I can’t think of a compelling theory of change for arthropod welfare that omits consideration of avian welfare, and I worry that your line of reasoning (despite the generally robust calculations you include) neglects two larger concerns:
The idea that, for the sake of increased total welfare, we should neglect a smaller but still significant harm, may border on naive utilitarianism. While chicken welfare reforms may, on balance, increase total suffering, there is no doubt that they directly and significantly reduce the immense suffering of factory-farmed chickens. The horrors of factory farming are too great to dismiss, even if in this case there is an extremely uncertain chance that they might reduce harm elsewhere. A better solution could be to work with farmed chicken welfare advocates to investigate ways of rearing chickens more humanely which do not (or are at least less likely to) increase insect suffering.
Outside of (and sometimes even inside) EA, insect welfare is a tough sell. I think an even tougher sell is insect welfare which comes at the cost of the welfare of birds, mammals, or other animals. Like Cameron, I have a hard time imagining a society that takes insect welfare seriously while subjecting farmed animals of other species to intense suffering, and so I worry that moving away from this kind of chicken welfare reform actually moves us further from adopting the reforms needed to decrease insect suffering in the long term.
That being said, I do think this is well worth discussing, and I appreciate your efforts to move things along with quantitative data!
The idea that, for the sake of increased total welfare, we should neglect a smaller but still significant harm, may border on naive utilitarianism.
One hallmark of naive utilitarianism is neglecting uncertain effects which are important in expectation. This is in contrast with my post, where I consider uncertain effects on wild arthropods. I conclude these can easily be larger than those on chickens, but this is not the same as neglecting the effects on chickens, which I also modelled.
Outside of (and sometimes even inside) EA, insect welfare is a tough sell. I think an even tougher sell is insect welfare which comes at the cost of the welfare of birds, mammals, or other animals.
Changing donations from organisations helping farmed vertebrates to ones helping invertebrates, as I recommend, may come at the cost of the welfare of farmed vertebrates. Similarly, changing donations from organisations helping people in extreme poverty to ones helping farmed vertebrates may come at the cost of the welfare of people in extreme poverty. Does this necessarily mean people should not change donations from organisations helping people in extreme poverty to ones helping farmed vertebrates? I do not think so. I encourage people to simply donate to the organisations they consider more cost-effective.
Like Cameron, I have a hard time imagining a society that takes insect welfare seriously while subjecting farmed animals of other species to intense suffering, and so I worry that moving away from this kind of chicken welfare reform actually moves us further from adopting the reforms needed to decrease insect suffering in the long term.
I do not think broad societal care about wild arthropods is necessary to greatly improve their welfare. A small research community may be enough to determine whether the most numerous animals have positive or negative lives, and then advocacy efforts can focus on increasing or decreasing the area with the highest density of animals, which is much easier. For example, people are broadly on board with decreasing deforestation, which greatly increases the number of wild arthropods, and therefore is hugely beneficial if they have positive lives.
Thanks for that first point – I was using “naive utilitarianism” in a broader sense which I now realize made my point less clear. What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good. I don’t disagree with your modelling, but worry more generally about reasoning which permits these other types of harm.
Your second point is fair and helps me understand your post better. Thanks for that!
I am not convinced of your third point. There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment. However, until we have more research on insect welfare and related potential interventions, I think this one will be hard to resolve.
What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good.
I worry about that too in some sense. On the other hand, I would not consider “serious harm” donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare instead of ones working to help farmed vertebrates or humans. In addition, I wonder whether donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare is better than to ones working on chicken welfare reforms from rights-based perspectives too. I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus violating the right to life of lots of animals.
There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment.
Rosenberg (2023) “found that there are ≈1 × 10^19 (twofold uncertainty range) soil arthropods on Earth, ≈95% of which are soil mites and springtails”. So looking into a few representative species of mites and springtails might be enough to have a good picture of the welfare of wild terrestrial arthropods.
I can’t think of a compelling theory of change for arthropod welfare that omits consideration of avian welfare, and I worry that your line of reasoning (despite the generally robust calculations you include) neglects two larger concerns:
The idea that, for the sake of increased total welfare, we should neglect a smaller but still significant harm, may border on naive utilitarianism. While chicken welfare reforms may, on balance, increase total suffering, there is no doubt that they directly and significantly reduce the immense suffering of factory-farmed chickens. The horrors of factory farming are too great to dismiss, even if in this case there is an extremely uncertain chance that they might reduce harm elsewhere. A better solution could be to work with farmed chicken welfare advocates to investigate ways of rearing chickens more humanely which do not (or are at least less likely to) increase insect suffering.
Outside of (and sometimes even inside) EA, insect welfare is a tough sell. I think an even tougher sell is insect welfare which comes at the cost of the welfare of birds, mammals, or other animals. Like Cameron, I have a hard time imagining a society that takes insect welfare seriously while subjecting farmed animals of other species to intense suffering, and so I worry that moving away from this kind of chicken welfare reform actually moves us further from adopting the reforms needed to decrease insect suffering in the long term.
That being said, I do think this is well worth discussing, and I appreciate your efforts to move things along with quantitative data!
Thanks for the comment, Samuel!
One hallmark of naive utilitarianism is neglecting uncertain effects which are important in expectation. This is in contrast with my post, where I consider uncertain effects on wild arthropods. I conclude these can easily be larger than those on chickens, but this is not the same as neglecting the effects on chickens, which I also modelled.
Changing donations from organisations helping farmed vertebrates to ones helping invertebrates, as I recommend, may come at the cost of the welfare of farmed vertebrates. Similarly, changing donations from organisations helping people in extreme poverty to ones helping farmed vertebrates may come at the cost of the welfare of people in extreme poverty. Does this necessarily mean people should not change donations from organisations helping people in extreme poverty to ones helping farmed vertebrates? I do not think so. I encourage people to simply donate to the organisations they consider more cost-effective.
I do not think broad societal care about wild arthropods is necessary to greatly improve their welfare. A small research community may be enough to determine whether the most numerous animals have positive or negative lives, and then advocacy efforts can focus on increasing or decreasing the area with the highest density of animals, which is much easier. For example, people are broadly on board with decreasing deforestation, which greatly increases the number of wild arthropods, and therefore is hugely beneficial if they have positive lives.
Hi Vasco,
Thanks for that first point – I was using “naive utilitarianism” in a broader sense which I now realize made my point less clear. What I meant was that I worry about the type of thinking that allows for serious harm if it increases net welfare, e.g. disregarding rights violations so long as they lead to the greatest total good. I don’t disagree with your modelling, but worry more generally about reasoning which permits these other types of harm.
Your second point is fair and helps me understand your post better. Thanks for that!
I am not convinced of your third point. There are just so many insects in the world that I think it would be hard to improve their welfare on a large scale without some level of societal investment. However, until we have more research on insect welfare and related potential interventions, I think this one will be hard to resolve.
Thanks again for sparking this great discussion!
Thanks for the follow-up, Samuel!
I worry about that too in some sense. On the other hand, I would not consider “serious harm” donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare instead of ones working to help farmed vertebrates or humans. In addition, I wonder whether donating to organisations working on invertebrate welfare is better than to ones working on chicken welfare reforms from rights-based perspectives too. I estimate broiler welfare and cage-free campaigns decrease 1.95 M and 452 k arthropod-years per $, thus violating the right to life of lots of animals.
Rosenberg (2023) “found that there are ≈1 × 10^19 (twofold uncertainty range) soil arthropods on Earth, ≈95% of which are soil mites and springtails”. So looking into a few representative species of mites and springtails might be enough to have a good picture of the welfare of wild terrestrial arthropods.
Thanks for the support, @Samuel Mazzarella 🔸!