I would like to see research on how to increase the welfare ofsoil animalsandmicroorganisms, including on how to build capacity to do this.Ithinkwhether interventions increase or decrease welfare in expectationis determined by very uncertain dominant effects on such potential beings. I do not even know whether electrically stunning shrimp increases or decreases welfare, even if I was certain it increased the welfare of shrimps conditional on these being sentient.
As a panpsychist and suffering abolitionist, Iām one of the most sympathetic people in the world to the cause of reducing suffering even in the smallest beings. And yet, I do not want to see more research on how to increase the welfare of microorganisms on the margin (or at least not with EA resources).
I probably wonāt change your mind about meta ethics, but I strongly disagree with the aggregationist QALY approach to comparing the welfare of humans vs e.g. soil animals (e.g. here). I hope to write more about this at some point, but as an intuition pump, I think thereās a good chance that the problem of reducing soil animal or microorganism suffering is somewhat analogous to the problem of reducing, say, pin pricks in humans. I would not support EA efforts to reduce the number of pin pricks in humans, no matter how vast, given that we also have humans who are actually being tortured right now.
As much as I care about insects and other small organisms, Iām really sad that the EA community invests far more resources into their well-being than to reducing torture in humans (e.g. there are 120 EA Forum posts on Invertebrate Welfare and only 7 on cluster headache; and there isnāt even an EA Forum tag for āTortureā despite it still being a huge problem globally (Claude estimated 1ā2m people tortured per year, ChatGPT estimated 500kā2m)).
I really appreciate your work, and I think we should absolutely think about these problems. But, on the margin, Iād rather see other work being done.
I would not support EA efforts to reduce the number of pin pricks in humans, no matter how vast, given that we also have humans who are actually being tortured right now.
Would you avert 2 h of pain of intensity 0.999 instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1? If so, would you avert 4 h (= 2*2) of pain of intensity 0.998 (= 0.999^2) instead of 2 h of pain of intensity 0.999? If so, why not generalise, and conclude you would avert 2^N h of pain of intensity 0.999^N instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1? You could endorse this, and still value averting pain more than proportionally to its intensity. The expected pain averted by picking the 1st option would be 2^N*0.999^N/ā(1*1) = 1.998^N times the expected pain averted by picking the 2nd option. However, averting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensity.
As much as I care about insects and other small organisms, Iām really sad that the EA community invests far more resources into their well-being than to reducing torture in humans (e.g. there are 120 EA Forum posts on Invertebrate Welfare and only 7 on cluster headache; and there isnāt even an EA Forum tag for āTortureā despite it still being a huge problem globally (Claude estimated 1ā2m people tortured per year, ChatGPT estimated 500kā2m)).
I think less funding is a better proxy for higher cost-effectiveness than fewer EA Forum posts. Do you know how much funding is spent globally per year on preventing human torture? I am not aware of any project studying the welfare of soil springtails, mites, and nematodes, which are the most abundant soil animals. There are no results for āspringtailā, āmite ā, and ānematodeā on Wild Animal Initiativeās (WAIās) grantees page.
If so, why not generalise, and conclude you would avert 2^N h of pain of intensity 0.999^N instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1?
I think the procedure might not be generalizable, for the following reason. I currently think that a moment of conscious experience corresponds to a specific configuration of the electromagnetic field. As such, it can undergo phase transitions, analogous to how water goes abruptly from liquid to gas at 100Ā°C. Using the 1-dimensional quantity ātemperatureā can be useful in some contexts but is insufficient in others. Steam is not simply āliquid water but a bit warmerā; steam has very different properties altogether.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnāt (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim āreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamā would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
(Here are some thoughts on phase transitions in certain altered states of consciousness.)
Do you know how much funding is spent globally per year on preventing human torture?
I donāt! Thatās the sort of question Iād like to see more research on (or discussed more on the Forum if such research already exists), as well as which torture-prevention orgs/āprograms are most cost-effective, etc.
Steam is not simply āliquid water but a bit warmerā; steam has very different properties altogether.
I agree pains of different intensities have different properties. My understanding is that the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) relies on this to some extent to define their 4 pain categories. However, I do not understand how that undermines my point. Water and water vapor have different properties, but we can still compare their temperature. Liwekise, I think we can compare the intensity of different pain experiences even if they have different properties.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnāt (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim āreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamā would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
I seem to agree. Assuming water had a potential to kill people of exactly 0, and steam had a potential to kill people above 0, no amount of water would have the potential to kill as many people as some amount of steam. However, I do not think this undermines my point. When I say that āaverting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensityā, the very low intensity still has to be higher than an intensity of exactly 0.
Hi Alfredo. I would be curious to know your thoughts on my post All pains are comparable?. You are welcome to comment there.
Summary
I agree there are pains which feel qualitatively different in the sense of having distinct properties. For example, annoying and excruciating pain as defined by the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI).
Some think there are pains whose intensity is incomparably/āqualitatively worse than others. For instance, some believe averting an arbitrarily short time of excruciating pain in humans is better than averting an arbitrarily long time of annoying pain in humans. In contrast, I would prefer warming up slightly cold patches of soil for sufficiently many nematodes over averting 1 trillion human-years of extreme torture.
Consider a human body as described by the state of all of its fundamental particles. Are there any 2 states which are only infinitesimally different whose pain intensities are not quantitatively comparable? I do not see how this could be possible. So I conclude the pain intensities for any 2 states of a human body are quantitatively comparable.
I would like to see research on how to increase the welfare of soil animals and microorganisms, including on how to build capacity to do this. I think whether interventions increase or decrease welfare in expectation is determined by very uncertain dominant effects on such potential beings. I do not even know whether electrically stunning shrimp increases or decreases welfare, even if I was certain it increased the welfare of shrimps conditional on these being sentient.
As a panpsychist and suffering abolitionist, Iām one of the most sympathetic people in the world to the cause of reducing suffering even in the smallest beings. And yet, I do not want to see more research on how to increase the welfare of microorganisms on the margin (or at least not with EA resources).
I probably wonāt change your mind about meta ethics, but I strongly disagree with the aggregationist QALY approach to comparing the welfare of humans vs e.g. soil animals (e.g. here). I hope to write more about this at some point, but as an intuition pump, I think thereās a good chance that the problem of reducing soil animal or microorganism suffering is somewhat analogous to the problem of reducing, say, pin pricks in humans. I would not support EA efforts to reduce the number of pin pricks in humans, no matter how vast, given that we also have humans who are actually being tortured right now.
As much as I care about insects and other small organisms, Iām really sad that the EA community invests far more resources into their well-being than to reducing torture in humans (e.g. there are 120 EA Forum posts on Invertebrate Welfare and only 7 on cluster headache; and there isnāt even an EA Forum tag for āTortureā despite it still being a huge problem globally (Claude estimated 1ā2m people tortured per year, ChatGPT estimated 500kā2m)).
I really appreciate your work, and I think we should absolutely think about these problems. But, on the margin, Iād rather see other work being done.
Thanks for sharing your thoughts, Alfredo!
Would you avert 2 h of pain of intensity 0.999 instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1? If so, would you avert 4 h (= 2*2) of pain of intensity 0.998 (= 0.999^2) instead of 2 h of pain of intensity 0.999? If so, why not generalise, and conclude you would avert 2^N h of pain of intensity 0.999^N instead of 1 h of pain of intensity 1? You could endorse this, and still value averting pain more than proportionally to its intensity. The expected pain averted by picking the 1st option would be 2^N*0.999^N/ā(1*1) = 1.998^N times the expected pain averted by picking the 2nd option. However, averting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensity.
I think less funding is a better proxy for higher cost-effectiveness than fewer EA Forum posts. Do you know how much funding is spent globally per year on preventing human torture? I am not aware of any project studying the welfare of soil springtails, mites, and nematodes, which are the most abundant soil animals. There are no results for āspringtailā, āmite ā, and ānematodeā on Wild Animal Initiativeās (WAIās) grantees page.
Thanks for your answer! :)
I think the procedure might not be generalizable, for the following reason. I currently think that a moment of conscious experience corresponds to a specific configuration of the electromagnetic field. As such, it can undergo phase transitions, analogous to how water goes abruptly from liquid to gas at 100Ā°C. Using the 1-dimensional quantity ātemperatureā can be useful in some contexts but is insufficient in others. Steam is not simply āliquid water but a bit warmerā; steam has very different properties altogether.
To extend this (very imperfect) analogy, imagine we lived in a world where steam killed people but (liquid) water didnāt (because of properties specific to steam, like being inhalable or something). In this case, the claim āreducing sufficiently many units of lukewarm water would still be better than reducing a unit of steamā would miss the point by the lights of someone who cares about death.
(Here are some thoughts on phase transitions in certain altered states of consciousness.)
I donāt! Thatās the sort of question Iād like to see more research on (or discussed more on the Forum if such research already exists), as well as which torture-prevention orgs/āprograms are most cost-effective, etc.
Thanks for clarifying.
I agree pains of different intensities have different properties. My understanding is that the Welfare Footprint Institute (WFI) relies on this to some extent to define their 4 pain categories. However, I do not understand how that undermines my point. Water and water vapor have different properties, but we can still compare their temperature. Liwekise, I think we can compare the intensity of different pain experiences even if they have different properties.
I seem to agree. Assuming water had a potential to kill people of exactly 0, and steam had a potential to kill people above 0, no amount of water would have the potential to kill as many people as some amount of steam. However, I do not think this undermines my point. When I say that āaverting sufficiently many hours of pain of a very low intensity would still be better than averting 1 h of pain of a very high intensityā, the very low intensity still has to be higher than an intensity of exactly 0.
Hi Alfredo. I would be curious to know your thoughts on my post All pains are comparable?. You are welcome to comment there.
Alfredo commented on the post, and I replied.