Iām not completely sure I would call your view constructivist, because of this comment by Sebo under the same piece.
Also, hereās a random thought, which I donāt necessarily think works/āholds for your view, but Iām curious what you think. I think objective tends to mean, as Huemer puts it in Ethical Intuitionism, constitutively independent of the attitudes of observers specifically, rather than anyoneās attitudes or stances. For example, a preference utilitarian can think there is an objective moral fact that it is bad to, all else equal, do something to someone that they disprefer, even though the ābadnessā comes from their dispreference. It seems like that would be subjective only if the claim was that it was bad according to some observer. But I donāt know if that means your view accepts objective or stance-independent moral facts.
For example, a preference utilitarian can think there is an objective moral fact that it is bad to, all else equal, do something to someone that they disprefer, even though the ābadnessā comes from their dispreference. It seems like that would be subjective only if the claim was that it was bad according to some observer.
Iām personally not sympathetic to such a claim. What makes it objective? Rather, to me, itās just bad to the person who disprefers it (and possibly other individuals). They are an observer. They are observers of their own mental states and things in the world, and they have attitudes about them.
The view I describe in this piece could be made objective in the way you describe, though.
Iām not completely sure I would call your view constructivist, because of this comment by Sebo under the same piece.
Also, hereās a random thought, which I donāt necessarily think works/āholds for your view, but Iām curious what you think. I think objective tends to mean, as Huemer puts it in Ethical Intuitionism, constitutively independent of the attitudes of observers specifically, rather than anyoneās attitudes or stances. For example, a preference utilitarian can think there is an objective moral fact that it is bad to, all else equal, do something to someone that they disprefer, even though the ābadnessā comes from their dispreference. It seems like that would be subjective only if the claim was that it was bad according to some observer. But I donāt know if that means your view accepts objective or stance-independent moral facts.
Iām personally not sympathetic to such a claim. What makes it objective? Rather, to me, itās just bad to the person who disprefers it (and possibly other individuals). They are an observer. They are observers of their own mental states and things in the world, and they have attitudes about them.
The view I describe in this piece could be made objective in the way you describe, though.