Okay, so maybe it’s not distinct to anti-realism. But that only strengthens my claim that there’s nothing irrational about having different values.
You keep trying to have it both ways. You say “anti-realists can’t claim that certain moral systems are true while others are false.” But then you substitute other words that suggest either empirical or normative claims:
“right”
“justified”
“easy to attack”
“doesn’t make sense”
“proper”
“rational”
“faulty reasoning”
“bad”
Even “intuitive” is subjective. Many cultures have “intuitive” values that we’d find reprehensible. (Getting back to the original claim, many people intuitively value humans much more than other animals.)
Debating value differences can be worthwhile, but I object to the EA attitude of acting like people with different values are “irrational” or “illogical”. It’s “unjustified”, as you’d say, and bad for outreach, especially when the values are controversial.
Again, antirealists can make normative claims just like anyone else. The difference is in how these claims are handled and interpreted. Antirealists just think that truth and falsity are the wrong sort of thing to be looking for when it comes to normative claims.
(And it goes without saying that anyone can make empirical claims.)
Debating value differences can be worthwhile, but I object to the EA attitude of acting like people with different values are “irrational” or “illogical”. It’s “unjustified”, as you’d say
No, I think there are plenty of beliefs and values where we are justified in calling them irrational or illogical. Specifically, there are beliefs and values where the people holding them have poor reasons for doing so, and there are beliefs and values which are harmful in society, and there are a great deal which are in both those groups.
and bad for outreach, especially when the values are controversial.
Maybe. Or maybe it’s important to prevent these ideas from gaining traction. Maybe having a clearly-defined out-group is helpful for the solidarity and strength of the in-group.
Okay, so maybe it’s not distinct to anti-realism. But that only strengthens my claim that there’s nothing irrational about having different values.
You keep trying to have it both ways. You say “anti-realists can’t claim that certain moral systems are true while others are false.” But then you substitute other words that suggest either empirical or normative claims:
“right”
“justified”
“easy to attack”
“doesn’t make sense”
“proper”
“rational”
“faulty reasoning”
“bad”
Even “intuitive” is subjective. Many cultures have “intuitive” values that we’d find reprehensible. (Getting back to the original claim, many people intuitively value humans much more than other animals.)
Debating value differences can be worthwhile, but I object to the EA attitude of acting like people with different values are “irrational” or “illogical”. It’s “unjustified”, as you’d say, and bad for outreach, especially when the values are controversial.
Again, antirealists can make normative claims just like anyone else. The difference is in how these claims are handled and interpreted. Antirealists just think that truth and falsity are the wrong sort of thing to be looking for when it comes to normative claims.
(And it goes without saying that anyone can make empirical claims.)
No, I think there are plenty of beliefs and values where we are justified in calling them irrational or illogical. Specifically, there are beliefs and values where the people holding them have poor reasons for doing so, and there are beliefs and values which are harmful in society, and there are a great deal which are in both those groups.
Maybe. Or maybe it’s important to prevent these ideas from gaining traction. Maybe having a clearly-defined out-group is helpful for the solidarity and strength of the in-group.