II. Harm is done to a subject in a world if and only if she exists in that world and her welfare there is lower than her welfare in an alternate world.
III. In worlds where a subject doesn’t exist, we treat her welfare as if it is equal to 0 (but again, she cannot be harmed in that world).
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.