Thanks for pointing that out! I should have read more carefully. I might still be reading you wrong here (if so, sorry) but it feels like this doesn’t directly engage with the point.
The paragraph argues that since foundations are currently sanctioned by governments, Reich and other critics ought to respect that decision because it’s democratic. I think this is a strawman of their argument; you’re assuming an abstract notion of ‘democraticness’ that infuses everything the government does, whereas the critics don’t care whether it’s a democratic government that’s making a bad decision―it’s still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
(And note that you can simultaneously believe that government makes some bad legislative decisions and that we would be better off by substituting private spending with gov spending).
you’re assuming an abstract notion of ‘democraticness’ that infuses everything the government does
Isn’t this what commitment to democracy entails if you think that democratic governance is procedurally valuable? If a decision derives from a democratic body, then that decision at least prima facie deserves respect as a democratic decision.
whereas the critics don’t care whether it’s a democratic government that’s making a bad decision―it’s still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
If this was their criticism, they wouldn’t bring up democracy, since it’s irrelevant. This is a substantive criticism: our democracy has done the wrong thing here. This is not the same thing as being anti-democratic, which is what they seem to be arguing.
I think there is a steelman of this argument which is something like:
A decision made by a democratic body is prima facie democratic, but can be undemocratic if it has certain characteristics like undermining democracy in the long-run or abusing “market failures” in the democratic system itself.
But the problem is I don’t think “making someone more powerful” is necessarily a procedurally objectionable outcome—I don’t think it necessarily undermines democracy. It seems perfectly reasonable to me for a democracy to decide that it will allow billionaires to make a lot of money if they give it away. What the critics have failed to do, in my estimation, is argue that this is not the type of decision that democracies can ratify. In the absence of such a showing, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that a well-known and easily stoppable pattern of mega-philanthropy has been democratically acquiesced to.
Thanks for pointing that out! I should have read more carefully. I might still be reading you wrong here (if so, sorry) but it feels like this doesn’t directly engage with the point.
The paragraph argues that since foundations are currently sanctioned by governments, Reich and other critics ought to respect that decision because it’s democratic. I think this is a strawman of their argument; you’re assuming an abstract notion of ‘democraticness’ that infuses everything the government does, whereas the critics don’t care whether it’s a democratic government that’s making a bad decision―it’s still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
(And note that you can simultaneously believe that government makes some bad legislative decisions and that we would be better off by substituting private spending with gov spending).
Thanks for your reply!
Isn’t this what commitment to democracy entails if you think that democratic governance is procedurally valuable? If a decision derives from a democratic body, then that decision at least prima facie deserves respect as a democratic decision.
If this was their criticism, they wouldn’t bring up democracy, since it’s irrelevant. This is a substantive criticism: our democracy has done the wrong thing here. This is not the same thing as being anti-democratic, which is what they seem to be arguing.
I think there is a steelman of this argument which is something like:
But the problem is I don’t think “making someone more powerful” is necessarily a procedurally objectionable outcome—I don’t think it necessarily undermines democracy. It seems perfectly reasonable to me for a democracy to decide that it will allow billionaires to make a lot of money if they give it away. What the critics have failed to do, in my estimation, is argue that this is not the type of decision that democracies can ratify. In the absence of such a showing, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that a well-known and easily stoppable pattern of mega-philanthropy has been democratically acquiesced to.