I think what youāre saying makes sense to me, but Iām confused by the fact you say āI wrote some thoughts related to moral status (not specifically welfare capacity) and personal identity hereā, but then the passage appears to be about moral agency, rather than about moral status/āpatienthood.
And then occasionally the passage appears to use moral agency as if it means moral status/āpatienthood. E.g., āPerhaps people are moral agents most of the time, but wouldnāt your account mean their suffering matters less in itself while they arenāt moral agents, even as normally developed adultsā. Although perhaps that reflects the particular arguments that that passage of yours was responding to.
Could you clarify which concept you were talking about in that passage?
(It looks to me like essentially the same argument you make could hold in relation to moral status anyway, so Iām not saying this undermines your points.)
The original context for that comment was in a discussion where moral agency was proposed to be important, but I think you could substitute other psychological features (autonomy, intelligence, rationality, social nature, social attachments/ālove, etc.) for moral agency and the same argument would apply to them.
I think what youāre saying makes sense to me, but Iām confused by the fact you say āI wrote some thoughts related to moral status (not specifically welfare capacity) and personal identity hereā, but then the passage appears to be about moral agency, rather than about moral status/āpatienthood.
And then occasionally the passage appears to use moral agency as if it means moral status/āpatienthood. E.g., āPerhaps people are moral agents most of the time, but wouldnāt your account mean their suffering matters less in itself while they arenāt moral agents, even as normally developed adultsā. Although perhaps that reflects the particular arguments that that passage of yours was responding to.
Could you clarify which concept you were talking about in that passage?
(It looks to me like essentially the same argument you make could hold in relation to moral status anyway, so Iām not saying this undermines your points.)
The original context for that comment was in a discussion where moral agency was proposed to be important, but I think you could substitute other psychological features (autonomy, intelligence, rationality, social nature, social attachments/ālove, etc.) for moral agency and the same argument would apply to them.