This was interesting to read! I don’t necessarily think the points that Greg Lewis pointed out are that big of a deal because while it can sometimes be embarrassing to discuss and investigate things as non-experts, there are also benefits that can come from it. Especially when the experts seem to be slow or under political constraints or sometimes just wrong in the case of individual experts. But I agree that EA can fall into a pattern where interested amateurs discuss technical topics with the ambition (and confidence?) of domain experts—without enough people in the room noticing that they might be out of their depth and missing subtle but important things.
Some comments on the UK government’s early reaction to Covid:
So one is, if you look at SAGE, which is the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies, who released what they had two weeks ago in terms of advice that they were giving the government, which is well worth a read. And my reading of it was essentially they were essentially weeks ahead of EA discourse in terms of all the considerations they should be weighing up.
Even if we assume that it wasn’t possible for non-experts to do better than SAGE, I’d say it was still reasonable for people to have been worried that the government was not on top of things. The recent Covid inquiry lays out that SAGE was only used to assess the consequences of policies that the politicians presented before them; lockdown wasn’t deemed politically feasible (without much thought—it basically just wasn’t seriously considered until very late). This led to government communications doing this weird dance where they tried to keep the public calm and speak about herd immunity and lowering the peak, but their measures and expectations did not match the reality of the situation.
Not to mention that when it came to the second lockdown later in 2020, by that point Boris Johnson was listening to epidemiologists who were just outright wrong. (Sunetra Gupta had this model that herd immunity had already been reached because there was this “iceberg” of not-yet-seen infections.) It’s unclear how much similar issues were already a factor in February/March of 2020. (I feel like I vaguely remember a government source mentioning vast numbers of asymptomatic infections before the first lockdown, but I just asked Claude about summarizing the inquiry findings on this, and Claude didn’t find anything that would point to this having been a factor. So, maybe I misremembered or maybe the government person did say that in one press interview as a possibility, but then it wasn’t a decisive factor in policy decisions and SAGE itself obviously never took this seriously because it could be ruled out early on.)
So, my point is that you can hardly blame EAs for not leaving things up to the experts if the “experts” include people who even in autumn of 2020 thought that herd immunity had already been reached, and if the Prime Minister picks them to listen to rather than SAGE.
Lastly, I think Gregory Lewis was at risk of being overconfident about the relevance of expert training or “being an expert” when he said that EAs who were right about the government U-turn about lockdowns were right only in the sense of a broken clock. I was one of several EAs who loudly and clearly said “the government is wrong about this!.” I even asked in an EA Covid group if we should be trying to get the attention of people in government about it. This might have been like 1-2 days before they did the U-turn. How would Greg Lewis know that I (and other non-experts like me—I wasn’t the only one who felt confident that the government was wrong about something right before March 16th) had not done sound steps of reasoning at the time?
I’m not sure myself; I admittedly remember having some weirdly overconfident adjacent beliefs at the time, not about the infection fatality rate [I think I was always really good at forecasting that—you can go through my Metaculus commenting history here], but about what the government experts were basing their estimates on. I for some reason thought it was reasonably plausible that the government experts were making a particular, specific mistake about interpreting the findings from the Cruise ship cases, but I didn’t have much evidence of them making that specific mistake [other than them mentioning the Cruise ship in connection with estimating a specific number], nor would it even make sense for government experts to stake a lot of their credence in just one single data point [because neither did I]. So, me thinking I know that they were making a specific mistake, as opposed to just being wrong for reasons that must be obscure to me, seems like pretty bad epistemics. But anyway, other than that, I feel like my comments from early March 2020 aged remarkably well and I could imagine that people don’t appreciate how much you will know and understand about a subject if you follow it obsessively with all your attention every single day. And it doesn’t take genius statistics skill to piece together infection fatality estimates and hospitalization estimates from different outbreaks around the world. Just using common sense and trying to adjust for age stratification effects with very crude math, and reasoning about where countries do good or bad testing (like, reading about the testing in Korea, it became clear to me that they probably were not missing tons of cases, which was very relevant in ruling out some hypothesis about vast amounts of asymptomatic infections), etc. This stuff was not rocket science.
Amanda Askell a few hours ago on twitter: