There’s an old (2006) Bostrom paper on ~this topic, as well as Yudkowsky’s ‘Anthropic Trilemma’ (2009) and Wei Dai’s ‘Moral Status of Independent Identical Copies’ (2009). Perhaps you’re remembering one of them?
(Bostrom disagrees with the second paragraph you cite, as far as I can tell. He writes: ‘If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue.’)
There’s an old (2006) Bostrom paper on ~this topic, as well as Yudkowsky’s ‘Anthropic Trilemma’ (2009) and Wei Dai’s ‘Moral Status of Independent Identical Copies’ (2009). Perhaps you’re remembering one of them?
(Bostrom disagrees with the second paragraph you cite, as far as I can tell. He writes: ‘If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue.’)