Yeah Iâm not quiet sure what Humphrey means by belief here (thanks for the link!). But then I donât really know what I mean by âbeliefâ to be honest! Iâm not sure I can define it without evoking my own phenomenal perspective, whether directly (a flash of inspiration) or via thought and introspection (trying to update my current beliefs with new evidence) - and I think thatâd already put me at odds with physicalists/âillusionists
I do think Humphrey is an illusionist (even if he doensât like the term) and view him as somewhat adjacent to Frankish. I think that the âmeta-problem of consciousnessâ isnât quite what Iâm hinting at (though it is a problem) - Iâm taking my phenomenal experiences as true. Dualists (like myself) need to try and get them to accord with our understanding of the physical world, but I think illusionists need to explain why Iâm experiencing anything at all rather than just reporting I am. We probably have very different intuitions on this, but part of the reason Iâve become more âdualistâ over time is that I found that I never had a good response to this criticism when I was a materialist/âphysicalist, so in the end I accepted it as a worthy criticism that disproved my original ideas.
Finally, Iâll note this isnât the first time weâve had a Forum discussion about consciousness[1] - maybe itâs something we could explore in a dialogue if itâs something you think would be a valuable use of our time and potentially useful for those reading on the Forum? It definitely touches on a number of EA cause areas.
I think illusionists need to explain why Iâm experiencing anything at all rather than just reporting I am
We need to first decide what we mean by âexperienceâ. I think there are two broad approaches (interpretations) of illusionism, which I described here and which could give us two different broad characterizations of âexperienceâ:
In the first, beliefs (illusions) of phenomenality/âmysteriousness/ânonphysical essence/âetc. themselves could be what distinguishes whatâs experienced from whatâs not experienced. These beliefs need not be verbalized (whether in inner speech or reported) and could be of a more intuitive kind, like Grazianoâs attention schema or Humphreyâs ipsundrum are meant to capture.[1] They might just be representations or models âdepictingâ phenomenal properties. See also my footnote here on Grazianoâs Attention Schema Theory. So, these beliefs would explain why youâre experiencing anything at all.
In the second, the physical properties that dispose us to have such beliefs could be what distinguishes experiences. This could be a kind of placeholder, but I suspect Frankish and Dennett would say that any reactive patterns and discriminations count, at least to some minimal degree.[2] So, thermometers and bacteria could be minimally experiencing things, too, and that youâre reacting and making any discriminations at all would explain why youâre experiencing anything at all. Those with blindsight could still have visual experiences, but in a way thatâs not accessible for standard verbal report and possibly of a more simple/âminimal kind.
I suspect thereâs no real fact of the matter which approach is ârightâ, but Iâm more inclined towards 1.
If you have something else in mind by âexperienceâ, I could try to respond to that.
Finally, Iâll note this isnât the first time weâve had a Forum discussion about consciousness[1] - maybe itâs something we could explore in a dialogue if itâs something you think would be a valuable use of our time and potentially useful for those reading on the Forum? It definitely touches on a number of EA cause areas.
I might be interested in having a (recorded) call, and then we can release it, the (edited) transcripts and/âor notes. I spend way too long writing comments (including this one, and others on this post), so I think I shouldnât commit to a text-based discussion.
That being said, Iâm not sure how useful this would be for other people, compared to them just reading writing by or listening to Graziano or Frankish. It was Grazianoâs papers (2021, 2022, some clarifications in 2020) that made illusionism click for me,[3] and I suspect I couldnât do a better job in explaining illusionism than to just linkpost or quote him, as well as Kammerer, 2022 (or just the short summary in Shabasson, 2021, section 9), which helps illustrate how the illusion could be so persistent.
I think the basic argument that convinced me roughly goes like this, based on Graziano (2021, 2022), and from a draft I wrote but never posted:
Our claims of conscious experience result from the depiction/ârepresentation of information processed in our brains as having properties we believe as common to our conscious experiences, like phenomenality, subjectivity, qualitativeness or a nonphysical essence. There must be information in our brains depicting these properties, because without such information, we wouldnât consistently talk about these properties in the first place. Of course, maybe the information processing appears to have these properties precisely because it actually has these properties, and thatâs a realist position. However, the depiction itself and access to it by systems necessary for belief formation would be enough, and thatâs the illusionist position. Thereâs no need to posit the actual existence of these properties, and in my view, thereâs currently no plausible explanation for the actual existence of these properties.
However, some things may make me unusually likely to accept illusionism:
I suspect my direct intuitions about physical phenomena and consciousness are relatively weak, and Iâm unusually inclined towards abstraction, so Iâve found little to count against illusionism for me. That consciousness just seems phenomenal, and red seems to be qualitative just doesnât count very strongly to me.
I have a very strong presumption in favour of physicalism,[4] and every non-illusionist physicalist theory doesnât seem to me to offer a serious attempt to solve the hard problem, so the best option seems to be to dissolve it, hence illusionism. It sounds like you went the other way towards dualism through your dissatisfaction with physicalist theories, and Iâd guess Chalmers did, too.
Dogs presumably do not think there is something it is like to be them, even if there is. It is not that a dog thinks there isnât anything it is like to be a dog; the dog is not a theorist at all, and hence does not suffer from the theoristsâ illusion. The hard problem and meta-problem are only problems for us humans, and mainly just for those of us humans who are particularly reflective. In other words, dogs arenât bothered or botherable by problem intuitions. Dogs â and, for that matter, clams and ticks and bacteria â do enjoy (or at any rate benefit from) a sort of user illusion: they are equipped to discriminate and track only some of the properties in their environment.
They were also the first explanations of illusionism Iâd read. I havenât settled on Grazianoâs AST in particular, but it seems like a promising direction.
But also, other than panpsychism, where could we possibly draw a line for the presence and absence of the extra nonphysical property/âproperties? I canât imagine there being any plausible responses.
Or, if panpsychist, how could these properties possibly combine in ways that correspond to what our brains are doing and our specific judgements? Maybe some kind of property dualism?
I also canât imagine there being any plausible account of how the nonphysical affects the physical (or else we would already have identified it and adopted it into our physical ontology), so Iâd be stuck with epiphenomenalism.
So, if not an illusionist, Iâd have to be a (property dualist) epiphenomenalist, and it seems there would be no way to empirically distinguish such accounts from their illusionist counterparts, which just drop the nonphysical stuff. And whether or not there are different ethical implications between them, I canât imagine them being that decisive in practice. The difference just doesnât seem that interesting anymore, but I favour the metaphysically more parsimonious illusionism.
FWIW, I havenât read much Chalmers, and I learned about property dualism after illusionism already became intuitive to me.
Yeah Iâm not quiet sure what Humphrey means by belief here (thanks for the link!). But then I donât really know what I mean by âbeliefâ to be honest! Iâm not sure I can define it without evoking my own phenomenal perspective, whether directly (a flash of inspiration) or via thought and introspection (trying to update my current beliefs with new evidence) - and I think thatâd already put me at odds with physicalists/âillusionists
I do think Humphrey is an illusionist (even if he doensât like the term) and view him as somewhat adjacent to Frankish. I think that the âmeta-problem of consciousnessâ isnât quite what Iâm hinting at (though it is a problem) - Iâm taking my phenomenal experiences as true. Dualists (like myself) need to try and get them to accord with our understanding of the physical world, but I think illusionists need to explain why Iâm experiencing anything at all rather than just reporting I am. We probably have very different intuitions on this, but part of the reason Iâve become more âdualistâ over time is that I found that I never had a good response to this criticism when I was a materialist/âphysicalist, so in the end I accepted it as a worthy criticism that disproved my original ideas.
Finally, Iâll note this isnât the first time weâve had a Forum discussion about consciousness[1] - maybe itâs something we could explore in a dialogue if itâs something you think would be a valuable use of our time and potentially useful for those reading on the Forum? It definitely touches on a number of EA cause areas.
And Iâve very much enjoyed learning from your perspective :)
We need to first decide what we mean by âexperienceâ. I think there are two broad approaches (interpretations) of illusionism, which I described here and which could give us two different broad characterizations of âexperienceâ:
In the first, beliefs (illusions) of phenomenality/âmysteriousness/ânonphysical essence/âetc. themselves could be what distinguishes whatâs experienced from whatâs not experienced. These beliefs need not be verbalized (whether in inner speech or reported) and could be of a more intuitive kind, like Grazianoâs attention schema or Humphreyâs ipsundrum are meant to capture.[1] They might just be representations or models âdepictingâ phenomenal properties. See also my footnote here on Grazianoâs Attention Schema Theory. So, these beliefs would explain why youâre experiencing anything at all.
In the second, the physical properties that dispose us to have such beliefs could be what distinguishes experiences. This could be a kind of placeholder, but I suspect Frankish and Dennett would say that any reactive patterns and discriminations count, at least to some minimal degree.[2] So, thermometers and bacteria could be minimally experiencing things, too, and that youâre reacting and making any discriminations at all would explain why youâre experiencing anything at all. Those with blindsight could still have visual experiences, but in a way thatâs not accessible for standard verbal report and possibly of a more simple/âminimal kind.
I suspect thereâs no real fact of the matter which approach is ârightâ, but Iâm more inclined towards 1.
If you have something else in mind by âexperienceâ, I could try to respond to that.
I might be interested in having a (recorded) call, and then we can release it, the (edited) transcripts and/âor notes. I spend way too long writing comments (including this one, and others on this post), so I think I shouldnât commit to a text-based discussion.
That being said, Iâm not sure how useful this would be for other people, compared to them just reading writing by or listening to Graziano or Frankish. It was Grazianoâs papers (2021, 2022, some clarifications in 2020) that made illusionism click for me,[3] and I suspect I couldnât do a better job in explaining illusionism than to just linkpost or quote him, as well as Kammerer, 2022 (or just the short summary in Shabasson, 2021, section 9), which helps illustrate how the illusion could be so persistent.
I think the basic argument that convinced me roughly goes like this, based on Graziano (2021, 2022), and from a draft I wrote but never posted:
Our claims of conscious experience result from the depiction/ârepresentation of information processed in our brains as having properties we believe as common to our conscious experiences, like phenomenality, subjectivity, qualitativeness or a nonphysical essence. There must be information in our brains depicting these properties, because without such information, we wouldnât consistently talk about these properties in the first place. Of course, maybe the information processing appears to have these properties precisely because it actually has these properties, and thatâs a realist position. However, the depiction itself and access to it by systems necessary for belief formation would be enough, and thatâs the illusionist position. Thereâs no need to posit the actual existence of these properties, and in my view, thereâs currently no plausible explanation for the actual existence of these properties.
However, some things may make me unusually likely to accept illusionism:
I suspect my direct intuitions about physical phenomena and consciousness are relatively weak, and Iâm unusually inclined towards abstraction, so Iâve found little to count against illusionism for me. That consciousness just seems phenomenal, and red seems to be qualitative just doesnât count very strongly to me.
I have a very strong presumption in favour of physicalism,[4] and every non-illusionist physicalist theory doesnât seem to me to offer a serious attempt to solve the hard problem, so the best option seems to be to dissolve it, hence illusionism. It sounds like you went the other way towards dualism through your dissatisfaction with physicalist theories, and Iâd guess Chalmers did, too.
But might leave out too many details of how this actually works in humans and other animals to be very satisfying.
E.g. Frankish on continuity here (54:00-57:37).
Also Dennett (2019, p. 54):
And Dennett thinks that chickens, octopuses and bees are definitely conscious.
They were also the first explanations of illusionism Iâd read. I havenât settled on Grazianoâs AST in particular, but it seems like a promising direction.
Just generally.
But also, other than panpsychism, where could we possibly draw a line for the presence and absence of the extra nonphysical property/âproperties? I canât imagine there being any plausible responses.
Or, if panpsychist, how could these properties possibly combine in ways that correspond to what our brains are doing and our specific judgements? Maybe some kind of property dualism?
I also canât imagine there being any plausible account of how the nonphysical affects the physical (or else we would already have identified it and adopted it into our physical ontology), so Iâd be stuck with epiphenomenalism.
So, if not an illusionist, Iâd have to be a (property dualist) epiphenomenalist, and it seems there would be no way to empirically distinguish such accounts from their illusionist counterparts, which just drop the nonphysical stuff. And whether or not there are different ethical implications between them, I canât imagine them being that decisive in practice. The difference just doesnât seem that interesting anymore, but I favour the metaphysically more parsimonious illusionism.
FWIW, I havenât read much Chalmers, and I learned about property dualism after illusionism already became intuitive to me.