People can discuss the reasons that they have certain moral or aesthetic preferences. They may even change their mind as a result of these discussions. But there’s nothing irrational about holding a certain set of preferences, so I object to EAs saying that particular preferences are right or wrong, especially if there’s significant disagreement.
But there’s nothing irrational about holding a certain set of preferences,
Sure there can be. As trivial cases, people could have preferences which violate VNM axioms. But usually when we talk about morality we don’t think that merely following the weakest kind of rationality is sufficient for a justified ethical system.
People can discuss the reasons that they have certain moral or aesthetic preferences. They may even change their mind as a result of these discussions. But there’s nothing irrational about holding a certain set of preferences, so I object to EAs saying that particular preferences are right or wrong, especially if there’s significant disagreement.
Sure there can be. As trivial cases, people could have preferences which violate VNM axioms. But usually when we talk about morality we don’t think that merely following the weakest kind of rationality is sufficient for a justified ethical system.