I don’t think such a rule has a chance of surviving if impact markets take off?
Added complexity to the norms for trading needs to pay for itself to withstand friction or else decay to its most intuitive equilibrium.
Or the norm for punishing defectors needs to pay for itself in order to stay in equilibrium.
Or someone needs to pay the cost of punishing defectors out of pocket for altruistic reasons.
Once a collateral-charging market takes off, someone could just start up an exchange that doesn’t demand a collateral, and instead just charge a nominal fee that doesn’t disincentivise risky investments but would still make them money. Traders would defect to this market if it’s more profitable for them.
(To be clear, I think I’m very pro GoodX’s project here; I’m just skeptical of the collateral suggestion.)
Traders would adopt a competitor without negative externality mechanisms, but charities wouldn’t, there will be no end buyers there, I wouldn’t expect that kind of vicious amoral competitive pressure between platforms to play out.
But afaik the theory of change of this project doesn’t rely on altruistic “end buyers”, it relies on profit-motivated speculation? At least, the aim is to make it work even in the worst-case scenario where traders are purely motivated by profit, and still have the trades generate altruistic value. Correct me if I’m wrong,
My understanding is that without altruistic end-buyers, then the intrinsic value of impact certificates becomes zero and it’s entirely a confidence game.
There might be a market for that sort of ultimately valueless token now (or several months ago? I haven’t been following the NFT stuff), I’m not sure there will be for long.
I think there’s an argument for the thing you were saying, though… Something like… If one marketplace forbids most foundational AI public works, then another marketplace will pop up with a different negative externality estimation process, and it wont go away, and most charities and government funders still aren’t EA and don’t care about undiscounted expected utility, so there’s a very real risk that that marketplace would become the largest one.
I guess there might not be many people who are charitibly inclined, and who could understand, believe in, and adopt impact markets, but also don’t believe in tail risks. There are lots of people who do one of those things, but I’m not sure there are any who do all.
I don’t think such a rule has a chance of surviving if impact markets take off?
Added complexity to the norms for trading needs to pay for itself to withstand friction or else decay to its most intuitive equilibrium.
Or the norm for punishing defectors needs to pay for itself in order to stay in equilibrium.
Or someone needs to pay the cost of punishing defectors out of pocket for altruistic reasons.
Once a collateral-charging market takes off, someone could just start up an exchange that doesn’t demand a collateral, and instead just charge a nominal fee that doesn’t disincentivise risky investments but would still make them money. Traders would defect to this market if it’s more profitable for them.
(To be clear, I think I’m very pro GoodX’s project here; I’m just skeptical of the collateral suggestion.)
Traders would adopt a competitor without negative externality mechanisms, but charities wouldn’t, there will be no end buyers there, I wouldn’t expect that kind of vicious amoral competitive pressure between platforms to play out.
But afaik the theory of change of this project doesn’t rely on altruistic “end buyers”, it relies on profit-motivated speculation? At least, the aim is to make it work even in the worst-case scenario where traders are purely motivated by profit, and still have the trades generate altruistic value. Correct me if I’m wrong,
Update: If it wasn’t clear, I was wrong. :p
My understanding is that without altruistic end-buyers, then the intrinsic value of impact certificates becomes zero and it’s entirely a confidence game.
There might be a market for that sort of ultimately valueless token now (or several months ago? I haven’t been following the NFT stuff), I’m not sure there will be for long.
Aye, I updated. I was kinda dumb. The magical speculation model is probably not worth going for when end-buyers seem within reach.
I think there’s an argument for the thing you were saying, though… Something like… If one marketplace forbids most foundational AI public works, then another marketplace will pop up with a different negative externality estimation process, and it wont go away, and most charities and government funders still aren’t EA and don’t care about undiscounted expected utility, so there’s a very real risk that that marketplace would become the largest one.
I guess there might not be many people who are charitibly inclined, and who could understand, believe in, and adopt impact markets, but also don’t believe in tail risks. There are lots of people who do one of those things, but I’m not sure there are any who do all.