“Maximising expected choiceworthiness involves diversification because the cost-effectiveness of each intervention decreases with spending. Going “all in” on the option with the highest marginal cost-effectiveness would only make sense for a very limited budget”
I’d argue almost all decision makers in the EA space operate in the linear regime where cost effectiveness does not meaningfully decrease.
Hi Simon. In that case, how do you explain that impact-focussed grantmakers support many interventions, even within a single area (see, for example, the Animal Welfare Fund)? If the cost-effectiveness of each did not meaningfully decrease with spending, one would expect them to focus on much fewer grants?
There’s a descriptive and normative component to your observation. I’d argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes. I’d say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators. Does said theory predict well what they do? No. Should it? I’m not sure, this is not a theory designed to describe what actors that call themselves altruistic do. Does it prescribe what they should do? Possibly, but I’d argue diversification is both good and you need another mechanism than diminishing returns to justify it.
(Tbf the animal space is probably where you are most likely to hit diminishing returns among EA cause areas right now. (If you’re a ~ billionaire))
I’d argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes.
I agree.
I’d say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators.
I agree in the sense the money influenced by grantmakers and evaluators ultimately comes from donors. However, are you suggesting grantmakers and evaluators diversify their grants and recommendations in significant part to appeal to donors? I agree to some extent, and it makes sense for grantmakers and evaluators to do it up to a point such that they can influence more funds. Them having a very narrow portfolio would tend to attract less funds.
I’d argue almost all decision makers in the EA space operate in the linear regime where cost effectiveness does not meaningfully decrease.
Hi Simon. In that case, how do you explain that impact-focussed grantmakers support many interventions, even within a single area (see, for example, the Animal Welfare Fund)? If the cost-effectiveness of each did not meaningfully decrease with spending, one would expect them to focus on much fewer grants?
There’s a descriptive and normative component to your observation.
I’d argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes. I’d say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators.
Does said theory predict well what they do? No. Should it? I’m not sure, this is not a theory designed to describe what actors that call themselves altruistic do.
Does it prescribe what they should do? Possibly, but I’d argue diversification is both good and you need another mechanism than diminishing returns to justify it.
(Tbf the animal space is probably where you are most likely to hit diminishing returns among EA cause areas right now. (If you’re a ~ billionaire))
I agree.
I agree in the sense the money influenced by grantmakers and evaluators ultimately comes from donors. However, are you suggesting grantmakers and evaluators diversify their grants and recommendations in significant part to appeal to donors? I agree to some extent, and it makes sense for grantmakers and evaluators to do it up to a point such that they can influence more funds. Them having a very narrow portfolio would tend to attract less funds.