Agreed. The first big barrier to putting self-modification into practice is “how do you do it”; the second big barrier is “how do you prove to others that you’ve done it.” I’m not sure why the authors don’t discuss these two issues more.
On how to actually self-modify/self-deceive, all they say is that it might involve “leaning into and/or refraining from over-riding common-sense moral intuitions”. But that doesn’t explain how to make the change irrevocably (which is the crucial step).
On how to demonstrate self-modification to others, they mention a “society of peers where one’s internal motivations are somewhat transparent to others.” I agree that our motivations are in general somewhat transparent—but are they transparent in this particular case, the case of differentiating between between a deontologist and a consequentialist-leaning-into-common-sense-morality-in-order-to-be-more-trustworthy?
Maybe so. For instance, maybe the deontologist naturally reacts to side-constraint violations with strong emotion, believing that they are intrinsically bad—but the consequentialist naturally reacts with less emotion, believing that the violation is neither good nor bad intrinsically, but instrumentally bad through [long chain of reasoning]. And maybe the emotional response is hard to fake.
So when someone lies to you, if you get angry—rather than exhibiting calculated disapproval—maybe that’s weak evidence that you have an intrinsic aversion to lying.
Actual self-modification-it’s similar to the problem with Pascal’s wager: even if you can persuade yourself of the utility of believing proposition X, it is at best extremely difficult, and, at worst, impossible to make yourself believe it if your epistemological system leads you to a contrary belief.
Counterfeiting deontological position-if the consequentialist basis for rejecting murder-for-organ-harvest is clear, you may nonetheless be able to convey a suitable outrage. Many of the naively repugnant utilitarian conclusions would actually be extraordinarily corrosive to our social fabric and could inspire similar emotional states. Consequentialists are no less emotional, caring, beings than deontologist (in fact we care more, because we don’t subordinate well-being to other principles). Thus the consequentialist surgeon could be just as perturbed by such repugnant schemes because of the actual harm they would entail!
Agreed. The first big barrier to putting self-modification into practice is “how do you do it”; the second big barrier is “how do you prove to others that you’ve done it.” I’m not sure why the authors don’t discuss these two issues more.
On how to actually self-modify/self-deceive, all they say is that it might involve “leaning into and/or refraining from over-riding common-sense moral intuitions”. But that doesn’t explain how to make the change irrevocably (which is the crucial step).
On how to demonstrate self-modification to others, they mention a “society of peers where one’s internal motivations are somewhat transparent to others.” I agree that our motivations are in general somewhat transparent—but are they transparent in this particular case, the case of differentiating between between a deontologist and a consequentialist-leaning-into-common-sense-morality-in-order-to-be-more-trustworthy?
Maybe so. For instance, maybe the deontologist naturally reacts to side-constraint violations with strong emotion, believing that they are intrinsically bad—but the consequentialist naturally reacts with less emotion, believing that the violation is neither good nor bad intrinsically, but instrumentally bad through [long chain of reasoning]. And maybe the emotional response is hard to fake.
So when someone lies to you, if you get angry—rather than exhibiting calculated disapproval—maybe that’s weak evidence that you have an intrinsic aversion to lying.
Actual self-modification-it’s similar to the problem with Pascal’s wager: even if you can persuade yourself of the utility of believing proposition X, it is at best extremely difficult, and, at worst, impossible to make yourself believe it if your epistemological system leads you to a contrary belief.
Counterfeiting deontological position-if the consequentialist basis for rejecting murder-for-organ-harvest is clear, you may nonetheless be able to convey a suitable outrage. Many of the naively repugnant utilitarian conclusions would actually be extraordinarily corrosive to our social fabric and could inspire similar emotional states. Consequentialists are no less emotional, caring, beings than deontologist (in fact we care more, because we don’t subordinate well-being to other principles). Thus the consequentialist surgeon could be just as perturbed by such repugnant schemes because of the actual harm they would entail!