I donāt know of any serious contemporary philosopher who has denied that the conjunction of sentience and agency is sufficient for moral standing, though there are philosophers who deny that agency is sufficient and a small number who deny that sentience is sufficient.
Interesting, thanks!
But I donāt know anybody who holds that view. Do you?
I donāt (but I know very little about the area as a whole, so Iād wouldnāt update on that in particular).
I can see why, if practically no one holds that view, āeven most theologians will agree that all sentient agents have moral standingā. I guess I asked my question because I interpreted the passage as saying that that followed logically from the prior statements alone, whereas it sounds like instead it follows given the prior statements plus a background empirical fact about theologiansā view.
Interesting, thanks!
I donāt (but I know very little about the area as a whole, so Iād wouldnāt update on that in particular).
I can see why, if practically no one holds that view, āeven most theologians will agree that all sentient agents have moral standingā. I guess I asked my question because I interpreted the passage as saying that that followed logically from the prior statements alone, whereas it sounds like instead it follows given the prior statements plus a background empirical fact about theologiansā view.