“The implication of these historical outcomes is that in order to reliably affect decision-making, you must yourself be the decision-maker. Prestige, access to decision-makers, relevant expertise, and cogent reasoning are not sufficient; even with all these you are liable to be ignored. By understanding the complex workings of decision-making at the highest levels, you can improve your chances of influencing outcomes in the way you desire, but even if you understand how the game is played, you are ultimately subject to the judgment of those who wield power, and this judgment can be frustratingly capricious. Without even such an understanding, you stand little or no chance whatsoever. ”
Nevertheless, I think this claim is overconfident and unfounded. We can’t just generalise from one case to the entire universe of cases! A more accurate assessment needs to reckon with the success of the nuclear and biological weapons arms control epistemic community in the early 1970s (such as Kissinger and Meselson) - as well as the many other examples of scientific advisers being influential.
Thanks the good points and the links! I agree the arms control epistemic community is an important story here, and re-reading Adler’s article I notice he even talks about how Szilard’s ideas were influential after all:
Very few people were as influential in the intellectual development of the arms control approach as Leo Szilard, whom Norman Cousins described as “an idea factory.” Although Szilard remained an outsider to RAND and to the halls of government, his indirect influence was considerable because he affected those who had an impact on political decisions. About a decade before arms control ideas had gained prominence, Szilard anticipated the nuclear stalemate and the use of mobile ICBMs, called for intermediate steps of force reduction with different totals for different systems, considered that an overwhelming counterforce capability would cause instability, was one of the first people to oppose an ABM system, and pleaded for a no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons. Some of Szilard’s proposals were unorthodox and visionary and thus made people think hard about unorthodox solutions.
Despite this, in my reading Adler’s article doesn’t contradict the conclusions of the report: my takeaway is that “Prestige, access to decision-makers, relevant expertise, and cogent reasoning” (while not sufficient on its own) is a good foundation that can be leveraged to gain influence, if used by a community of people working strategically over a long time period, whose members gain key positions in the relevant institutions.
The authors’ takeaway is:
I’m sympathetic to this view, and think they’re right about this case study (eg see my Are you really in a race? The Cautionary Tales of Szilárd and Ellsberg).
Nevertheless, I think this claim is overconfident and unfounded. We can’t just generalise from one case to the entire universe of cases! A more accurate assessment needs to reckon with the success of the nuclear and biological weapons arms control epistemic community in the early 1970s (such as Kissinger and Meselson) - as well as the many other examples of scientific advisers being influential.
Thanks the good points and the links! I agree the arms control epistemic community is an important story here, and re-reading Adler’s article I notice he even talks about how Szilard’s ideas were influential after all:
Despite this, in my reading Adler’s article doesn’t contradict the conclusions of the report: my takeaway is that “Prestige, access to decision-makers, relevant expertise, and cogent reasoning” (while not sufficient on its own) is a good foundation that can be leveraged to gain influence, if used by a community of people working strategically over a long time period, whose members gain key positions in the relevant institutions.