Right. So, looking at how HMW was specified up top—parts II and III—then people who exist in only one of two outcomes count for zero even if they have negative well-being in the world where they exist. That what how I interpreted the view as working in my comment.
One could specify a different view on which creating net-negative lives, even if they couldn’t have had a higher level of welfare, is bad, rather than neutral. This would need a fourth condition.
(My understanding is that people who like HMVs tend to think that creating uniquely exist negative lives is bad, rather than neutral, as that captures that procreative asymmetry.
II. Harm is done to a subject in a world if and only if she exists in that world and her welfare there is lower than her welfare in an alternate world.
III. In worlds where a subject doesn’t exist, we treat her welfare as if it is equal to 0 (but again, she cannot be harmed in that world).
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.
Right. So, looking at how HMW was specified up top—parts II and III—then people who exist in only one of two outcomes count for zero even if they have negative well-being in the world where they exist. That what how I interpreted the view as working in my comment.
One could specify a different view on which creating net-negative lives, even if they couldn’t have had a higher level of welfare, is bad, rather than neutral. This would need a fourth condition.
(My understanding is that people who like HMVs tend to think that creating uniquely exist negative lives is bad, rather than neutral, as that captures that procreative asymmetry.
Given this:
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have negative wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then they have been harmed.
If a person exists in only one of two outcomes and they have positive wellbeing in the outcome where they exist, then there is no harm to anyone.
So creating net negative lives is bad under Meacham’s view.
It’s possible I’m getting something wrong, but this is how I’m reading it. I find thinking of ‘counting for zero’ confusing so I’m framing it differently.
Ah, I see. No, you’ve got it right. I’d somehow misread it and the view works the way I had thought it was supposed to: non-existence as zero is not-existence can be compared to existence in terms of welfare levels.