Evolutionarily speaking, nothing would change if the rewards and punishment had a value of “alternative value” = k*”value”, where k is positive? The expected value of each action would have been k times as large, but the ratio between the expected value of any 2 actions would have been exactly the same. k can in principle be arbitrarily close to 0. So experiences could have an intensity arbitrarily close to 0 while leading to exactly the same behaviour?
This question gets to me a lot. It seems totally unclear how much the valence of an experience correlates to behavior. Like, it seems plausible that extraordinarily little pain could motivate behavior in simple organisms, but it’s also hard to imagine, since, as a complex organism, I need pretty intense pain to be motivated to significantly change my behavior. And, it doesn’t seem like there’s any way we could reduce uncertainty about this.
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Also, in regards to Bob’s book, it seems like it would make sense, rather than adding the model’s estimates together to instead act on each model separately, i.e. assigning 5% of resources to help animals according to the equality model, 25% according to the neurophysiological model, and 70% according to the proxies model. Then, within the 70% for the proxies model, we could assign 33% of resources to applying a high exponent to the welfare ranges, 33% to applying no exponent to the welfare ranges, and 33% to applying a low exponent to the welfare ranges.
The problem of what percentages you should use and what models to use would, of course, still remain though.
This question gets to me a lot. It seems totally unclear how much the valence of an experience correlates to behavior. Like, it seems plausible that extraordinarily little pain could motivate behavior in simple organisms, but it’s also hard to imagine, since, as a complex organism, I need pretty intense pain to be motivated to significantly change my behavior. And, it doesn’t seem like there’s any way we could reduce uncertainty about this.
Makes sense. Relatedly, you may be interested in the post “Do primitive sentient organisms feel extreme pain? disentangling intensity range and resolution” by Wladimir Alonso and Cynthia Schuck.
Also, in regards to Bob’s book, it seems like it would make sense, rather than adding the model’s estimates together to instead act on each model separately, i.e. assigning 5% of resources to help animals according to the equality model, 25% according to the neurophysiological model, and 70% according to the proxies model. Then, within the 70% for the proxies model, we could assign 33% of resources to applying a high exponent to the welfare ranges, 33% to applying no exponent to the welfare ranges, and 33% to applying a low exponent to the welfare ranges.
I think the above goes against maximising expected value in principle, even if it may be a good approach in practive, and I believe maximising expected value follows from very intuitive premises.
The problem of what percentages you should use and what models to use would, of course, still remain though.
I broadly agree with the points you made in that comment.
You may be interested in myestimates of the total welfare of various organism populations assuming welfare per fully-happy-animal-year is a power law of the individual number of neurons, or of the basal metabolic rate (BMR) at 25 ºC. Here is some context about why a power lay may be appropriate.
The metabolic energy argument makes sense. It’s unclear to me whether we should apply any kind of power law though since consciousness seems to be different in nature, as I view it as likely non-physical.
Only physical consciousness is falsifiable? I think so. So I believe it is better to focus on physicalist theories of consciousness. Relatedly, you may be interested in this discussion between me and Wladimir Alonso from the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) about whether sentience is binary.
Also, in regards to Bob’s book, it seems like it would make sense, rather than adding the model’s estimates together to instead act on each model separately, i.e. assigning 5% of resources to help animals according to the equality model, 25% according to the neurophysiological model, and 70% according to the proxies model. Then, within the 70% for the proxies model, we could assign 33% of resources to applying a high exponent to the welfare ranges, 33% to applying no exponent to the welfare ranges, and 33% to applying a low exponent to the welfare ranges.
Something like this is proposed in the article “Moral Uncertainty, Proportionality and Bargaining”.
You write:
This question gets to me a lot. It seems totally unclear how much the valence of an experience correlates to behavior. Like, it seems plausible that extraordinarily little pain could motivate behavior in simple organisms, but it’s also hard to imagine, since, as a complex organism, I need pretty intense pain to be motivated to significantly change my behavior. And, it doesn’t seem like there’s any way we could reduce uncertainty about this.
--
Also, in regards to Bob’s book, it seems like it would make sense, rather than adding the model’s estimates together to instead act on each model separately, i.e. assigning 5% of resources to help animals according to the equality model, 25% according to the neurophysiological model, and 70% according to the proxies model. Then, within the 70% for the proxies model, we could assign 33% of resources to applying a high exponent to the welfare ranges, 33% to applying no exponent to the welfare ranges, and 33% to applying a low exponent to the welfare ranges.
The problem of what percentages you should use and what models to use would, of course, still remain though.
Hi James.
Makes sense. Relatedly, you may be interested in the post “Do primitive sentient organisms feel extreme pain? disentangling intensity range and resolution” by Wladimir Alonso and Cynthia Schuck.
I think the above goes against maximising expected value in principle, even if it may be a good approach in practive, and I believe maximising expected value follows from very intuitive premises.
Right.
Thanks for sharing that post. I made this comment on it in case you’re curious.
I broadly agree with the points you made in that comment.
You may be interested in my estimates of the total welfare of various organism populations assuming welfare per fully-happy-animal-year is a power law of the individual number of neurons, or of the basal metabolic rate (BMR) at 25 ºC. Here is some context about why a power lay may be appropriate.
The metabolic energy argument makes sense. It’s unclear to me whether we should apply any kind of power law though since consciousness seems to be different in nature, as I view it as likely non-physical.
Only physical consciousness is falsifiable? I think so. So I believe it is better to focus on physicalist theories of consciousness. Relatedly, you may be interested in this discussion between me and Wladimir Alonso from the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) about whether sentience is binary.
Something like this is proposed in the article “Moral Uncertainty, Proportionality and Bargaining”.