It seems to me that Eric Herboso’s reply already does an excellent job of explaining how one can, at the same time, follow proper epistemic rules and promote social justice. I would like to add a couple of considerations. First, I think Hypatia is engaging in a straw man fallacy. They describe social justice norms as having three features:
Placing great emphasis on standpoint epistemology;
Displaying great intolerance and hostility toward dissenting views;
A general skepticism of empirical evidence.
Given their definition of such norms it is understandable that they further incur in the false dilemma denounced by Herboso. But this is quite an uncharitable understanding of the guidelines often suggested to mitigate discrimination in our interpersonal relationships and in our organisations. One ought rather to understand them in the following way:
Assign greater credence to the beliefs of members of discriminated groups as to what constitutes an instance of discrimination and as to what are effective mechanisms to prevent it. This is based on the reasonable (though defeasible) presumption that they are in a privileged epistemic position;
Impose social sanctions on those whose behaviour (including, of course, speech acts) is harmful towards members of discriminated groups. This may include in some contexts behaviour consisting in denying that such discrimination exists or that it needs to be addressed. It is unreasonable to suggest that inquiry and speech should not be subjected to ethical standards (on top of epistemic standards);
Evidence-based reasoning, with the understanding that the burden of proof lies with those who deny that the EA movement must make strenuous efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination in its midst.
Thus, it is the position that funds should not be allocated to combat discrimination within the movement that should be rigorously defended. It is by not addressing social justice issues within the movement that one creates a hostile environment, destroys trust and squanders talent.
Finally, I think it would be profitable if there was an open discussion about the substantive issue of whether there is such thing as structural discrimination in our societies (and within the movement) and its relative moral importance. My hunch is that many apparent disagreements about the interpersonal and organisational norms that should be enforced regarding social justice are rooted in more substantive moral disagreements. What are the best epistemic norms to follow on a daily basis does not depend solely on theoretical epistemic principles, but also on moral and political considerations.
Evidence-based reasoning, with the understanding that the burden of proof lies with those who deny that the EA movement must make strenuous efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination in its midst.
I feel somewhat skeptical of this, given that you also say:
This may include in some contexts behaviour consisting in denying that such discrimination exists or that it needs to be addressed.
It feels like ‘trying to provide empirical evidence that the EA movement should not make overcoming discrimination an overwhelming priority’ can certainly feel like denying discrimination exists, and can feel harmful to people. I’m somewhat skeptical that such a discussion would likely happen in a healthy and constructive way under prevailing social justice discussion norms. Have you ever come across good examples of such discussions?
Hi Neel. Thanks for your respectful reply. Yes, I have been present in discussions in which all parties have been comfortable. Suppose that the background assumption is that gender/racial/class/whatever discrimination exists in the EA community, that it is unjust and that it needs to be addressed. Suppose that the EA organisations involved have taken steps to address it. Suppose that a further assumption is that the burden of evidence lies with those who claim that addressing its existence in the EA community should not be an overwhelming priority. My hypothesis is that these are conditions that allow for a healthy and constructive discussion.
I’m confused about why this comment was heavily downvoted. I’d be curious if people think (a) the norms (“assign greater credence to the beliefs of members of discriminated groups” etc.) described by Eze are bad, or (b) they don’t accurately describe actual “social justice norms” or potential norms at ACE or whatever actual norms may be relevant for this discussion, and therefore the comment is besides the point, or (c) something else.
It seems to me that Eric Herboso’s reply already does an excellent job of explaining how one can, at the same time, follow proper epistemic rules and promote social justice. I would like to add a couple of considerations. First, I think Hypatia is engaging in a straw man fallacy. They describe social justice norms as having three features:
Placing great emphasis on standpoint epistemology;
Displaying great intolerance and hostility toward dissenting views;
A general skepticism of empirical evidence.
Given their definition of such norms it is understandable that they further incur in the false dilemma denounced by Herboso. But this is quite an uncharitable understanding of the guidelines often suggested to mitigate discrimination in our interpersonal relationships and in our organisations. One ought rather to understand them in the following way:
Assign greater credence to the beliefs of members of discriminated groups as to what constitutes an instance of discrimination and as to what are effective mechanisms to prevent it. This is based on the reasonable (though defeasible) presumption that they are in a privileged epistemic position;
Impose social sanctions on those whose behaviour (including, of course, speech acts) is harmful towards members of discriminated groups. This may include in some contexts behaviour consisting in denying that such discrimination exists or that it needs to be addressed. It is unreasonable to suggest that inquiry and speech should not be subjected to ethical standards (on top of epistemic standards);
Evidence-based reasoning, with the understanding that the burden of proof lies with those who deny that the EA movement must make strenuous efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination in its midst.
Thus, it is the position that funds should not be allocated to combat discrimination within the movement that should be rigorously defended. It is by not addressing social justice issues within the movement that one creates a hostile environment, destroys trust and squanders talent.
Finally, I think it would be profitable if there was an open discussion about the substantive issue of whether there is such thing as structural discrimination in our societies (and within the movement) and its relative moral importance. My hunch is that many apparent disagreements about the interpersonal and organisational norms that should be enforced regarding social justice are rooted in more substantive moral disagreements. What are the best epistemic norms to follow on a daily basis does not depend solely on theoretical epistemic principles, but also on moral and political considerations.
I feel somewhat skeptical of this, given that you also say:
It feels like ‘trying to provide empirical evidence that the EA movement should not make overcoming discrimination an overwhelming priority’ can certainly feel like denying discrimination exists, and can feel harmful to people. I’m somewhat skeptical that such a discussion would likely happen in a healthy and constructive way under prevailing social justice discussion norms. Have you ever come across good examples of such discussions?
Hi Neel. Thanks for your respectful reply. Yes, I have been present in discussions in which all parties have been comfortable. Suppose that the background assumption is that gender/racial/class/whatever discrimination exists in the EA community, that it is unjust and that it needs to be addressed. Suppose that the EA organisations involved have taken steps to address it. Suppose that a further assumption is that the burden of evidence lies with those who claim that addressing its existence in the EA community should not be an overwhelming priority. My hypothesis is that these are conditions that allow for a healthy and constructive discussion.
I’m confused about why this comment was heavily downvoted. I’d be curious if people think (a) the norms (“assign greater credence to the beliefs of members of discriminated groups” etc.) described by Eze are bad, or (b) they don’t accurately describe actual “social justice norms” or potential norms at ACE or whatever actual norms may be relevant for this discussion, and therefore the comment is besides the point, or (c) something else.
I must say I am pretty confused as well.