I am struggling to comprehend the second half of your post. Sorry! Can you clarify exactly why you believe that you have effectively invalidated average utilitarianism one proposition at a time, and the reasons you are alluding to as ‘already discussed’ in favour of total utilitarianism?
Also, I have said this before, but should a forum for effective altruism be a place in which to discuss what are—from the outside—the minutia of highly obscure moral theories? This is supposed to be a normatively ecumenical movement focused upon the efficacy of charitable giving, is it not? I doubt this is helpful in cultivating that kind of diversity.
Average utilitarianism vs total utilitarianism isn’t minutiae, there’s actually a pretty massive difference in the entire way we think about morality between those two systems.
“Both average and total utilitarianism begin with an axiom that seem obviously true. For total utilitarianism this axiom is: “It is good for a SEP with positive utility to occur if it doesn’t affect anything else...” is the part you want. I probably should have formalised this a bit more.
Also, if you follow the link to Less Wrong, I give a seperate and more formal argument in the second section. I removed that argument because I decided that, while convincing, the argument I gave had no philosophical advantages over (a more formulised version) if the argument that I did give on this page.
I realise the difference between average and total utilitarianism, but in the context of the the whole history of moral and political thought the gap between the two is infinitesimal as compared to the gap between the utilitarian framework in which the debate operates and alternative systems of thought. There is no a priori reason to think that the efficacy of charitable giving should have any relation whatsoever to utilitarianism. Yet it occupies a huge part of the movement. I think that is regretful not only because I think utilitarianism hopelessly misguided, but because it stifles the kind of diversity which is necessary to create a genuinely ecumenical movement.
I am still struggling to follow any line of reasoning in the second half of what you have written. Why is that quote the part I want? What is it supposed to be doing? Can you summarise what you are doing in one paragraph of clear language?
I’ll give you one example where it makes a difference. Take for example factory farming—if we care about average utility, then it is clearly bad as the conditions are massively pulling down the average. If we care about total utility, then it is possible that the animals may have a small, but positive utility, and that less animals would exist if not for factory farming, so it’s existence might work out as a positive.
Re: other questions. I’ll probably rewrite and repost a more refined version of my argument at some point, but that is work for another day.
Perhaps I have not been clear enough. I am not disputing that average and total utilitarianism can lead to radically different practical conclusions. What I am saying is that the assumptions which underlie the two are far closer together than the gap between that common framework and much of the history of moral and political thought. From the point of view of the Spinozian, Wittgensteinian, Foucauldian, Weberian, Rawlsian, Williamsian, Augustinian, Hobbesian, the two are of the same kind and equally alien for being so. You are able to have this discussion exactly because you accept the project of ‘utilitarianism’. Most people do not.
This is only obviously true if you evaluate average/total at a given time. Population ethicists tend to consider the population in a whole universe history. And in a big enough world, if you can only make changes at the margin then average utilitarianism is the same as critical-level total utilitarianism (where the critical level is set by the average of the population). Then it’s again possible that the animals have a positive contribution.
There is no a priori reason to think that the efficacy of charitable giving should have any relation whatsoever to utilitarianism. Yet it occupies a huge part of the movement.
I think the argument is that, a priori, utilitarians think we should give effectively. Further, given the facts as they far (namely that effective donations can do an astronomical amount of good), there are incredibly strong moral reasons for utilitarians to promote effective giving and thus to participate in the EA movement.
I think that [the obsession with utilitarianism] is regretful… because it stifles the kind of diversity which is necessary to create a genuinely ecumenical movement.
I do find discussions like this a little embarrassing but then again they are interesting to the members of the EA community and this is an inward-facing page. Nonetheless I do share your fears about it putting outsiders off.
I agree that given the amount of good which the most effective charities can do, there are potentially strong reasons for utilitarians to donate. Yet utilitarians are but a small sub-set of at least one plausible index of the potential scope of effective altruism: any person, organisation or government which currently donates to charity or supports foreign aid programmes. In order to get anywhere near that kind of critical mass the movement has to break away from being a specifically utilitarian one.
I am struggling to comprehend the second half of your post. Sorry! Can you clarify exactly why you believe that you have effectively invalidated average utilitarianism one proposition at a time, and the reasons you are alluding to as ‘already discussed’ in favour of total utilitarianism?
Also, I have said this before, but should a forum for effective altruism be a place in which to discuss what are—from the outside—the minutia of highly obscure moral theories? This is supposed to be a normatively ecumenical movement focused upon the efficacy of charitable giving, is it not? I doubt this is helpful in cultivating that kind of diversity.
Average utilitarianism vs total utilitarianism isn’t minutiae, there’s actually a pretty massive difference in the entire way we think about morality between those two systems.
“Both average and total utilitarianism begin with an axiom that seem obviously true. For total utilitarianism this axiom is: “It is good for a SEP with positive utility to occur if it doesn’t affect anything else...” is the part you want. I probably should have formalised this a bit more.
Also, if you follow the link to Less Wrong, I give a seperate and more formal argument in the second section. I removed that argument because I decided that, while convincing, the argument I gave had no philosophical advantages over (a more formulised version) if the argument that I did give on this page.
I realise the difference between average and total utilitarianism, but in the context of the the whole history of moral and political thought the gap between the two is infinitesimal as compared to the gap between the utilitarian framework in which the debate operates and alternative systems of thought. There is no a priori reason to think that the efficacy of charitable giving should have any relation whatsoever to utilitarianism. Yet it occupies a huge part of the movement. I think that is regretful not only because I think utilitarianism hopelessly misguided, but because it stifles the kind of diversity which is necessary to create a genuinely ecumenical movement.
I am still struggling to follow any line of reasoning in the second half of what you have written. Why is that quote the part I want? What is it supposed to be doing? Can you summarise what you are doing in one paragraph of clear language?
I’ll give you one example where it makes a difference. Take for example factory farming—if we care about average utility, then it is clearly bad as the conditions are massively pulling down the average. If we care about total utility, then it is possible that the animals may have a small, but positive utility, and that less animals would exist if not for factory farming, so it’s existence might work out as a positive.
Re: other questions. I’ll probably rewrite and repost a more refined version of my argument at some point, but that is work for another day.
Perhaps I have not been clear enough. I am not disputing that average and total utilitarianism can lead to radically different practical conclusions. What I am saying is that the assumptions which underlie the two are far closer together than the gap between that common framework and much of the history of moral and political thought. From the point of view of the Spinozian, Wittgensteinian, Foucauldian, Weberian, Rawlsian, Williamsian, Augustinian, Hobbesian, the two are of the same kind and equally alien for being so. You are able to have this discussion exactly because you accept the project of ‘utilitarianism’. Most people do not.
This is only obviously true if you evaluate average/total at a given time. Population ethicists tend to consider the population in a whole universe history. And in a big enough world, if you can only make changes at the margin then average utilitarianism is the same as critical-level total utilitarianism (where the critical level is set by the average of the population). Then it’s again possible that the animals have a positive contribution.
That’s interesting, I’ve never really thought about temporality, but I don’t see any reason why a future person would be valued less.
That said, I see critical level utilitarianism flawed for very similar reasons. I’ll probably write about it some time.
I think the argument is that, a priori, utilitarians think we should give effectively. Further, given the facts as they far (namely that effective donations can do an astronomical amount of good), there are incredibly strong moral reasons for utilitarians to promote effective giving and thus to participate in the EA movement.
I do find discussions like this a little embarrassing but then again they are interesting to the members of the EA community and this is an inward-facing page. Nonetheless I do share your fears about it putting outsiders off.
I agree that given the amount of good which the most effective charities can do, there are potentially strong reasons for utilitarians to donate. Yet utilitarians are but a small sub-set of at least one plausible index of the potential scope of effective altruism: any person, organisation or government which currently donates to charity or supports foreign aid programmes. In order to get anywhere near that kind of critical mass the movement has to break away from being a specifically utilitarian one.