Insofar as I value conscious experiences purely by virtue of their valence (i.e. positivity or negativity), I value animals not too much less than humans (discounted to the extent I suspect that they’re “less conscious” or “less capable of feeling highly positive states”, which I’m still quite uncertain about).
Insofar as I value preference fulfilment in general, I value humans significantly more than animals (because human preferences are stronger and more complex than animals’) but not overwhelmingly so, because animals have strong and reasonably consistent preferences too.
Insofar as I value specific types of conscious experiences and preference fulfilment, such as “reciprocated romantic love” or “achieving one’s overarching life goals”, then I value humans far more than animals (and would probably value posthumans significantly more than humans).
I don’t think there are knock-down arguments in favour of any of these approaches, and so I usually try to balance all of these considerations. Broadly speaking, I do this by prioritising hedonic components when I think about preventing disvalue, and by prioritising the other components when I think about creating value.
Would you say the discrepancy between preferences and hedonism is because humans can (and do) achieve much greater highs than nonhuman animals under preferences, but human and nonhuman lows aren’t so different?
Also, it seems that for an antifrustrationist with respect to preferences, a human might on average be worse off than a nonhuman animal at a similar positive average hedonistic welfare level, precisely because humans have more unsatisfied preferences.
Would you say the discrepancy between preferences and hedonism is because humans can (and do) achieve much greater highs than nonhuman animals under preferences, but human and nonhuman lows aren’t so different?
Something like that. Maybe the key idea here is my ranking of possible lives:
Amazing hedonic state + all personal preferences satisfied >> amazing hedonic state.
Terrible hedonic state ≈ terrible hedonic state + all personal preferences violated.
In other words, if I imagine myself suffering enough hedonically I don’t really care about any other preferences I have about my life any more by comparison. Whereas that isn’t true for feelings of bliss.
I imagine things being more symmetrical for animals, I guess because I don’t consider their preferences to be as complex or core to their identities.
Insofar as I value conscious experiences purely by virtue of their valence (i.e. positivity or negativity), I value animals not too much less than humans (discounted to the extent I suspect that they’re “less conscious” or “less capable of feeling highly positive states”, which I’m still quite uncertain about).
Insofar as I value preference fulfilment in general, I value humans significantly more than animals (because human preferences are stronger and more complex than animals’) but not overwhelmingly so, because animals have strong and reasonably consistent preferences too.
Insofar as I value specific types of conscious experiences and preference fulfilment, such as “reciprocated romantic love” or “achieving one’s overarching life goals”, then I value humans far more than animals (and would probably value posthumans significantly more than humans).
I don’t think there are knock-down arguments in favour of any of these approaches, and so I usually try to balance all of these considerations. Broadly speaking, I do this by prioritising hedonic components when I think about preventing disvalue, and by prioritising the other components when I think about creating value.
Would you say the discrepancy between preferences and hedonism is because humans can (and do) achieve much greater highs than nonhuman animals under preferences, but human and nonhuman lows aren’t so different?
Also, it seems that for an antifrustrationist with respect to preferences, a human might on average be worse off than a nonhuman animal at a similar positive average hedonistic welfare level, precisely because humans have more unsatisfied preferences.
Something like that. Maybe the key idea here is my ranking of possible lives:
Amazing hedonic state + all personal preferences satisfied >> amazing hedonic state.
Terrible hedonic state ≈ terrible hedonic state + all personal preferences violated.
In other words, if I imagine myself suffering enough hedonically I don’t really care about any other preferences I have about my life any more by comparison. Whereas that isn’t true for feelings of bliss.
I imagine things being more symmetrical for animals, I guess because I don’t consider their preferences to be as complex or core to their identities.