Hereās a google doc comment I wrote expanding on my reasoning related to key takeaway 1, i.e. that āThe book made me a bit less concerned about unrecoverable collapse and unrecoverable dystopia (i.e., the two types of existential catastrophe other than extinction, in Toby Ordās breakdown)ā.
This comment was in the context of what implications Henrichās argument might have for whether impartiality in the moral sense will be more common among future agents, as one sub-question of whether the long-term future will be good or bad in expectation. (Caveats: The comment is definitely going beyond just what Henrich explicitly says, and itās also possible itās based on some misremembering on my part.)
I think Henrich does show that some cultures have higher levels of things like āimpartialityā than others (though he doesnāt talk about precisely that), in particular higher levels of universalism. But we already know that most people donāt have very impartial values, including within Western cultures. So I donāt think this is really a surprising update from Henrich that pushes against how likely future agents are to be impartialāwe already knew that most people arenāt very impartial, and Henrich just tells us that again.
But then Henrich also says that some clusters of values and norms contributed to greater economic and scientific progress in some places, and allowed those places to become dominant, and then the values have started to spread elsewhere as well via imitation etc. And that cluster of values and norms includes the impartiality-like stuff. So Henrich actually implies those things have higher āfitnessā in the cultural evolutionary sense.
So I think Henrich should mostly update us from āsome people are more impartial, but most arenāt, and we donāt know why, so who knows what the future bringsā to āsome people are more impartial, but most arenāt, but the former seems to have to do with things that are more culturally fit and thus may typically multiply themselves, āconquerā other things, and/āor be imitated, so we have weak reason to believe the future will have more of that.ā
Hereās a google doc comment I wrote expanding on my reasoning related to key takeaway 1, i.e. that āThe book made me a bit less concerned about unrecoverable collapse and unrecoverable dystopia (i.e., the two types of existential catastrophe other than extinction, in Toby Ordās breakdown)ā.
This comment was in the context of what implications Henrichās argument might have for whether impartiality in the moral sense will be more common among future agents, as one sub-question of whether the long-term future will be good or bad in expectation. (Caveats: The comment is definitely going beyond just what Henrich explicitly says, and itās also possible itās based on some misremembering on my part.)