The critic could also argue that the problem is the âwhitewashingâ effect of philanthropy. Like Alexander, I am not convinced that this is a real phenomenon, but even if it was, I donât think the criticism holds. A democracy should be able to weigh the pros of philanthropy (solution of market and policy failures) against cons it might have (whitewashing a bad or unequal economic system). If the democracy decides that the pros outweighs the cons, that calculus deserves respect. Through the various policy subsidies of philanthropy, our democracy appears to have arrived at such a decision. Again, that might be a substantively bad decision, but it is not an anti-democratic one. And if the decision to subsidize philanthropy was substantively flawed, one wonders why we should expect better disposition of money that would have otherwise gone to philanthropy.
Thanks for pointing that out! I should have read more carefully. I might still be reading you wrong here (if so, sorry) but it feels like this doesnât directly engage with the point.
The paragraph argues that since foundations are currently sanctioned by governments, Reich and other critics ought to respect that decision because itâs democratic. I think this is a strawman of their argument; youâre assuming an abstract notion of âdemocraticnessâ that infuses everything the government does, whereas the critics donât care whether itâs a democratic government thatâs making a bad decisionâitâs still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
(And note that you can simultaneously believe that government makes some bad legislative decisions and that we would be better off by substituting private spending with gov spending).
youâre assuming an abstract notion of âdemocraticnessâ that infuses everything the government does
Isnât this what commitment to democracy entails if you think that democratic governance is procedurally valuable? If a decision derives from a democratic body, then that decision at least prima facie deserves respect as a democratic decision.
whereas the critics donât care whether itâs a democratic government thatâs making a bad decisionâitâs still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
If this was their criticism, they wouldnât bring up democracy, since itâs irrelevant. This is a substantive criticism: our democracy has done the wrong thing here. This is not the same thing as being anti-democratic, which is what they seem to be arguing.
I think there is a steelman of this argument which is something like:
A decision made by a democratic body is prima facie democratic, but can be undemocratic if it has certain characteristics like undermining democracy in the long-run or abusing âmarket failuresâ in the democratic system itself.
But the problem is I donât think âmaking someone more powerfulâ is necessarily a procedurally objectionable outcomeâI donât think it necessarily undermines democracy. It seems perfectly reasonable to me for a democracy to decide that it will allow billionaires to make a lot of money if they give it away. What the critics have failed to do, in my estimation, is argue that this is not the type of decision that democracies can ratify. In the absence of such a showing, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that a well-known and easily stoppable pattern of mega-philanthropy has been democratically acquiesced to.
I think I address that here:
Thanks for pointing that out! I should have read more carefully. I might still be reading you wrong here (if so, sorry) but it feels like this doesnât directly engage with the point.
The paragraph argues that since foundations are currently sanctioned by governments, Reich and other critics ought to respect that decision because itâs democratic. I think this is a strawman of their argument; youâre assuming an abstract notion of âdemocraticnessâ that infuses everything the government does, whereas the critics donât care whether itâs a democratic government thatâs making a bad decisionâitâs still a bad decision that leaves individuals with outsized power.
(And note that you can simultaneously believe that government makes some bad legislative decisions and that we would be better off by substituting private spending with gov spending).
Thanks for your reply!
Isnât this what commitment to democracy entails if you think that democratic governance is procedurally valuable? If a decision derives from a democratic body, then that decision at least prima facie deserves respect as a democratic decision.
If this was their criticism, they wouldnât bring up democracy, since itâs irrelevant. This is a substantive criticism: our democracy has done the wrong thing here. This is not the same thing as being anti-democratic, which is what they seem to be arguing.
I think there is a steelman of this argument which is something like:
But the problem is I donât think âmaking someone more powerfulâ is necessarily a procedurally objectionable outcomeâI donât think it necessarily undermines democracy. It seems perfectly reasonable to me for a democracy to decide that it will allow billionaires to make a lot of money if they give it away. What the critics have failed to do, in my estimation, is argue that this is not the type of decision that democracies can ratify. In the absence of such a showing, it seems reasonable to me to conclude that a well-known and easily stoppable pattern of mega-philanthropy has been democratically acquiesced to.