> It would be good to get a description with deep understanding or causal relationships for how a larger board, board quality, or governance in general would have prevented the FTX collapse, especially in a deceptive environment, like FTX, where low quality efforts can be coopted.
I think it would have been tough for a non-FTX board to have fixed the issue. However, if the boards of EA orgs that heavily interacted with FTX were really on their game, maybe they could have realized that EA should have been more cautious around FTX, and taken corresponding actions. I think FTX itself basically didn’t have a board, and if it did, it could have been much better too.
> Just as importantly, it would be good to have a detailed understanding of how boards would be involved in improving EA org operation.
I think of the board as the ED’s boss. If the org isn’t doing a great job, it’s kind of the ED’s responsibility. If the ED isn’t doing a good job, it’s sort of the board’s responsibility. Boards do have limited abilities in practice (it’s a huge pain to actually fire an ED), but I they definitely have some power. I think good boards help prevent corruption, align incentives from EDs, and help choose new EDs when needed.
> Frankly, this recent governance thread on the forum, has traits that, from the outside, seem to reflect local online trends instead of substance. This can produce “the wrong hill to climb”, wasting effort, disillusioning people, or be coopted.
I see it a bit more like a “window of opportunity/interest”. My hunch is that a lot of EA orgs have struggled a bit with middle/upper management (this is very common for orgs!), and the board seems like a good place to help improve things.
Quick things:
> It would be good to get a description with deep understanding or causal relationships for how a larger board, board quality, or governance in general would have prevented the FTX collapse, especially in a deceptive environment, like FTX, where low quality efforts can be coopted.
I think it would have been tough for a non-FTX board to have fixed the issue. However, if the boards of EA orgs that heavily interacted with FTX were really on their game, maybe they could have realized that EA should have been more cautious around FTX, and taken corresponding actions. I think FTX itself basically didn’t have a board, and if it did, it could have been much better too.
> Just as importantly, it would be good to have a detailed understanding of how boards would be involved in improving EA org operation.
I think of the board as the ED’s boss. If the org isn’t doing a great job, it’s kind of the ED’s responsibility. If the ED isn’t doing a good job, it’s sort of the board’s responsibility. Boards do have limited abilities in practice (it’s a huge pain to actually fire an ED), but I they definitely have some power. I think good boards help prevent corruption, align incentives from EDs, and help choose new EDs when needed.
> Frankly, this recent governance thread on the forum, has traits that, from the outside, seem to reflect local online trends instead of substance. This can produce “the wrong hill to climb”, wasting effort, disillusioning people, or be coopted.
I see it a bit more like a “window of opportunity/interest”. My hunch is that a lot of EA orgs have struggled a bit with middle/upper management (this is very common for orgs!), and the board seems like a good place to help improve things.