Maybe one way to think about torture causing us to abandon other life goals is that it induces in us a strong and urgent life goal to end the torture. Of course, itâs a bit weird to call it a life goal, given how much it focuses on its immediate achievement. Would you still consider this a life goal, anyway? It seems like it might often not meet âbeing strategic in oneâs thinking about objectivesâ, if the individual is too desperate to think strategically.
Iâd guess this isnât what happens for burnout, although people do want to not feel miserable and burned out, but they might not take an âoptimizing mindsetâ at all to it.
Of course, it doesnât need to be the case that every life goal that is abandoned is abandoned because a conflicting life goal was adopted and prioritized.
However,, if torture (or depression, etc.) is meant to be bad even if it doesnât frustrate life goals, then Iâm guessing you wouldnât intend for life goals to account for all that we should care about on behalf of someone.
Of course, it doesnât need to be the case that every life goal that is abandoned is abandoned because a conflicting life goal was adopted and prioritized.
Yeah, in the case of torture or burnout, I find it more natural to think of it as the personâs needs-meeting machinery rebelling against the long-term planning parts of the brain/âself. That said, transformative experiences like torture or suffering through disillusionment or burnout could induce changes that lead to the adoption of other life goals, perhaps ones that put a lot of weight on avoiding suffering or ones that give more room to personal needs. (Though allowing oneself to care about personal needs can also be viewed as an instrumental adjustment to make the original life goal â the one that led to burnout â sustainable again.)
However, if torture (or depression, etc.) is meant to be bad even if it doesnât frustrate life goals, then Iâm guessing you wouldnât intend for life goals to account for all that we should care about on behalf of someone.
Indeed! I donât mean for life goals to be the fundamental building blocks in a moral theory like preference utilitarianism. I do think of them as âbuilding blocksâ or âkey conceptsâ in my moral reasoning repertoire, but mostly in the sense of âif someone does have a life goal, that seems clearly relevant somehow.â Other things can matter too. For instance, reducing suffering unambiguously falls into the care/âaltruism dimension of morality. Non-human animals donât have life goals, but it still seems âgood from an impartial perspectiveâ to help them.
Likewise, when a person doesnât have a life goal (picture someone who has no responsibilities and plays video games as much as they can), we still want to care for that person. Obviously, they shouldnât suffer, but there seem to be degrees of freedom after that (basically all the writing in AI alignment on how itâs difficult to define âhuman valuesâ).
Maybe one way to think about torture causing us to abandon other life goals is that it induces in us a strong and urgent life goal to end the torture. Of course, itâs a bit weird to call it a life goal, given how much it focuses on its immediate achievement. Would you still consider this a life goal, anyway? It seems like it might often not meet âbeing strategic in oneâs thinking about objectivesâ, if the individual is too desperate to think strategically.
Iâd guess this isnât what happens for burnout, although people do want to not feel miserable and burned out, but they might not take an âoptimizing mindsetâ at all to it.
Of course, it doesnât need to be the case that every life goal that is abandoned is abandoned because a conflicting life goal was adopted and prioritized.
However,, if torture (or depression, etc.) is meant to be bad even if it doesnât frustrate life goals, then Iâm guessing you wouldnât intend for life goals to account for all that we should care about on behalf of someone.
Yeah, in the case of torture or burnout, I find it more natural to think of it as the personâs needs-meeting machinery rebelling against the long-term planning parts of the brain/âself. That said, transformative experiences like torture or suffering through disillusionment or burnout could induce changes that lead to the adoption of other life goals, perhaps ones that put a lot of weight on avoiding suffering or ones that give more room to personal needs. (Though allowing oneself to care about personal needs can also be viewed as an instrumental adjustment to make the original life goal â the one that led to burnout â sustainable again.)
Indeed! I donât mean for life goals to be the fundamental building blocks in a moral theory like preference utilitarianism. I do think of them as âbuilding blocksâ or âkey conceptsâ in my moral reasoning repertoire, but mostly in the sense of âif someone does have a life goal, that seems clearly relevant somehow.â Other things can matter too. For instance, reducing suffering unambiguously falls into the care/âaltruism dimension of morality. Non-human animals donât have life goals, but it still seems âgood from an impartial perspectiveâ to help them.
Likewise, when a person doesnât have a life goal (picture someone who has no responsibilities and plays video games as much as they can), we still want to care for that person. Obviously, they shouldnât suffer, but there seem to be degrees of freedom after that (basically all the writing in AI alignment on how itâs difficult to define âhuman valuesâ).