This is a very thought-provoking idea—thank you Aaron for sharing it. That said, I wonder about the analogy with carbon credits, which are based on the fungibility of carbon: one ton emitted can, in principle, be balanced by one ton absorbed elsewhere. When it comes to sentient experience, things are less straightforward.
For example, if a laying hen endures 200 hours of Disabling Pain, what would it mean to “offset” that suffering? Supporting a happier life for another animal may be valuable in itself, but it doesn’t reverse or neutralize the original experience. Each animal is a distinct individual, and pain—unlike carbon—cannot be canceled by pleasure elsewhere.
From a practical standpoint too, the goal should be to ensure funding is tied as tightly as possible to direct improvements at the source of suffering. The risk of a credit market is that it can introduce a layer of abstraction, where the focus shifts from making a specific farm better to simply trading units of ‘welfare’ to balance a ledger.
Speaking from the perspective of the Welfare Footprint approach (apologies for the self-reference), I see real potential in identifying reforms that can prevent large amounts of intense suffering in a measurable way. For instance, if evidence shows that implementing electrical stunning in a shrimp slaughter facility could avert, say, one billion hours of Disabling Pain and one hundred thousand hours of Excruciating Pain annually—and if that reform costs $200,000—then this creates a clear and actionable opportunity to “pay to reduce time in intense pain” directly. That might align well with what you’re suggesting, while avoiding some of the conceptual challenges that arise from offsetting.
This is a very thought-provoking idea—thank you Aaron for sharing it. That said, I wonder about the analogy with carbon credits, which are based on the fungibility of carbon: one ton emitted can, in principle, be balanced by one ton absorbed elsewhere. When it comes to sentient experience, things are less straightforward.
For example, if a laying hen endures 200 hours of Disabling Pain, what would it mean to “offset” that suffering? Supporting a happier life for another animal may be valuable in itself, but it doesn’t reverse or neutralize the original experience. Each animal is a distinct individual, and pain—unlike carbon—cannot be canceled by pleasure elsewhere.
From a practical standpoint too, the goal should be to ensure funding is tied as tightly as possible to direct improvements at the source of suffering. The risk of a credit market is that it can introduce a layer of abstraction, where the focus shifts from making a specific farm better to simply trading units of ‘welfare’ to balance a ledger.
Speaking from the perspective of the Welfare Footprint approach (apologies for the self-reference), I see real potential in identifying reforms that can prevent large amounts of intense suffering in a measurable way. For instance, if evidence shows that implementing electrical stunning in a shrimp slaughter facility could avert, say, one billion hours of Disabling Pain and one hundred thousand hours of Excruciating Pain annually—and if that reform costs $200,000—then this creates a clear and actionable opportunity to “pay to reduce time in intense pain” directly. That might align well with what you’re suggesting, while avoiding some of the conceptual challenges that arise from offsetting.