If one accepts all these assumptions, why would the best course of action be to offset AMF donations rather than to avoid donating to AMF in the first place?
Sorry for the confusion. By āI would move any marginal donations from helping humans to helping invertebratesā, I meant I would not donate to AMF. I have now clarified this in the post. āNonetheless, I think directing a small fraction (10 %?) of oneās donations to helping invertebrates would be a good compromise to offset potential negative effectsā, even if I think donating just to SWP, WAI or Arthropoda Foundation would be better.
If ITNs cause vastly more harm to mosquitoes than they help humans, wouldnāt this imply that AMF is not just a weak investment, but actually a net-negative intervention? It seems like these numbers, if taken seriously, suggest AMF should be deprioritized rather than merely balanced with shrimp welfare donations.
I do not know whether AMF is beneficial or harmful. My mainline numbers suggest it is harmful, but there is lots of uncertainty, and I have not covered all the relevant effects.
I neglected the effectsof ITNs on the number of wild animals because it is super unclear whether they have positive or negative lives. Yet, there is still lots of uncertainty even just in the effects I considered. Just accounting for uncertainty in mosquitoesā capacity for welfare, I estimate the 5th and 95th percentile harm to mosquitoes caused by ITNs are 0 and 11.5 k times their benefits to humans. So it is unclear to me whether ITNs increase or decrease welfare.
I assume that this is mostly about hedging against uncertainty under diff moral theories, but it seems like making this tradeoff of offset compared to counterfactual more money to AMF implies a certain tradeoff that youāre okay with such that you should never make the initial investment.
Iām confused about what sorta epistemic/ā moral uncertainty theory someone would need to be offsetting the way you propose. Tbh Iāve already confused myself with this comment, but I hope itās helpful(?)
I have not thought about this. I just think some people are drawn to offseting, and that donating to animal and human welfare is better than just to human welfare (although I also believe that donating just to animal welfare would be even better).
The part that Iām still stuck on is that this last part about the implicit tradeoff in oneās offset seems crucial. The degree of offsetting is entirely based on tradeoff (maybe with some risk aversion under diff moral theories), but if you put that much into offsetting than it seems like you either have a major moral or epistemic disagreement with those that are donating in the first place. If that is the case, one person has got to give (either they donāt offset near this much or they donāt donate to AMF).
While Iām here, I also wanted to thank you for writing this post. Super interesting, thoughtful, and Iāve shared with a bunch of people already!
The degree of offsetting is entirely based on tradeoff (maybe with some risk aversion under diff moral theories), but if you put that much into offsetting than it seems like you either have a major moral or epistemic disagreement with those that are donating in the first place.
I think you are right. In my mind, oneās marginal donations should always go towards their best donation option, and therefore small donors should just donate to their best donation option. This is in contrast with donating to one organisation for offsetting negative impacts on animals, and then simultaneously donate to other organisations.
While Iām here, I also wanted to thank you for writing this post. Super interesting, thoughtful, and Iāve shared with a bunch of people already!
Thanks for the kind words, and sharing the post around, Noah!
Thanks for the comment, Noah.
Sorry for the confusion. By āI would move any marginal donations from helping humans to helping invertebratesā, I meant I would not donate to AMF. I have now clarified this in the post. āNonetheless, I think directing a small fraction (10 %?) of oneās donations to helping invertebrates would be a good compromise to offset potential negative effectsā, even if I think donating just to SWP, WAI or Arthropoda Foundation would be better.
I do not know whether AMF is beneficial or harmful. My mainline numbers suggest it is harmful, but there is lots of uncertainty, and I have not covered all the relevant effects.
I have not thought about this. I just think some people are drawn to offseting, and that donating to animal and human welfare is better than just to human welfare (although I also believe that donating just to animal welfare would be even better).
Thanks for the response.
The part that Iām still stuck on is that this last part about the implicit tradeoff in oneās offset seems crucial. The degree of offsetting is entirely based on tradeoff (maybe with some risk aversion under diff moral theories), but if you put that much into offsetting than it seems like you either have a major moral or epistemic disagreement with those that are donating in the first place. If that is the case, one person has got to give (either they donāt offset near this much or they donāt donate to AMF).
While Iām here, I also wanted to thank you for writing this post. Super interesting, thoughtful, and Iāve shared with a bunch of people already!
I think you are right. In my mind, oneās marginal donations should always go towards their best donation option, and therefore small donors should just donate to their best donation option. This is in contrast with donating to one organisation for offsetting negative impacts on animals, and then simultaneously donate to other organisations.
Thanks for the kind words, and sharing the post around, Noah!