For something to constitute an “s-risk” under this definition, the suffering involved not only has to be astronomical in scope (e.g., “more suffering than has existed on Earth so far”),[5] but also significant compared to other sources of expected future suffering. This last bit ensures that “s-risks,” assuming sufficient tractability, are always a top priority for suffering-focused longtermists.
Nitpick but you also need to assume sufficient likelihood, right? One might very well be a suffering-focused longtermist and think s-risks are tractable but so exceedingly unlikely that they’re not a top priority relative to, e.g., near-term animal suffering (especially if they prefer risk aversion over classic expected value reasoning).
(I’m not arguing that someone who thinks that is right. I actually think they’re probably very wrong. Just wanted to make sure we agree the definition of s-risks doesn’t include any claim about their likelihood .) :)
Just wanted to make sure we agree the definition of s-risks doesn’t include any claim about their likelihood
That’s probably the best way to think of it, yeah.
I think the definition isn’t rigorous enough to withstand lots of scrutiny. Still, in my view, it serves as a useful “pointer.”
You could argue that the definition implicitly tracks probabilities because in order to assess whether some source of expected suffering constitutes an s-risk, we have to check how it matches up against all other sources of expected suffering in terms of “probability times magnitude and severity.” But this just moves the issue to “what’s our current expectation over future suffering.” It’s definitely reasonable for people to have widely different views on this, so it makes sense to have that discussion independent of the specific assumptions behind that s-risk definition.
(emphasis is mine)
Nitpick but you also need to assume sufficient likelihood, right? One might very well be a suffering-focused longtermist and think s-risks are tractable but so exceedingly unlikely that they’re not a top priority relative to, e.g., near-term animal suffering (especially if they prefer risk aversion over classic expected value reasoning).
(I’m not arguing that someone who thinks that is right. I actually think they’re probably very wrong. Just wanted to make sure we agree the definition of s-risks doesn’t include any claim about their likelihood .) :)
Good point, thanks!
That’s probably the best way to think of it, yeah.
I think the definition isn’t rigorous enough to withstand lots of scrutiny. Still, in my view, it serves as a useful “pointer.”
You could argue that the definition implicitly tracks probabilities because in order to assess whether some source of expected suffering constitutes an s-risk, we have to check how it matches up against all other sources of expected suffering in terms of “probability times magnitude and severity.” But this just moves the issue to “what’s our current expectation over future suffering.” It’s definitely reasonable for people to have widely different views on this, so it makes sense to have that discussion independent of the specific assumptions behind that s-risk definition.