I donât understand why the consequentialist would not simply falsely represent herself as the deontologist, as she could retain the reputational benefits and would almost always act identically.
It seems like self-modifying would, from such a perspective, require a one to act irrationally where a departure from a rule is warranted by the circumstances.
The key here is transparency. Partially because people openly discuss their moral views, and partially because even when not explicitly stating their views, other people are good enough at reading them to get at least weak evidence about whether they are trustworthy, consequentialists may be unable to seem like perfect deontologists without actually being deontologists.
Agreed. The first big barrier to putting self-modification into practice is âhow do you do itâ; the second big barrier is âhow do you prove to others that youâve done it.â Iâm not sure why the authors donât discuss these two issues more.
On how to actually self-modify/âself-deceive, all they say is that it might involve âleaning into and/âor refraining from over-riding common-sense moral intuitionsâ. But that doesnât explain how to make the change irrevocably (which is the crucial step).
On how to demonstrate self-modification to others, they mention a âsociety of peers where oneâs internal motivations are somewhat transparent to others.â I agree that our motivations are in general somewhat transparentâbut are they transparent in this particular case, the case of differentiating between between a deontologist and a consequentialist-leaning-into-common-sense-morality-in-order-to-be-more-trustworthy?
Maybe so. For instance, maybe the deontologist naturally reacts to side-constraint violations with strong emotion, believing that they are intrinsically badâbut the consequentialist naturally reacts with less emotion, believing that the violation is neither good nor bad intrinsically, but instrumentally bad through [long chain of reasoning]. And maybe the emotional response is hard to fake.
So when someone lies to you, if you get angryârather than exhibiting calculated disapprovalâmaybe thatâs weak evidence that you have an intrinsic aversion to lying.
Actual self-modification-itâs similar to the problem with Pascalâs wager: even if you can persuade yourself of the utility of believing proposition X, it is at best extremely difficult, and, at worst, impossible to make yourself believe it if your epistemological system leads you to a contrary belief.
Counterfeiting deontological position-if the consequentialist basis for rejecting murder-for-organ-harvest is clear, you may nonetheless be able to convey a suitable outrage. Many of the naively repugnant utilitarian conclusions would actually be extraordinarily corrosive to our social fabric and could inspire similar emotional states. Consequentialists are no less emotional, caring, beings than deontologist (in fact we care more, because we donât subordinate well-being to other principles). Thus the consequentialist surgeon could be just as perturbed by such repugnant schemes because of the actual harm they would entail!
I donât understand why the consequentialist would not simply falsely represent herself as the deontologist, as she could retain the reputational benefits and would almost always act identically.
It seems like self-modifying would, from such a perspective, require a one to act irrationally where a departure from a rule is warranted by the circumstances.
The key here is transparency. Partially because people openly discuss their moral views, and partially because even when not explicitly stating their views, other people are good enough at reading them to get at least weak evidence about whether they are trustworthy, consequentialists may be unable to seem like perfect deontologists without actually being deontologists.
Agreed. The first big barrier to putting self-modification into practice is âhow do you do itâ; the second big barrier is âhow do you prove to others that youâve done it.â Iâm not sure why the authors donât discuss these two issues more.
On how to actually self-modify/âself-deceive, all they say is that it might involve âleaning into and/âor refraining from over-riding common-sense moral intuitionsâ. But that doesnât explain how to make the change irrevocably (which is the crucial step).
On how to demonstrate self-modification to others, they mention a âsociety of peers where oneâs internal motivations are somewhat transparent to others.â I agree that our motivations are in general somewhat transparentâbut are they transparent in this particular case, the case of differentiating between between a deontologist and a consequentialist-leaning-into-common-sense-morality-in-order-to-be-more-trustworthy?
Maybe so. For instance, maybe the deontologist naturally reacts to side-constraint violations with strong emotion, believing that they are intrinsically badâbut the consequentialist naturally reacts with less emotion, believing that the violation is neither good nor bad intrinsically, but instrumentally bad through [long chain of reasoning]. And maybe the emotional response is hard to fake.
So when someone lies to you, if you get angryârather than exhibiting calculated disapprovalâmaybe thatâs weak evidence that you have an intrinsic aversion to lying.
Actual self-modification-itâs similar to the problem with Pascalâs wager: even if you can persuade yourself of the utility of believing proposition X, it is at best extremely difficult, and, at worst, impossible to make yourself believe it if your epistemological system leads you to a contrary belief.
Counterfeiting deontological position-if the consequentialist basis for rejecting murder-for-organ-harvest is clear, you may nonetheless be able to convey a suitable outrage. Many of the naively repugnant utilitarian conclusions would actually be extraordinarily corrosive to our social fabric and could inspire similar emotional states. Consequentialists are no less emotional, caring, beings than deontologist (in fact we care more, because we donât subordinate well-being to other principles). Thus the consequentialist surgeon could be just as perturbed by such repugnant schemes because of the actual harm they would entail!