I agree that many thoughtful people reject impartiality (the majority of human beings probably reject impartiality). But this is not necessarily a reason to think there may be a sound epistemic case not to completely reject partialism.
I think two broad (though not necessarily knock-down) arguments against (some version of) those claims are considerations of epistemic modesty/āhumility and moral uncertainty. More specifically, I see that as at least a reason why itās useful to engage with the idea of non-impartial views, and to try to leave oneās conceptual framework open to such views.
(That said, I also think thereās clear value insometimeshaving discussions that are just about oneās āindependent impressionsāāi.e., what one would believe without updating on the views of others. For example, that helps avoids information cascades. And I do personallyshare strong intuitions towards an impartial/āunitarian approach.)
I found this whole comment thread interesting.
I think two broad (though not necessarily knock-down) arguments against (some version of) those claims are considerations of epistemic modesty/āhumility and moral uncertainty. More specifically, I see that as at least a reason why itās useful to engage with the idea of non-impartial views, and to try to leave oneās conceptual framework open to such views.
(That said, I also think thereās clear value in sometimes having discussions that are just about oneās āindependent impressionsāāi.e., what one would believe without updating on the views of others. For example, that helps avoids information cascades. And I do personally share strong intuitions towards an impartial/āunitarian approach.)