and epistemics, was a tactical decision.
I think two things are being conflated here into a 3rd position no one holds
-Some people donât like the big R community very much.
-Some people donât think improving the worldâs small-r rationality/âepistemics should be a leading EA cause area.
Are getting conflated into:
-People donât think itâs important to try hard at being small-r rational.
I agree that some people might be running together the first two claims, and that is bad, since they are independent, and it could easily be high impact to work on improving collective epistemics in the outside world even if the big R rationalist community was bad in various ways. But holding the first two claims (which I think I do moderately) doesnât imply the third. I think the rationalists are often not that rational in practice, and are too open to racism and sexim. And I also (weakly) think that we donât currently know enough about âimproving epistemicsâ for it to be a tractable cause area. But obviously I still want us to make decisions rationally, in the small-r sense internally. Who wouldnât! Being against small-r rationality is like being against kindness or virtue; no one thinks of themselves as taking that stand.
I donât think so. I think in practice
I. - Some people donât like the big R community very much.
AND
2a. - Some people donât think improving the EA community small-r rationality/âepistemics should be one of top ~3-5 EA priorities.
OR
2b. - Some people do agree this is important, but donât clearly see the extent to which the EA community imported healthy epistemic vigilance and norms from Rationalist or Rationality-adjacent circles
=>
- As a consequence, they are at risk of distancing from small r rationality as a collateral damage /â by neglect
Also I think many people in the EA community donât think itâs important to try hard at being small-r rational at the level of aliefs. No matter what is the actual situation revealed by actual decisions, I would expect the EA community to at least pay lip service to epistemics and reason, so I donât think stated preferences are strong evidence.
âBeing against small-r rationality is like being against kindness or virtue; no one thinks of themselves as taking that stand.â
Yes I do agree almost no one thinks about themselves that way. I think it is maybe somewhat similar to âBeing against effective charityââI would be surprised if people though about themselves that way.
Eh, I agree with you that LW-style rationalists are far from sinless in this regard, but itâs hard to not notice that many people, including on EAF, seem to have a strong revealed preference for irrationality.
Iâm not sure why; one guess I have is that people (subconsciously) correctly identify rational irrationality as the best strategy to come across as loyal to oneâs tribe. I find this sad, but I donât have a real answer here; the incentives are strong and point in the wrong direction.
In my ideal culture, everybody will be polite about it, but sloppy thinking will still be heavily censured, rather than rewarded.
(slightly feverish, apologies if Iâm not making as much sense, ironically).
What instances do you have in mind by âstrong revealed preference for irrationalityâ?
On LW, I thought comments here were very poor, with a few half-exceptions. It wasnât even a controversial topic!
On EAF, I pragmatically am not that interested in either starting new fights, or relitigating past ones. I will say that making my comment here solely about kindness, rather than kindness and epistemics, was a tactical decision.