Can you have pure joy unconnected to a particular sensation? Maybe, but Iâm sceptical. First, the closest I can imagine is calm joyful moments during meditation, or drug-induced euphoria, but in both cases I think itâs at least plausible there are associated sensations. Second, to me, even the purest moments of simple joy seem to be sensations in themselves, and I donât know if thereâs any conscious experience without sensations.
I would say thinking of something funny is often pleasurable. Similarly, thinking of something sad can be unpleasant. And this thinking can just be inner speech (rather than visual imagination). Inner speech is of course sensory, but itâs not the sensations of the inner speech, and instead your high-level interpretation of the meaning that causes the pleasure. (There might still be other subtle sensations associated with pleasure, e.g. from changes to your heart rate, body temperature, facial muscles, or even simulated smiling.)
Also, people can just be in good or bad moods, which could be pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, but not really consistently simultaneous with any particular sensations.
I would add that conscious sensation allows for more abstract processing of sensations, which enables tool use and other complex planning like long term planning in order to get the future self more pleasurable sensations. Humphrey doesnât talk about that much, perhaps because itâs only a small subset of conscious species that have been observed doing those things, so perhaps mere consciousness isnât sufficient to engage in them (some would argue you need language to do good long term planning and complex abstraction).
Maybe some other potential capacities that seem widespread among mammals and birds (and not really investigated much in others?) that could make use of conscious sensation (and conscious pleasure and unpleasantness):
episodic(-like) memory (although itâs not clear this is consciously experienced in other animals)
working memory
voluntary attention control
short-term planning (which benefits from the above)
FWIW, mammals seem able to discriminate anxiety-like states from other states.[1]
Animals do engage in play with unpleasant experiences, e.g., playfighting can include moderately unpleasant sensations.
I donât think they are motivated to explore things they find unpleasant or aversive, or unpleasantness or aversion themselves. Rather, it just happens sometimes when theyâre engaging in the things they are motivated to do for other reasons.
I suppose the benefits of those experiences being conscious might be to form more sophisticated strategies of avoiding them in future.
Ya, this seems plausible to me. But this also seems like the thing thatâs more morally important to look into directly. Maybe frogsâ vision is blindsight, their touch and hearing are unconscious, etc., so they arenât motivated to engage in sensory play, but they might still benefit from conscious unpleasantness and aversion for more sophisticated strategies to avoid them. And they might still benefit from conscious pleasure for more sophisticated strategies to pursue pleasure. The conscious pleasure, unpleasantness and desire seem far more important than conscious sensations.
Carey and Fry (1995) show that pigs generalize the discrimination between non-anxiety states and drug-induced anxiety to non-anxiety and anxiety in general, in this case by pressing one lever repeatedly with anxiety, and alternating between two levers without anxiety (the levers gave food rewards, but only if they pressed them according to the condition). Similar experiments were performed on rats, as discussed in SĂĄnchez-SuĂĄrez, 2016, in section 4.d., starting on p.81. Rats generalized from hangover to morphine withdrawal and jetlag, from high doses of cocaine to movement restriction, from an anxiety-inducing drug to aggressive defeat and predator cues. Of course, anxiety has physical symptoms, so maybe this is what theyâre discriminating, not the negative affect or aversive desire, although non-anxiolytic anticonvulsants didnât block the effects, so convulsions in particular seem unlikely to explain the difference.
I would say thinking of something funny is often pleasurable. Similarly, thinking of something sad can be unpleasant. And this thinking can just be inner speech (rather than visual imagination)....Also, people can just be in good or bad moods, which could be pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, but not really consistently simultaneous with any particular sensations.
I think most of those things actually can be reduced to sensations; moods canât be, but then, are moods consciously experienced, or do they only predispose us to interpret conscious experiences more positively or negatively?
(Edit: another set of sensations you might overlook when you think about conscious experience of mood are your bodily sensations: heart rate, skin conductivity, etc.)
But this also seems like the thing thatâs more morally important to look into directly. Maybe frogsâ vision is blindsight, their touch and hearing are unconscious, etc., so they arenât motivated to engage in sensory play, but they might still benefit from conscious unpleasantness and aversion for more sophisticated strategies to avoid them. And they might still benefit from conscious pleasure for more sophisticated strategies to pursue pleasure.
They âmightâ do, sure, but whatâs your expectation they in fact will experience conscious pleasantness devoid of sensations? High enough to not write it off entirely, to make it worthwhile to experiment on, and to be cautious about how we treat those organisms in the meantimeâsure. I think we can agree on that.
But perhaps weâve reached a sort of crux here: is it possible, or probable, that organisms could experience conscious pleasure or pain without conscious sensation? It seems like a worthwhile question. After reading Humphrey I feel like itâs certainly possible, but Iâd give it maybe around 0.35 probability. As I said in OP, I would value more research in this area to try to give us more certainty.
If your probability that conscious pleasure and pain can exist without conscious sensation is, say, over 0.8 or so, Iâd be curious about what leads you to believe that with confidence.
I think most of those things actually can be reduced to sensations
What do you mean by âreduced toâ? Itâs tricky to avoid confounding here, because weâre constantly aware of sensations and our experiences of pleasure and unpleasantness seem typically associated with sensations. But I would guess that pleasure and unpleasantness arenât always because of the conscious sensations, but these can have the same unconscious perceptions as a common cause.
Apparently even conscious physical pain affect (unpleasantness) can occur without pain sensation, but this is not normal and recorded cases seem to be the result of brain damage (Ploner et al., 1999, Uhelski et al., 2012).
moods canât be, but then, are moods consciously experienced, or do they only predispose us to interpret conscious experiences more positively or negatively?
Iâm not sure, and thatâs a great question! Seems pretty likely these are just dispositions. I was also thinking of separation anxiety as an unpleasant experience with no specific sensations in other animals (assuming they canât imagine their parents, when they are away), but this could just be more like a mood that disposes them to interpret their perceptions or sensations more negatively/âthreatening.
They âmightâ do, sure, but whatâs your expectation they in fact will experience conscious pleasantness devoid of sensations? (...) If your probability that conscious pleasure and pain can exist without conscious sensation is, say, over 0.8 or so, Iâd be curious about what leads you to believe that with confidence.
Thanks for pushing on this. There are multiple standards at which I could answer this, and it would depend on what I (or we) want âconsciousâ to mean.
With relatively high standards for consciousness like Humphrey seems to be using, or something else at least as strict as having a robust global workspace (with some standard executive functions, like working memory or voluntary attention control), Iâd assign maybe 70%-95% probability to the in principle possibility based on introspection, studies of pain affect without pain sensation, and imagining direct stimulation of pleasure systems, or with drugs or meditation. However, Iâd be very surprised (<15%) if thereâs any species with conscious pleasure or unpleasantness without the species generally also having conscious sensations. It doesnât seem useful for an animal to be conscious of pleasure or unpleasantness without also being conscious of their causes, which seems to require conscious sensation. Plus, whatever mechanisms are necessary for consciousness per se could be used for both perceptions/âsensations and pleasure.
With low standards, e.g. a sensation is a perception + a belief that the perception matters, and pleasure is a positive judgement (as a belief), and low standards for what counts as a belief, Iâd be less confident either way for both the in principle and in practice questions. Iâd mostly have in mind similar intuitions, arguments and other evidence as above, but the evidence just seems weaker and less reliable here. But Iâd also be more confident that frogs, fish and invertebrates have conscious pleasure and unpleasantness and conscious sensations.
You could also mix low standards for one but high standards for the other, but Iâd give these possibilities less weight.
But I would guess that pleasure and unpleasantness isnât always because of the conscious sensations, but these can have the same unconscious perceptions as a common cause.
This sounds right. My claim is that there are all sorts of unconscious perceptions an valenced processing going on in the brain, but all of that is only experienced consciously once thereâs a certain kind of recurrent cortical processing of the signal which can loosely be described as âsensationâ. I mean that very loosely; it even can include memories of physical events or semantic thought (which you might understand as a sort of recall of auditory processing). Without that recurrent cortical processing modeling the reward and learning process, probably all that midbrain dopaminergic activity does not get consciously perceived. Perhaps it does, indirectly, when the dopaminergic activity (or lack thereof) influences the sorts of sensations you have.
But Iâm getting really speculative here. Iâm an empiricist and my main contention is that thereâs a live issue with unknowns and researchers should figure out what sort of empirical tests might resolve some of these questions, and then collect data to test all this out.
Thanks, this is helpful!
I would say thinking of something funny is often pleasurable. Similarly, thinking of something sad can be unpleasant. And this thinking can just be inner speech (rather than visual imagination). Inner speech is of course sensory, but itâs not the sensations of the inner speech, and instead your high-level interpretation of the meaning that causes the pleasure. (There might still be other subtle sensations associated with pleasure, e.g. from changes to your heart rate, body temperature, facial muscles, or even simulated smiling.)
Also, people can just be in good or bad moods, which could be pleasant and unpleasant, respectively, but not really consistently simultaneous with any particular sensations.
Maybe some other potential capacities that seem widespread among mammals and birds (and not really investigated much in others?) that could make use of conscious sensation (and conscious pleasure and unpleasantness):
episodic(-like) memory (although itâs not clear this is consciously experienced in other animals)
working memory
voluntary attention control
short-term planning (which benefits from the above)
FWIW, mammals seem able to discriminate anxiety-like states from other states.[1]
I donât think they are motivated to explore things they find unpleasant or aversive, or unpleasantness or aversion themselves. Rather, it just happens sometimes when theyâre engaging in the things they are motivated to do for other reasons.
Ya, this seems plausible to me. But this also seems like the thing thatâs more morally important to look into directly. Maybe frogsâ vision is blindsight, their touch and hearing are unconscious, etc., so they arenât motivated to engage in sensory play, but they might still benefit from conscious unpleasantness and aversion for more sophisticated strategies to avoid them. And they might still benefit from conscious pleasure for more sophisticated strategies to pursue pleasure. The conscious pleasure, unpleasantness and desire seem far more important than conscious sensations.
Carey and Fry (1995) show that pigs generalize the discrimination between non-anxiety states and drug-induced anxiety to non-anxiety and anxiety in general, in this case by pressing one lever repeatedly with anxiety, and alternating between two levers without anxiety (the levers gave food rewards, but only if they pressed them according to the condition). Similar experiments were performed on rats, as discussed in SĂĄnchez-SuĂĄrez, 2016, in section 4.d., starting on p.81. Rats generalized from hangover to morphine withdrawal and jetlag, from high doses of cocaine to movement restriction, from an anxiety-inducing drug to aggressive defeat and predator cues. Of course, anxiety has physical symptoms, so maybe this is what theyâre discriminating, not the negative affect or aversive desire, although non-anxiolytic anticonvulsants didnât block the effects, so convulsions in particular seem unlikely to explain the difference.
I think most of those things actually can be reduced to sensations; moods canât be, but then, are moods consciously experienced, or do they only predispose us to interpret conscious experiences more positively or negatively?
(Edit: another set of sensations you might overlook when you think about conscious experience of mood are your bodily sensations: heart rate, skin conductivity, etc.)
They âmightâ do, sure, but whatâs your expectation they in fact will experience conscious pleasantness devoid of sensations? High enough to not write it off entirely, to make it worthwhile to experiment on, and to be cautious about how we treat those organisms in the meantimeâsure. I think we can agree on that.
But perhaps weâve reached a sort of crux here: is it possible, or probable, that organisms could experience conscious pleasure or pain without conscious sensation? It seems like a worthwhile question. After reading Humphrey I feel like itâs certainly possible, but Iâd give it maybe around 0.35 probability. As I said in OP, I would value more research in this area to try to give us more certainty.
If your probability that conscious pleasure and pain can exist without conscious sensation is, say, over 0.8 or so, Iâd be curious about what leads you to believe that with confidence.
What do you mean by âreduced toâ? Itâs tricky to avoid confounding here, because weâre constantly aware of sensations and our experiences of pleasure and unpleasantness seem typically associated with sensations. But I would guess that pleasure and unpleasantness arenât always because of the conscious sensations, but these can have the same unconscious perceptions as a common cause.
Apparently even conscious physical pain affect (unpleasantness) can occur without pain sensation, but this is not normal and recorded cases seem to be the result of brain damage (Ploner et al., 1999, Uhelski et al., 2012).
Iâm not sure, and thatâs a great question! Seems pretty likely these are just dispositions. I was also thinking of separation anxiety as an unpleasant experience with no specific sensations in other animals (assuming they canât imagine their parents, when they are away), but this could just be more like a mood that disposes them to interpret their perceptions or sensations more negatively/âthreatening.
Thanks for pushing on this. There are multiple standards at which I could answer this, and it would depend on what I (or we) want âconsciousâ to mean.
With relatively high standards for consciousness like Humphrey seems to be using, or something else at least as strict as having a robust global workspace (with some standard executive functions, like working memory or voluntary attention control), Iâd assign maybe 70%-95% probability to the in principle possibility based on introspection, studies of pain affect without pain sensation, and imagining direct stimulation of pleasure systems, or with drugs or meditation. However, Iâd be very surprised (<15%) if thereâs any species with conscious pleasure or unpleasantness without the species generally also having conscious sensations. It doesnât seem useful for an animal to be conscious of pleasure or unpleasantness without also being conscious of their causes, which seems to require conscious sensation. Plus, whatever mechanisms are necessary for consciousness per se could be used for both perceptions/âsensations and pleasure.
With low standards, e.g. a sensation is a perception + a belief that the perception matters, and pleasure is a positive judgement (as a belief), and low standards for what counts as a belief, Iâd be less confident either way for both the in principle and in practice questions. Iâd mostly have in mind similar intuitions, arguments and other evidence as above, but the evidence just seems weaker and less reliable here. But Iâd also be more confident that frogs, fish and invertebrates have conscious pleasure and unpleasantness and conscious sensations.
You could also mix low standards for one but high standards for the other, but Iâd give these possibilities less weight.
This sounds right. My claim is that there are all sorts of unconscious perceptions an valenced processing going on in the brain, but all of that is only experienced consciously once thereâs a certain kind of recurrent cortical processing of the signal which can loosely be described as âsensationâ. I mean that very loosely; it even can include memories of physical events or semantic thought (which you might understand as a sort of recall of auditory processing). Without that recurrent cortical processing modeling the reward and learning process, probably all that midbrain dopaminergic activity does not get consciously perceived. Perhaps it does, indirectly, when the dopaminergic activity (or lack thereof) influences the sorts of sensations you have.
But Iâm getting really speculative here. Iâm an empiricist and my main contention is that thereâs a live issue with unknowns and researchers should figure out what sort of empirical tests might resolve some of these questions, and then collect data to test all this out.