Iâm not sure about this, though. As I wrote in a previous comment:
The reasons to do various parochial things, or respect deontological constraints, arenât like this. They arenât grounded in something like âthis thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/âwhenever it is [or whoever causes it]â.
The concern Iâve tried to convey in our discussion so far is: Insofar as our moral reasons for action are grounded in âthis thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/âwhenever it is [or whoever causes it]â, then shining the spotlight of our active altruism on beings who happen to be salient/ânear to us is arbitrary. To me, active âaltruismâ per se[1] is pretty inextricable from anti-arbitrariness.
And Iâm saying, suppose for a moment weâre no longer trying to be actively altruistic, and instead consider normative reasons that arenât grounded in the above. Then, prioritizing those whom you actually have special relationships with isnât arbitrary in the relevant sense. Because those relationships give you a reason to prioritize them. (Of course, if we started from an impartial altruistic perspective, this reason would be dwarfed by our duty to reduce large-scale suffering overall, insofar as thatâs tractable! But the worry is that itâs not.)
Is your position something like, âWe also have special relationships with strangers who are near to usâ? I might be sympathetic to that, but it seems like it needs more unpacking.
Like I said, I do share the LAR intuition in some limited contexts, and it would be pretty sad if thereâs no non-arbitrary way to make sense of active altruism at all. I find this situation unsettling. But I currently feel confused as to how much I honestly endorse LAR.
Iâm not sure about this, though. As I wrote in a previous comment:
The concern Iâve tried to convey in our discussion so far is: Insofar as our moral reasons for action are grounded in âthis thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/âwhenever it is [or whoever causes it]â, then shining the spotlight of our active altruism on beings who happen to be salient/ânear to us is arbitrary. To me, active âaltruismâ per se[1] is pretty inextricable from anti-arbitrariness.
And Iâm saying, suppose for a moment weâre no longer trying to be actively altruistic, and instead consider normative reasons that arenât grounded in the above. Then, prioritizing those whom you actually have special relationships with isnât arbitrary in the relevant sense. Because those relationships give you a reason to prioritize them. (Of course, if we started from an impartial altruistic perspective, this reason would be dwarfed by our duty to reduce large-scale suffering overall, insofar as thatâs tractable! But the worry is that itâs not.)
Is your position something like, âWe also have special relationships with strangers who are near to usâ? I might be sympathetic to that, but it seems like it needs more unpacking.
Like I said, I do share the LAR intuition in some limited contexts, and it would be pretty sad if thereâs no non-arbitrary way to make sense of active altruism at all. I find this situation unsettling. But I currently feel confused as to how much I honestly endorse LAR.
As opposed to deontological(-ish) prohibitions against harming strangers.