But yeah naive maximization based on hugely uncertain calculations which might tell us stopping factory farming is good one day, then bad the nextâi donât take that seriously.
I wonder whether people are sufficiently thinking at the margin when they make the above criticism. I assume good algorithmic trading models could easily say one should invest more in a company in one day, and less in the next. This does not mean the models are flawed. It could simply mean there is uncertainty about the optimal amount to invest. It would not make sense to frequently shift a large fraction of the resources spent on stopping factory-farming from day to day. However, this does not follow from someone arguing there should be more factory-farming in one day, and less in the next. What follows from a post like mine on the impact of factory-farming accounting for soil animals are tiny shifts in the overall portfolio. I have some related thoughts here.
In addition, I think the takeaway from being very uncertain about whether factory-farming increases or decreases animal welfare is that stopping it is not something that robustly increases welfare. I recommend research on the welfare of soil animals in different biomes over pursuing whatever land use change interventions naively look the most cost-effective.
If weâre not something like robustly certain that stopping factory farming increases animal welfare then weâre not robustly certain anything increases animal welfare.
Trading can happen second to second. Real work on real issues requires years of planning and many years of carrying out. I donât think its wise to get too distracted mid-action unless there is pretty overwhelming evidence that what you are doing is probably bad, or that thereâs a waaaaaaaaaaaaaay better thing to do instead. Making âTiny shiftsâ in a charity portfolio isnât super practical. Rather when we are fairly confident that thereâs something better to be done I think we slowly and carefully make a shift. And being âfairly confidentâ is tricky.
If weâre not something like robustly certain that factory farming increases animal welfare then weâre not robustly certain anything increases animal welfare.
I think you meant âstopping factory-farmingâ. I would say research on the welfare of soil animals has a much lower risk of decreasing welfare in expectation.
Trading can happen second to second. Real work on real issues requires years of planning and many years of carrying out.
Making âTiny shiftsâ in a charity portfolio isnât super practical.
I do not know what you mean by this. However, what I meant is that it makes sense to recommend Y over X if Y is more cost-effective at the margin than X, and the recommendation is not expected to change the marginal cost-effectiveness of X and Y much as a result of changes in their funding caused by the recommendation (which I believe applies to my post).
In terms of direct work, I think interventions with smaller effects on soil animals as a fraction of those on the target beneficiaries have a lower risk of decreasing animal welfare in expectation. For example, I believe cage-free corporate campaigns have a lower risk of decreasing animal welfare in expectation than decreasing the consumption of chicken meat. For my preferred way of comparing welfare across species (where individual welfare per animal-year is proportional to ânumber of neuronsâ^0.5), Iestimate decreasing the consumption of chicken meat changes the welfare of soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes 83.7 k times as much as it increaes the welfare of chickens, whereas Icalculate cage-free corporate campaigns change the welfare of such soil animals 1.15 k times as much as they increase the welfare of chickens. On the other hand, in practice, I expect the effects on soil animals to be sufficiently large in both cases for me to be basically agnostic about whether they increase or decrease welfare in expectation.
Hi Nick.
I wonder whether people are sufficiently thinking at the margin when they make the above criticism. I assume good algorithmic trading models could easily say one should invest more in a company in one day, and less in the next. This does not mean the models are flawed. It could simply mean there is uncertainty about the optimal amount to invest. It would not make sense to frequently shift a large fraction of the resources spent on stopping factory-farming from day to day. However, this does not follow from someone arguing there should be more factory-farming in one day, and less in the next. What follows from a post like mine on the impact of factory-farming accounting for soil animals are tiny shifts in the overall portfolio. I have some related thoughts here.
In addition, I think the takeaway from being very uncertain about whether factory-farming increases or decreases animal welfare is that stopping it is not something that robustly increases welfare. I recommend research on the welfare of soil animals in different biomes over pursuing whatever land use change interventions naively look the most cost-effective.
If weâre not something like robustly certain that stopping factory farming increases animal welfare then weâre not robustly certain anything increases animal welfare.
Trading can happen second to second. Real work on real issues requires years of planning and many years of carrying out. I donât think its wise to get too distracted mid-action unless there is pretty overwhelming evidence that what you are doing is probably bad, or that thereâs a waaaaaaaaaaaaaay better thing to do instead. Making âTiny shiftsâ in a charity portfolio isnât super practical. Rather when we are fairly confident that thereâs something better to be done I think we slowly and carefully make a shift. And being âfairly confidentâ is tricky.
I think you meant âstopping factory-farmingâ. I would say research on the welfare of soil animals has a much lower risk of decreasing welfare in expectation.
Here is how I think about this.
I do not know what you mean by this. However, what I meant is that it makes sense to recommend Y over X if Y is more cost-effective at the margin than X, and the recommendation is not expected to change the marginal cost-effectiveness of X and Y much as a result of changes in their funding caused by the recommendation (which I believe applies to my post).
yes i missed the word stopping!
yes we can always do research for sure thatâs great. I was considering direct work though not including research.
In terms of direct work, I think interventions with smaller effects on soil animals as a fraction of those on the target beneficiaries have a lower risk of decreasing animal welfare in expectation. For example, I believe cage-free corporate campaigns have a lower risk of decreasing animal welfare in expectation than decreasing the consumption of chicken meat. For my preferred way of comparing welfare across species (where individual welfare per animal-year is proportional to ânumber of neuronsâ^0.5), I estimate decreasing the consumption of chicken meat changes the welfare of soil ants, termites, springtails, mites, and nematodes 83.7 k times as much as it increaes the welfare of chickens, whereas I calculate cage-free corporate campaigns change the welfare of such soil animals 1.15 k times as much as they increase the welfare of chickens. On the other hand, in practice, I expect the effects on soil animals to be sufficiently large in both cases for me to be basically agnostic about whether they increase or decrease welfare in expectation.