Thanks for the comment. The examples are purely illustrative, so it’s probably best not to wrangle over the specifics of cleaner wrasse behavior and octopus drug responses. I think it’s plausible there are some creatures that by virtue of their natural solitary behavior are incapable of developing intimate bonds with other animals. And although definitions of moral agency certainly vary, I find it plausible that many animals are moral patients but not moral agents. If those two claims are right, then it shows that objective list theories of welfare predict differences in capacity for welfare, which is the point I aim to make in the text.
Hi Michael,
Thanks for the comment. The examples are purely illustrative, so it’s probably best not to wrangle over the specifics of cleaner wrasse behavior and octopus drug responses. I think it’s plausible there are some creatures that by virtue of their natural solitary behavior are incapable of developing intimate bonds with other animals. And although definitions of moral agency certainly vary, I find it plausible that many animals are moral patients but not moral agents. If those two claims are right, then it shows that objective list theories of welfare predict differences in capacity for welfare, which is the point I aim to make in the text.