I would agree that greater indiferrence between not existing, and exiting over a given period implies the expected value of the welfare realised over the period is closer to 0. However, I still think this expected value cannot be 0 for the reasons I described in my last comment. At the same time, I believe this is very much compatible with indifference across potential future states. Humans’ capacity to assess their future welfare has a finite sensitivity. Total indifference between not existing, and existing over a given period only suggests the expected welfare over the period is below the sensitivity. I would get a reading of 0 kg putting a feather on a scale with low precision designed to weigh elephants, but this does not mean that the feather has no mass. It just means the scale is not sensitive enough to measure its mass. Likewise, the scale would output 0 kg for feathers of different masses, but this does not mean they all have the same or an incomparable mass. It just means the scale is not sensitive enough to measure the differences in their mass.
I do not think you can assume humans’ and nematodes’ assessments of their future welfare are equally sensitive. I assume the force needed to crush a nematode would be imperceptible by humans. So, if nematodes’ were as sensitive as humans with respect to physical forces, they would not be able to avoid mechanical threats, which seems very counter to what would be evolutionarily advantageous.
I referred to TAI as defined by Metaculus. I understand this still involves some ambiguities. Yet, I would not say it is indeterminate whether TAI will happen before or after 2039.
To make the analogy with the scale more accurate: suppose mass could also be negative (because welfare can be negative), and most of all: suppose Newton’s law would use the measured mass, as measured on that scale. The latter would be a bit like quantum mechanics, as if the feather is in a superposition of different masses, and doing a quantum measurement with that scale gives its mass that enters Newton’s law. Then the question whether the mass of the feather is positive or negative, is ill-defined when the feather is in a superposition of both positive and negative masses.
A better physics analogy is Einstein’s theory of special relativity. Suppose you and I have super accurate clocks. I determine that “now!” corresponds with time zero. Relative to my “now!”, there are events in the past and future. But suppose you also determined your “now!” as time zero on your clock. And suppose the space-time event that corresponds with you saying “now!” lies outside the lightcone of my “now!” space-time event. The question is: is your “now!” in the future or the past of my “now!”? When the speed of light is finite, this question is always ill-defined, even if we had infinitely accurate clocks. You can always pick a reference frame according to which your “now!” exactly corresponds with time zero on my clock (yes, with infinite precision; what a coincidence!). And pick another reference frame according to which your “now!” is in the future of my “now!”. In the analogy, the time of your “now!” on my clock, corresponds with the welfare of the nematode relative to non-existence. My “now!” corresponds with zero welfare of non-existence, your “now!” corresponds with the welfare of the nematode. If your “now!” is in the future (past) of my “now!”, that corresponds with a positive (negative) welfare of the nematode. The different reference frames in special relativity correspond with different ‘welfare frames’ of the nematode. So even if a nematode could measure physical forces with infinite precision, and would be sensitive to the pain of the slightest increase in a physical force, it would still be impossible to say whether the nematode has a positive or negative welfare. I can compare my welfare with non-existence to a high degree, but not infinitely accurately. In the special relativity analogy, this corresponds with a space-time with a very high lightspeed. But for the nematode, the comparison with non-existence is much more difficult, which would correspond with a space-time with a very low speed of light. If the speed of light is extremely low, or say zero, almost all your space-time events are outside my lightcone, which means you can pick any moment along your timeline and I can pick a reference frame according to which that moment is in the future of my “now!”. With the nematode: pick any full description of its experiences, the physical forces that it feels and so on, and I can pick a welfare frame according to which that nematode has a positive welfare, and you picked a welfare frame according to which that same nematode, with the very same experiences, has a negative welfare. There is no objective way to determine which of our welfare frames is the correct one. If a nematode’s welfare range is very small, it is likely that all its experiences that it could possibly have always lead to a welfare level that is incommensurable with zero, even if the nematode could measure its own welfare with infinite precision.
As for the TAI: the point is that I can give another equally reasonable/valid definition of a TAI as the one of Metaculus, and there is no objective way to determine which of our definitions is the correct one. This intrinsic indeterminacy of the definition results in the incommensurability of the timelines. I can always pick a definition according to which the arrival of TAI is after 2039, even if according to Metaculus’ definition of TAI, the arrival is exactly in 2039 and we can measure that arrival date with infinite precision. The different definitions of TAI correspond with the different reference frames in special relativity, and the different welfare frames of the nematode.
Thanks, Stijn. I think it is better to keep the analogies simple. Imagine there is a glass with alcohol, whose freezing point is −114 ºC, at a temperature of 0.2 ºC. Consider a thermometer which systematically underestimates temperature by 1 ºC, another which systematically overestimates temperature by 1 ºC, and another which is well calibrated. In addition, assume the thermometers can only display integers. The thermometers would output temperatures of −1, 1, and 0 ºC. However, despite the different calibration of the thermometers, and their outputted temperature, it is not indeterminate whether the temperature of the alcohol in the glass is below or above 0 ºC. Subjective measurements of the hedonistic welfare of nematodes are much more uncertain than measurements of the temperature of ethanol with thermometers. However, what is the fundamental difference that makes you conclude there is no fact of the matter about whether nematodes have a positive or negative welfare per animal-year? Why does it mean one can neglect the welfare of nematodes, but not of farmed insects?
I still prefer the special relativity analogy, because its mathematical structure is similar to what I have in mind about welfare of nematodes. Your alcohol temperature analogy seems to be misleading, because it speaks about over- and underestimations and being well calibrated, but that is not the issue. The clocks of observers in special relativity are all well-calibrated, no clock overestimates time. And yet there is this weird kind of intransitivity in special relativity, where space-time events X and Y happen simultaneously (at time 0), space-time event Z is in the future of Y, and yet events X and Z also happen simultaneously (at time 0, but according to another reference frame). Same goes for nematode welfare: nematode in state X (non-existence) and Y have the same welfare (equal to 0), the nematode in state Z is strictly happier than in Y, and yet there is a welfare frame according to which states X and Z are equally good (welfare 0).
I believe (farmed) insects have a wider welfare range than nematodes, which means it is less likely that all their positive and negative experiences are incommensurable with non-existence. An insect can be so miserable that its welfare is negative according to all welfare frames, in which case it is objectively/absolutely true that that insect has a negative welfare. A nematode cannot reach such intense levels of misery.
There is only one right perspective to assess the welfare of a being under hedonism. The perspective of the being whose welfare is being assessed. When I say my best guess is that the (hedonistic) welfare per animal-year of soil nematodes is negative, I am effectively guessing that I would prefer not existing over being born as a random soil nematode.
I am missing a quantitative argument distinguishing nematodes from insects. I feel like someone else could just as reasonably argue for neglecting effects on insects because their welfare range is still too small. For reference, “My estimate for the welfare range of soil nematodes of 6.68*10^-6 is 0.334 % of RP’s mainline welfare range of silkworms of 0.002”. Why is 0.002 not small enough? What is the minimum welfare range for effects to be considered? Why?
The crucial issue is that a nematode may not be able to compare its welfare with non-existence. Even for me it may be hard to compare welfare with non-existence, i.e. imagining a level of welfare at which I would be indifferent with non-existence. I believe there is not always a straightforward answer, even under hedonism, when one’s welfare is at a similar level as non-existence. Just as in special relativity there is not always a straightforward answer when a space-time event happens now. Still, in special relativity, time is a continuous variable that can in principle be measured with infinite accuracy (i.e. clocks could in principle be infinitely well-calibrated in the theory of special relativity). So the notion of time makes perfect sense in special relativity, but the notion of “now” does not. Similarly: the notion of welfare makes perfect sense in hedonism, but the notion of zero welfare does not.
Yes, we are missing quantitative estimates for determining zero welfare of nematodes and insects. Like we do not know the speed of light. All I can say is that in the special relativity analogy, a nematode has a “lower speed of light” than an insect. And sure, I consider it likely that even insects have a welfare range that is smaller than the neutral range. This neutral range is the range of welfare levels that are incommensurable with zero, or the range of welfare levels for which there always is a valid welfare frame such that the welfare is zero. If the welfare range is smaller than the neutral range, it is always impossible to objectively/absolutely determine whether a welfare is positive or negative: there is always a valid welfare frame for which the welfare is positive, and another equally valid welfare frame for which the welfare is negative. This is all compatible with hedonism. I guess you assume in your hedonic theory, the speed of light is infinite, which means there is one absolute welfare frame (as in Newtonian physics there is one absolute reference frame). The more I think about it, the more skeptical I am about that assumption of an absolute welfare frame.
Do you think newborns can compare their (hedonistic) welfare to non-existence? I assume they cannot. However, I still think there is a fact of the matter about whether any given newborn has a positive or negative (expected) welfare over a certain period of time. Likewise for nematodes or any other being.
I do not quite understand what you mean by neutral range, but it looks like you would consider effects on nematodes if the neutral range of these was smaller than their welfare range. If so, you can only neglect effects on nematodes if you are certain their neutral range is larger than their welfare range. I assign this a probability of 0, not 1, as I see welfare per animal-year (as assessed by the being experiencing it) as a continuous distribution.
Yes, I think newborns can compare their welfare with non-existence, to a small degree, but I’m uncertain about it. That is why I think it is so difficult to estimate whether my newborn sons have a positive or negative welfare. I tend to believe that my first son had a negative welfare the first few weeks and positive now, and my second son (who is a month old and lying next to me now) has an average positive welfare these days. But it could easily be indeterminate. For a nematode I’m much more confident that it is indeterminate. A question I would ask is: would the most empathic veterinarians prefer to euthanize a nematode, like they prefers to euthanize a dog when that dog has a negative welfare? I doubt it. Would the most empathic total utilitarians prefer to breed more nematodes, like they prefer the existence of more individuals with positive welfare? I doubt it. Would those people believe that a nematode happens to have exactly 0 welfare? I doubt it. So a nematode’s welfare is not clearly negative, not clearly positive, and not clearly zero. Then what is it? It’s incommensurable with 0.
Yes, if a nematode’s neutral range was smaller or zero, I would say that there is an objective fact of the matter whether the nematode has positive or negative welfare. just like when speed of light is infinite, there is an absolute reference frame, and every space-time event is either in the future, the present or the past of this space time-event I call “now!” That’s Newtonian physics.
Your case would be like assigning a probability of 0 to the possibility that the speed of light is finite. Note that the fact that welfare is continuous, is irrelevant: also time in special relativity is continuous.
Thanks for clarifying, Stijn!
I would agree that greater indiferrence between not existing, and exiting over a given period implies the expected value of the welfare realised over the period is closer to 0. However, I still think this expected value cannot be 0 for the reasons I described in my last comment. At the same time, I believe this is very much compatible with indifference across potential future states. Humans’ capacity to assess their future welfare has a finite sensitivity. Total indifference between not existing, and existing over a given period only suggests the expected welfare over the period is below the sensitivity. I would get a reading of 0 kg putting a feather on a scale with low precision designed to weigh elephants, but this does not mean that the feather has no mass. It just means the scale is not sensitive enough to measure its mass. Likewise, the scale would output 0 kg for feathers of different masses, but this does not mean they all have the same or an incomparable mass. It just means the scale is not sensitive enough to measure the differences in their mass.
I do not think you can assume humans’ and nematodes’ assessments of their future welfare are equally sensitive. I assume the force needed to crush a nematode would be imperceptible by humans. So, if nematodes’ were as sensitive as humans with respect to physical forces, they would not be able to avoid mechanical threats, which seems very counter to what would be evolutionarily advantageous.
I referred to TAI as defined by Metaculus. I understand this still involves some ambiguities. Yet, I would not say it is indeterminate whether TAI will happen before or after 2039.
To make the analogy with the scale more accurate: suppose mass could also be negative (because welfare can be negative), and most of all: suppose Newton’s law would use the measured mass, as measured on that scale. The latter would be a bit like quantum mechanics, as if the feather is in a superposition of different masses, and doing a quantum measurement with that scale gives its mass that enters Newton’s law. Then the question whether the mass of the feather is positive or negative, is ill-defined when the feather is in a superposition of both positive and negative masses.
A better physics analogy is Einstein’s theory of special relativity. Suppose you and I have super accurate clocks. I determine that “now!” corresponds with time zero. Relative to my “now!”, there are events in the past and future. But suppose you also determined your “now!” as time zero on your clock. And suppose the space-time event that corresponds with you saying “now!” lies outside the lightcone of my “now!” space-time event. The question is: is your “now!” in the future or the past of my “now!”? When the speed of light is finite, this question is always ill-defined, even if we had infinitely accurate clocks. You can always pick a reference frame according to which your “now!” exactly corresponds with time zero on my clock (yes, with infinite precision; what a coincidence!). And pick another reference frame according to which your “now!” is in the future of my “now!”. In the analogy, the time of your “now!” on my clock, corresponds with the welfare of the nematode relative to non-existence. My “now!” corresponds with zero welfare of non-existence, your “now!” corresponds with the welfare of the nematode. If your “now!” is in the future (past) of my “now!”, that corresponds with a positive (negative) welfare of the nematode. The different reference frames in special relativity correspond with different ‘welfare frames’ of the nematode. So even if a nematode could measure physical forces with infinite precision, and would be sensitive to the pain of the slightest increase in a physical force, it would still be impossible to say whether the nematode has a positive or negative welfare. I can compare my welfare with non-existence to a high degree, but not infinitely accurately. In the special relativity analogy, this corresponds with a space-time with a very high lightspeed. But for the nematode, the comparison with non-existence is much more difficult, which would correspond with a space-time with a very low speed of light. If the speed of light is extremely low, or say zero, almost all your space-time events are outside my lightcone, which means you can pick any moment along your timeline and I can pick a reference frame according to which that moment is in the future of my “now!”. With the nematode: pick any full description of its experiences, the physical forces that it feels and so on, and I can pick a welfare frame according to which that nematode has a positive welfare, and you picked a welfare frame according to which that same nematode, with the very same experiences, has a negative welfare. There is no objective way to determine which of our welfare frames is the correct one. If a nematode’s welfare range is very small, it is likely that all its experiences that it could possibly have always lead to a welfare level that is incommensurable with zero, even if the nematode could measure its own welfare with infinite precision.
As for the TAI: the point is that I can give another equally reasonable/valid definition of a TAI as the one of Metaculus, and there is no objective way to determine which of our definitions is the correct one. This intrinsic indeterminacy of the definition results in the incommensurability of the timelines. I can always pick a definition according to which the arrival of TAI is after 2039, even if according to Metaculus’ definition of TAI, the arrival is exactly in 2039 and we can measure that arrival date with infinite precision. The different definitions of TAI correspond with the different reference frames in special relativity, and the different welfare frames of the nematode.
Thanks, Stijn. I think it is better to keep the analogies simple. Imagine there is a glass with alcohol, whose freezing point is −114 ºC, at a temperature of 0.2 ºC. Consider a thermometer which systematically underestimates temperature by 1 ºC, another which systematically overestimates temperature by 1 ºC, and another which is well calibrated. In addition, assume the thermometers can only display integers. The thermometers would output temperatures of −1, 1, and 0 ºC. However, despite the different calibration of the thermometers, and their outputted temperature, it is not indeterminate whether the temperature of the alcohol in the glass is below or above 0 ºC. Subjective measurements of the hedonistic welfare of nematodes are much more uncertain than measurements of the temperature of ethanol with thermometers. However, what is the fundamental difference that makes you conclude there is no fact of the matter about whether nematodes have a positive or negative welfare per animal-year? Why does it mean one can neglect the welfare of nematodes, but not of farmed insects?
I still prefer the special relativity analogy, because its mathematical structure is similar to what I have in mind about welfare of nematodes. Your alcohol temperature analogy seems to be misleading, because it speaks about over- and underestimations and being well calibrated, but that is not the issue. The clocks of observers in special relativity are all well-calibrated, no clock overestimates time. And yet there is this weird kind of intransitivity in special relativity, where space-time events X and Y happen simultaneously (at time 0), space-time event Z is in the future of Y, and yet events X and Z also happen simultaneously (at time 0, but according to another reference frame). Same goes for nematode welfare: nematode in state X (non-existence) and Y have the same welfare (equal to 0), the nematode in state Z is strictly happier than in Y, and yet there is a welfare frame according to which states X and Z are equally good (welfare 0).
I believe (farmed) insects have a wider welfare range than nematodes, which means it is less likely that all their positive and negative experiences are incommensurable with non-existence. An insect can be so miserable that its welfare is negative according to all welfare frames, in which case it is objectively/absolutely true that that insect has a negative welfare. A nematode cannot reach such intense levels of misery.
Thanks, Stijn.
There is only one right perspective to assess the welfare of a being under hedonism. The perspective of the being whose welfare is being assessed. When I say my best guess is that the (hedonistic) welfare per animal-year of soil nematodes is negative, I am effectively guessing that I would prefer not existing over being born as a random soil nematode.
I am missing a quantitative argument distinguishing nematodes from insects. I feel like someone else could just as reasonably argue for neglecting effects on insects because their welfare range is still too small. For reference, “My estimate for the welfare range of soil nematodes of 6.68*10^-6 is 0.334 % of RP’s mainline welfare range of silkworms of 0.002”. Why is 0.002 not small enough? What is the minimum welfare range for effects to be considered? Why?
The crucial issue is that a nematode may not be able to compare its welfare with non-existence. Even for me it may be hard to compare welfare with non-existence, i.e. imagining a level of welfare at which I would be indifferent with non-existence. I believe there is not always a straightforward answer, even under hedonism, when one’s welfare is at a similar level as non-existence. Just as in special relativity there is not always a straightforward answer when a space-time event happens now. Still, in special relativity, time is a continuous variable that can in principle be measured with infinite accuracy (i.e. clocks could in principle be infinitely well-calibrated in the theory of special relativity). So the notion of time makes perfect sense in special relativity, but the notion of “now” does not. Similarly: the notion of welfare makes perfect sense in hedonism, but the notion of zero welfare does not.
Yes, we are missing quantitative estimates for determining zero welfare of nematodes and insects. Like we do not know the speed of light. All I can say is that in the special relativity analogy, a nematode has a “lower speed of light” than an insect. And sure, I consider it likely that even insects have a welfare range that is smaller than the neutral range. This neutral range is the range of welfare levels that are incommensurable with zero, or the range of welfare levels for which there always is a valid welfare frame such that the welfare is zero. If the welfare range is smaller than the neutral range, it is always impossible to objectively/absolutely determine whether a welfare is positive or negative: there is always a valid welfare frame for which the welfare is positive, and another equally valid welfare frame for which the welfare is negative. This is all compatible with hedonism. I guess you assume in your hedonic theory, the speed of light is infinite, which means there is one absolute welfare frame (as in Newtonian physics there is one absolute reference frame). The more I think about it, the more skeptical I am about that assumption of an absolute welfare frame.
Do you think newborns can compare their (hedonistic) welfare to non-existence? I assume they cannot. However, I still think there is a fact of the matter about whether any given newborn has a positive or negative (expected) welfare over a certain period of time. Likewise for nematodes or any other being.
I do not quite understand what you mean by neutral range, but it looks like you would consider effects on nematodes if the neutral range of these was smaller than their welfare range. If so, you can only neglect effects on nematodes if you are certain their neutral range is larger than their welfare range. I assign this a probability of 0, not 1, as I see welfare per animal-year (as assessed by the being experiencing it) as a continuous distribution.
Yes, I think newborns can compare their welfare with non-existence, to a small degree, but I’m uncertain about it. That is why I think it is so difficult to estimate whether my newborn sons have a positive or negative welfare. I tend to believe that my first son had a negative welfare the first few weeks and positive now, and my second son (who is a month old and lying next to me now) has an average positive welfare these days. But it could easily be indeterminate. For a nematode I’m much more confident that it is indeterminate. A question I would ask is: would the most empathic veterinarians prefer to euthanize a nematode, like they prefers to euthanize a dog when that dog has a negative welfare? I doubt it. Would the most empathic total utilitarians prefer to breed more nematodes, like they prefer the existence of more individuals with positive welfare? I doubt it. Would those people believe that a nematode happens to have exactly 0 welfare? I doubt it. So a nematode’s welfare is not clearly negative, not clearly positive, and not clearly zero. Then what is it? It’s incommensurable with 0.
I wrote some ideas about that neutral range here:
https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2021/10/16/person-affecting-neutral-range-utilitarianism/
https://stijnbruers.wordpress.com/2020/08/26/relativistic-welfare-farm-animal-abolitionism-and-wild-animal-welfarism/
Yes, if a nematode’s neutral range was smaller or zero, I would say that there is an objective fact of the matter whether the nematode has positive or negative welfare. just like when speed of light is infinite, there is an absolute reference frame, and every space-time event is either in the future, the present or the past of this space time-event I call “now!” That’s Newtonian physics.
Your case would be like assigning a probability of 0 to the possibility that the speed of light is finite. Note that the fact that welfare is continuous, is irrelevant: also time in special relativity is continuous.
Thanks for the discussion, and best wishes for your newborn son, Stijn!
yes, this was a fruitful discussion; thanks! I summarized my arguments here: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/udcCBBwGnCneLRjkH/should-we-consider-the-welfare-of-small-soil-animals-on-the