This post demonstrates the reductio ad absurdum of these sorts of calculations.
âCaged chickens might be better than free range because it means there are more insects living in the soilâ is the sort of conclusion that most people can discard as being too absurd to consider, but if youâre earnestly attempting a utility calculus-based approach like this you are forced to conclude that it is a serious option.
This is paralysing. You could use the same logic here to lead yourself to conclusions like:
we should prevent economic development in the poorest parts of the world because they might eat more chickens or reduce the numbers of insects in the soil
we should kill whales to prevent the harm they do to krill
the primary moral concern of Earth is the rights of demodex mites
Iâd encourage you to stop making these sorts of posts. I think theyâre off-putting for people that might otherwise engage more with more reasonable EA ideas. Expressing uncomfortable truths is important when itâs useful, but these calculations are so riddled with uncertainty and so lacking in actionable conclusions that this post and posts like it are probably net harmful.
Iâd encourage you to stop making these sorts of posts. I think theyâre off-putting for people that might otherwise engage more with more reasonable EA ideas.
I strong downvoted this comment because I think this type of discourse censorship is terrible. Effective Altruism should be about figuring out how to do the most good, and then doing just that.
âThis idea is off puttingâ can be use as a fully general counterargument against any new intervention or pivot. Helping farmed animals is off putting to many. Helping people abroad before helping those at home is off putting to many.
This is, by the way, not to say that you canât dismiss an argument if the logic lead to absurd conclusions. Reasoning from first principals can be a dangerous activity if you take your ideas seriously (see e.g., epistemic learned helplessness, memedic immune system). But when trying to figure out how to do the most good, I think itâs really really bad to have any sort internal thought censors.
(I think itâs comparably better to consider âdoes this sound off puttingâ deciding what actions to take.)
Expressing uncomfortable truths is important when itâs useful, but these calculations are so riddled with uncertainty and so lacking in actionable conclusions that this post and posts like it are probably net harmful.
I think itâs reasonable to say that loudly pondering uncomfortable ideas is not useful if it returns an answer with error bars so wide that you might as well have not written the post at all.
What should be done about the possibility that insects or anthropods are conscious and affected by our interventions in your view?
EDITED to add: Just reviving the idea that its ok to favour humans over animals to a very high degree wonât help here, since itâs animal versus animal interests we are dealing with.
I donât think this is a point against valuing animal lives (to some extent) as much as itâs a point against utilitarianism. Which I agree with. I didnât downvote because I donât think a detailed calculation in itself is harmful, but when you reach these kinds of conclusions is probably the point to acknowledge pure utilitarianism might be a doomed idea.
I have some sympathy with that view, except that I think this is a problem for a much wider class of views than utiliarianism itself. The problem doesnât (entirely) go away if you modify utilitarianism in various attractive ways like âdonât violate rightsâ, or âyour allowed/âobligated to favour friends and family to some degreeâ or âdoing the best thing is just good, not obligatory. The underlying issue is that it seems silly to ever think you can do more good by helping insects than more normal beneficiaries, or that you can do more good in a galaxy-brained indirect way than directly, but there are reasonably strong theoretical arguments that those claims are either true, or at least could be true for all we know. That is an issue for any moral theory that says we can rank outcomes by desirability, regardless of how they think the desirability of various outcomes factors into determining what the morally correct action is. And any sane theory, in my view, thinks that how good/âbad the consequences of an action are is relevant to whether you should do it, whether or not other things are also relevant to whether the action should be performed.
Of course it is open to the non-consequentialist to say that goodness of consequences are sometimes relevant, but never with insects. But that seems a like cheating to me unless they can explain why.
Thanks, Michael. I agree. For example, I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus greatly increasing deaths nearterm, which I assume can easily be harmful from a perspective concerned about the right to life.
I guess some impartiality, âvaluing animal lives (to some extent)â, is the key element of utilitarianism which is necessary for the conclusions of my post to hold. Which moral theory having impartiality as an element would imply different conclusions?
You make a great point about the parallel to the meat-eater problem, and I agree that, for similar reasons, itâs probably still a good idea to advocate for chicken welfare reforms.
However, I donât think reductio ad absurdum is a compelling argument in this case.
This postâs argument seems absurd not because it leads to some kind of internal contradiction, but rather because it argues for something thatâs way outside the things people normally think are good ideas. I donât think âseems absurd to most peopleâ is a reliable indicator of âis not ethically sound,â because I think many people believe things and act in ways that are not morally sound (e.g., factory farming). What I love about EA is that itâs a social space that encourages questioning of conventional ideas.
we should prevent economic development in the poorest parts of the world because they might eat more chickens or reduce the numbers of insects in the soil
we should kill whales to prevent the harm they do to krill
I think the effects on arthropods of these interventions may well be the driver of their overall effects, but I have little idea about whether they benefit or harm arthropods. I believe people caring about arthropods would do better supporting the Arthropoda Foundation, RPâs work on invertebrate welfare, the Shrimp Welfare Project, or Wild Animal Initiative.
the primary moral concern of Earth is the rights of demodex mites
I worry adocating for animal rights may be harmful due to encouraging wilderness preservation, because wild arthropods could have negative lives. In any case, I believe animal welfare interventions focussing on improving the conditions of animals instead of giving them rights have been more cost-effective at increasing the welfare of the targeted animals.
Expressing uncomfortable truths is important when itâs useful, but these calculations are so riddled with uncertainty and so lacking in actionable conclusions that this post and posts like it are probably net harmful.
I had some actionable conclusions? I recommended donating and making grants to improve invertebrate welfare, and encouraged organisations helping vertebrates to consider how they can help invertebrates.
While I didnât karma-vote on the main post, I downvoted this comment because I think the idea of net-negative lives for naturally occurring creatures is not only false but even harmful.
I estimated 6.37 % of people have negative lives in the sense of preferring to not have been born, and I guess there is a higher fraction of wild arthropods with negative lives. What do you think is the probability of a random arthropod having a negative life? If it was around 50 % like mine, would you still consider harmful discussing the possibility of wild arthropods having negative lives?
I assume youâre looking for a rational explanation, but itâs rather based on personal experience. Itâs because I think my life with constant chronic pain has more negative experiences than positive ones but I have decided I should keep on living.
I am probably just stating the obvious, but I encourage you to chat with LLMs to brainstorm solutions for your chronic pain (the more context you give, the better). You can also use Elicit to find good studies (you can filter in randomised controlled trials (RCTs), meta-analyses, and systematic reviews). I am happy to have a look if you are open to sharing more (privately or not).
A negative life is typically defined has one with more suffering than happiness, regardless of whether the person living it wants to keep living or not. Wanting to end oneâs life is a much stricter condition than having a negative life. I estimated 6.37 % of people have negative lives in the sense of preferring to not have been born, but only 0.0088 % of people commited suicide in 2021. I assume people who ended their lives had negative lives when they ended, so I estimate only 0.138 % (= 8.8*10^-5/â0.0637) of people with negative lives in a given year end their lives that year.
The above suggests the vast majority of people with negative lives do not end their lives. I think this is because commiting suicide is hard, people hope their lives may become positive in the future, and believe that ending their lives would harm others.
In principleâthough I canât say Iâve been consistent about it. Iâve supported ending our family dogâs misery when she was diagnosed with pretty bad cancer, and I still stand behind that decision. On the other hand I donât think I would ever apply this to an animal one has had no interaction with.
On a meta level, and Iâm adding this because itâs relevant to your other comment: I think itâs fine to live with such contradictions. Given our brain architecture, I donât expect human morality to be translatable to a short and clear set of rules.
On the other hand I donât think I would ever apply this to an animal one has had no interaction with.
Would you be against painlessly enthanising a stray dog with a similar condition as your familyâs dog? If you would support ending their misery too, why not supporting efforts to decrease the number of wild animals with negative lives?
If I somehow ran into such a dog and decided the effort to take them to an ultrasound etc. was worth it, then probably yesâbut I wouldnât start e.g. actively searching for stray dogs with cancer in order to do that.
No, thatâs not what I think. I think itâs rather dangerous and probably morally bad to seek out ânegative livesâ in order to stop them. And I think we should not be interfering with nature in ways we do not really understand. The whole idea of wild animal welfare seems to me not only unsupported morally but also absurd and probably a bad thing in practice.
This post demonstrates the reductio ad absurdum of these sorts of calculations.
âCaged chickens might be better than free range because it means there are more insects living in the soilâ is the sort of conclusion that most people can discard as being too absurd to consider, but if youâre earnestly attempting a utility calculus-based approach like this you are forced to conclude that it is a serious option.
This is paralysing. You could use the same logic here to lead yourself to conclusions like:
we should prevent economic development in the poorest parts of the world because they might eat more chickens or reduce the numbers of insects in the soil
we should kill whales to prevent the harm they do to krill
the primary moral concern of Earth is the rights of demodex mites
Iâd encourage you to stop making these sorts of posts. I think theyâre off-putting for people that might otherwise engage more with more reasonable EA ideas. Expressing uncomfortable truths is important when itâs useful, but these calculations are so riddled with uncertainty and so lacking in actionable conclusions that this post and posts like it are probably net harmful.
I strong downvoted this comment because I think this type of discourse censorship is terrible. Effective Altruism should be about figuring out how to do the most good, and then doing just that.
âThis idea is off puttingâ can be use as a fully general counterargument against any new intervention or pivot. Helping farmed animals is off putting to many. Helping people abroad before helping those at home is off putting to many.
This is, by the way, not to say that you canât dismiss an argument if the logic lead to absurd conclusions. Reasoning from first principals can be a dangerous activity if you take your ideas seriously (see e.g., epistemic learned helplessness, memedic immune system). But when trying to figure out how to do the most good, I think itâs really really bad to have any sort internal thought censors.
(I think itâs comparably better to consider âdoes this sound off puttingâ deciding what actions to take.)
I think itâs reasonable to say that loudly pondering uncomfortable ideas is not useful if it returns an answer with error bars so wide that you might as well have not written the post at all.
What should be done about the possibility that insects or anthropods are conscious and affected by our interventions in your view?
EDITED to add: Just reviving the idea that its ok to favour humans over animals to a very high degree wonât help here, since itâs animal versus animal interests we are dealing with.
I donât think this is a point against valuing animal lives (to some extent) as much as itâs a point against utilitarianism. Which I agree with. I didnât downvote because I donât think a detailed calculation in itself is harmful, but when you reach these kinds of conclusions is probably the point to acknowledge pure utilitarianism might be a doomed idea.
I have some sympathy with that view, except that I think this is a problem for a much wider class of views than utiliarianism itself. The problem doesnât (entirely) go away if you modify utilitarianism in various attractive ways like âdonât violate rightsâ, or âyour allowed/âobligated to favour friends and family to some degreeâ or âdoing the best thing is just good, not obligatory. The underlying issue is that it seems silly to ever think you can do more good by helping insects than more normal beneficiaries, or that you can do more good in a galaxy-brained indirect way than directly, but there are reasonably strong theoretical arguments that those claims are either true, or at least could be true for all we know. That is an issue for any moral theory that says we can rank outcomes by desirability, regardless of how they think the desirability of various outcomes factors into determining what the morally correct action is. And any sane theory, in my view, thinks that how good/âbad the consequences of an action are is relevant to whether you should do it, whether or not other things are also relevant to whether the action should be performed.
Of course it is open to the non-consequentialist to say that goodness of consequences are sometimes relevant, but never with insects. But that seems a like cheating to me unless they can explain why.
I agree with Davidâs comment. These sorts of ethical dilemmas are puzzles for everyone, not just for utilitarianism.
And in the case of insect welfare, rights-based theories produce more puzzling puzzles because itâs unclear how to reckon with tradeoffs.
Thanks, Michael. I agree. For example, I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus greatly increasing deaths nearterm, which I assume can easily be harmful from a perspective concerned about the right to life.
Hi Guy,
I guess some impartiality, âvaluing animal lives (to some extent)â, is the key element of utilitarianism which is necessary for the conclusions of my post to hold. Which moral theory having impartiality as an element would imply different conclusions?
You make a great point about the parallel to the meat-eater problem, and I agree that, for similar reasons, itâs probably still a good idea to advocate for chicken welfare reforms.
However, I donât think reductio ad absurdum is a compelling argument in this case.
This postâs argument seems absurd not because it leads to some kind of internal contradiction, but rather because it argues for something thatâs way outside the things people normally think are good ideas. I donât think âseems absurd to most peopleâ is a reliable indicator of âis not ethically sound,â because I think many people believe things and act in ways that are not morally sound (e.g., factory farming). What I love about EA is that itâs a social space that encourages questioning of conventional ideas.
Thanks for the comment, Henry.
I think the effects on arthropods of these interventions may well be the driver of their overall effects, but I have little idea about whether they benefit or harm arthropods. I believe people caring about arthropods would do better supporting the Arthropoda Foundation, RPâs work on invertebrate welfare, the Shrimp Welfare Project, or Wild Animal Initiative.
I worry adocating for animal rights may be harmful due to encouraging wilderness preservation, because wild arthropods could have negative lives. In any case, I believe animal welfare interventions focussing on improving the conditions of animals instead of giving them rights have been more cost-effective at increasing the welfare of the targeted animals.
I had some actionable conclusions? I recommended donating and making grants to improve invertebrate welfare, and encouraged organisations helping vertebrates to consider how they can help invertebrates.
While I didnât karma-vote on the main post, I downvoted this comment because I think the idea of net-negative lives for naturally occurring creatures is not only false but even harmful.
Thanks, Guy. I upvoted your comment.
I estimated 6.37 % of people have negative lives in the sense of preferring to not have been born, and I guess there is a higher fraction of wild arthropods with negative lives. What do you think is the probability of a random arthropod having a negative life? If it was around 50 % like mine, would you still consider harmful discussing the possibility of wild arthropods having negative lives?
I donât think thereâs such a thing as a negative life.
Why do you believe that?
I assume youâre looking for a rational explanation, but itâs rather based on personal experience. Itâs because I think my life with constant chronic pain has more negative experiences than positive ones but I have decided I should keep on living.
I am probably just stating the obvious, but I encourage you to chat with LLMs to brainstorm solutions for your chronic pain (the more context you give, the better). You can also use Elicit to find good studies (you can filter in randomised controlled trials (RCTs), meta-analyses, and systematic reviews). I am happy to have a look if you are open to sharing more (privately or not).
A negative life is typically defined has one with more suffering than happiness, regardless of whether the person living it wants to keep living or not. Wanting to end oneâs life is a much stricter condition than having a negative life. I estimated 6.37 % of people have negative lives in the sense of preferring to not have been born, but only 0.0088 % of people commited suicide in 2021. I assume people who ended their lives had negative lives when they ended, so I estimate only 0.138 % (= 8.8*10^-5/â0.0637) of people with negative lives in a given year end their lives that year.
The above suggests the vast majority of people with negative lives do not end their lives. I think this is because commiting suicide is hard, people hope their lives may become positive in the future, and believe that ending their lives would harm others.
In principle, or only in practice?
In principleâthough I canât say Iâve been consistent about it. Iâve supported ending our family dogâs misery when she was diagnosed with pretty bad cancer, and I still stand behind that decision. On the other hand I donât think I would ever apply this to an animal one has had no interaction with.
On a meta level, and Iâm adding this because itâs relevant to your other comment: I think itâs fine to live with such contradictions. Given our brain architecture, I donât expect human morality to be translatable to a short and clear set of rules.
Thanks for sharing, Guy!
Would you be against painlessly enthanising a stray dog with a similar condition as your familyâs dog? If you would support ending their misery too, why not supporting efforts to decrease the number of wild animals with negative lives?
If I somehow ran into such a dog and decided the effort to take them to an ultrasound etc. was worth it, then probably yesâbut I wouldnât start e.g. actively searching for stray dogs with cancer in order to do that.
Makes sense. I think that suggests you consider decreasing the number of negative lives good in principle, although not always worth it in practice.
No, thatâs not what I think. I think itâs rather dangerous and probably morally bad to seek out ânegative livesâ in order to stop them. And I think we should not be interfering with nature in ways we do not really understand. The whole idea of wild animal welfare seems to me not only unsupported morally but also absurd and probably a bad thing in practice.