Suppose weāre torn between multiple moral theories, accounts of which entities are truly sentient, or other broad āworldviewsā. How we respond to this uncertainty may be very different depending on whether we opt for maximizing expected choiceworthiness or worldview diversification. The former involves centralized agency, weighing the possible stakes of each option in proportion to the credibility of the theory that assigns it such stakes, and then potentially going āall inā on whatever option yields the best prospect in expectation. Perhaps a good approach for ideal agents, but (I suggest) too risky for the rest of us. The latter alternative decentralizes and devolves power or resources to an ensemble of subagents representing different philosophical worldviews in rough proportion to their credibility.[3]
Maximising expected choiceworthiness involves diversification because the cost-effectiveness of each intervention decreases with spending. Going āall inā on the option with the highest marginal cost-effectiveness would only make sense for a very limited budget (until the highest marginal cost-effectiveness decreases to the 2nd highest marginal cost-effectiveness). The optimal number of options supported increases as the spending increases. I wonder if maximising expected choiceworthiness with adequate modelling of how marginal cost-effectiveness decreases with spending would lead to a more principled diversification than worldview diversification as practiced today.
It is also worth keeping in mind that wide uncertainty across interventions and worldviews should push one towards supporting interventions decreasing that uncertainty. I think there is often lots of discussion about how to distribute resources across interventions which involve very few aiming to decrease the uncertainty about the optimal allocation. I would like to see much more research on animal sentience, and, more broadly, on comparing welfare across species.
I donāt necessarily want to discourage anyone who is more willing to personally go all-in on a neglected high-impact cause area (shrimp welfare, for example). Especially if you imagine what your ideal moral portfolio would look like at the level of all of society, you might well find that going āall inā on the most neglected of your ideal cause areas is ā on present margins ā actually the best way for you to diversify societyās moral portfolio, and make up for othersāmistaken neglect of important causes.
The point above may also apply to large funders? Coefficient Giving (CG) directed āover $1 billionā in 2025, and 1.18 billion $ is 0.001 % of the gross world product (GWP) in 2025 of 118 T$.
āMaximising expected choiceworthiness involves diversification because the cost-effectiveness of each intervention decreases with spending. Going āall inā on the option with the highest marginal cost-effectiveness would only make sense for a very limited budgetā
Iād argue almost all decision makers in the EA space operate in the linear regime where cost effectiveness does not meaningfully decrease.
Hi Simon. In that case, how do you explain that impact-focussed grantmakers support many interventions, even within a single area (see, for example, the Animal Welfare Fund)? If the cost-effectiveness of each did not meaningfully decrease with spending, one would expect them to focus on much fewer grants?
Thereās a descriptive and normative component to your observation. Iād argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes. Iād say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators. Does said theory predict well what they do? No. Should it? Iām not sure, this is not a theory designed to describe what actors that call themselves altruistic do. Does it prescribe what they should do? Possibly, but Iād argue diversification is both good and you need another mechanism than diminishing returns to justify it.
(Tbf the animal space is probably where you are most likely to hit diminishing returns among EA cause areas right now. (If youāre a ~ billionaire))
Iād argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes.
I agree.
Iād say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators.
I agree in the sense the money influenced by grantmakers and evaluators ultimately comes from donors. However, are you suggesting grantmakers and evaluators diversify their grants and recommendations in significant part to appeal to donors? I agree to some extent, and it makes sense for grantmakers and evaluators to do it up to a point such that they can influence more funds. Them having a very narrow portfolio would tend to attract less funds.
Hi Richard. Great post.
Maximising expected choiceworthiness involves diversification because the cost-effectiveness of each intervention decreases with spending. Going āall inā on the option with the highest marginal cost-effectiveness would only make sense for a very limited budget (until the highest marginal cost-effectiveness decreases to the 2nd highest marginal cost-effectiveness). The optimal number of options supported increases as the spending increases. I wonder if maximising expected choiceworthiness with adequate modelling of how marginal cost-effectiveness decreases with spending would lead to a more principled diversification than worldview diversification as practiced today.
It is also worth keeping in mind that wide uncertainty across interventions and worldviews should push one towards supporting interventions decreasing that uncertainty. I think there is often lots of discussion about how to distribute resources across interventions which involve very few aiming to decrease the uncertainty about the optimal allocation. I would like to see much more research on animal sentience, and, more broadly, on comparing welfare across species.
The point above may also apply to large funders? Coefficient Giving (CG) directed āover $1 billionā in 2025, and 1.18 billion $ is 0.001 % of the gross world product (GWP) in 2025 of 118 T$.
Iād argue almost all decision makers in the EA space operate in the linear regime where cost effectiveness does not meaningfully decrease.
Hi Simon. In that case, how do you explain that impact-focussed grantmakers support many interventions, even within a single area (see, for example, the Animal Welfare Fund)? If the cost-effectiveness of each did not meaningfully decrease with spending, one would expect them to focus on much fewer grants?
Thereās a descriptive and normative component to your observation.
Iād argue that many donors are surprisingly diversified given direct application of philosophical theory, yes. Iād say the ultimate decision makers are donors, not eg evaluators.
Does said theory predict well what they do? No. Should it? Iām not sure, this is not a theory designed to describe what actors that call themselves altruistic do.
Does it prescribe what they should do? Possibly, but Iād argue diversification is both good and you need another mechanism than diminishing returns to justify it.
(Tbf the animal space is probably where you are most likely to hit diminishing returns among EA cause areas right now. (If youāre a ~ billionaire))
I agree.
I agree in the sense the money influenced by grantmakers and evaluators ultimately comes from donors. However, are you suggesting grantmakers and evaluators diversify their grants and recommendations in significant part to appeal to donors? I agree to some extent, and it makes sense for grantmakers and evaluators to do it up to a point such that they can influence more funds. Them having a very narrow portfolio would tend to attract less funds.