I think that we probably spent too much time ensuring SBF felt respected and too little ensuring that he and Caroline weren’t engaged in large scale fraud.
Very likely true! My point was that there are many types of donor risks, and we have to be careful about managing the entire basket of them. Means of mitigating certain types of donor risks may increase other risks. Thus, we should consider the risk of fraud/insolvency based on readily-available information against other donor-related risks before deciding how much to poke the bear.
Here, SBF’s wealth was poorly understood, was in a small private company, was in an industry with lots of fraud and very poor regulation, was new money, and was not “in the bag” in terms of being committed to charitable causes. The next megadonor might be someone whose wealth came from shares in a publicly-traded “boring” company in a more mature and properly-regulated field. Their donor risk profile would be much different than SBF’s.
I think that we probably spent too much time ensuring SBF felt respected and too little ensuring that he and Caroline weren’t engaged in large scale fraud.
Very likely true! My point was that there are many types of donor risks, and we have to be careful about managing the entire basket of them. Means of mitigating certain types of donor risks may increase other risks. Thus, we should consider the risk of fraud/insolvency based on readily-available information against other donor-related risks before deciding how much to poke the bear.
Here, SBF’s wealth was poorly understood, was in a small private company, was in an industry with lots of fraud and very poor regulation, was new money, and was not “in the bag” in terms of being committed to charitable causes. The next megadonor might be someone whose wealth came from shares in a publicly-traded “boring” company in a more mature and properly-regulated field. Their donor risk profile would be much different than SBF’s.