Regarding Popper’s claim that it’s impossible to “predict historical developments to the extent to which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge”:
I can see how there might be a certain technical sense in which this is true, though I’m not sufficiently familiar with Popper’s formal arguments to comment in detail.
However, I don’t think the claim can be true in the everyday sense (rather than just for a certain technical sense of “predicting”) that arguably is relevant when making plans for the future.
For example, consider climate change. It seems clear that between now and, say, 2100 our knowledge will grow in various ways that are relevant: we’ll better understand the climate system, but perhaps even more crucially we’ll know more about the social and economic aspects (e.g. how people will to adapt to a warmer climate, how much emission reductions countries will pursue, …) and on how much progress we’ve made with developing various relevant technologies (e.g. renewable energy, batteries, carbon capture and storage, geoengineering, …).
The latter two seem like paradigm examples of things that would be “impossible to predict” in Popper’s sense. But does it follow that regarding climate change we should throw our hands up in the air and do nothing because it’s “impossible to predict the future”? Or that climate change policy faces some deep technical challenge?
Maybe all we are doing when choosing between climate change policies in Popper’s terms is “predicting that certain developments will take place under certain conditions” rather than “predicting historical developments” simpliciter. But as I said, then this to me just suggests that as longtermists we will be just fine using “predictions of certain developments under certain conditions”.
I find it hard to see why there would be a qualitative difference between longtermism (as a practical project) and climate change mitigation which implies that the former is infeasible while the latter is a worthwhile endeavor.
Regarding Popper’s claim that it’s impossible to “predict historical developments to the extent to which they may be influenced by the growth of our knowledge”:
I can see how there might be a certain technical sense in which this is true, though I’m not sufficiently familiar with Popper’s formal arguments to comment in detail.
However, I don’t think the claim can be true in the everyday sense (rather than just for a certain technical sense of “predicting”) that arguably is relevant when making plans for the future.
For example, consider climate change. It seems clear that between now and, say, 2100 our knowledge will grow in various ways that are relevant: we’ll better understand the climate system, but perhaps even more crucially we’ll know more about the social and economic aspects (e.g. how people will to adapt to a warmer climate, how much emission reductions countries will pursue, …) and on how much progress we’ve made with developing various relevant technologies (e.g. renewable energy, batteries, carbon capture and storage, geoengineering, …).
The latter two seem like paradigm examples of things that would be “impossible to predict” in Popper’s sense. But does it follow that regarding climate change we should throw our hands up in the air and do nothing because it’s “impossible to predict the future”? Or that climate change policy faces some deep technical challenge?
Maybe all we are doing when choosing between climate change policies in Popper’s terms is “predicting that certain developments will take place under certain conditions” rather than “predicting historical developments” simpliciter. But as I said, then this to me just suggests that as longtermists we will be just fine using “predictions of certain developments under certain conditions”.
I find it hard to see why there would be a qualitative difference between longtermism (as a practical project) and climate change mitigation which implies that the former is infeasible while the latter is a worthwhile endeavor.