To clarify, the context of the quoted remark was that, just as we can care for those we love in the face of cluelessness, we can likewise care for and benefit strangers.
Specifically in relation to this:
we still have reason to respect other values we hold dear — those that were never grounded purely in the impartial good in the first place. Integrity, care for those we love, and generally not being a jerk, for starters. Beyond that, my honest answer is: I don’t know.
I think the “other values we hold dear” can and should also include a strong focus on helping strangers as well, even if challenges from cluelessness and the like were to prove devastating to standard versions of consequentialism. I mostly responded to what I saw as an overly exclusive focus on those we love versus others.
I’m not sure about this, though. As I wrote in a previous comment:
The reasons to do various parochial things, or respect deontological constraints, aren’t like this. They aren’t grounded in something like “this thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/whenever it is [or whoever causes it]”.
The concern I’ve tried to convey in our discussion so far is: Insofar as our moral reasons for action are grounded in “this thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/whenever it is [or whoever causes it]”, then shining the spotlight of our active altruism on beings who happen to be salient/near to us is arbitrary. To me, active “altruism” per se[1] is pretty inextricable from anti-arbitrariness.
And I’m saying, suppose for a moment we’re no longer trying to be actively altruistic, and instead consider normative reasons that aren’t grounded in the above. Then, prioritizing those whom you actually have special relationships with isn’t arbitrary in the relevant sense. Because those relationships give you a reason to prioritize them. (Of course, if we started from an impartial altruistic perspective, this reason would be dwarfed by our duty to reduce large-scale suffering overall, insofar as that’s tractable! But the worry is that it’s not.)
Is your position something like, “We also have special relationships with strangers who are near to us”? I might be sympathetic to that, but it seems like it needs more unpacking.
Like I said, I do share the LAR intuition in some limited contexts, and it would be pretty sad if there’s no non-arbitrary way to make sense of active altruism at all. I find this situation unsettling. But I currently feel confused as to how much I honestly endorse LAR.
To clarify, the context of the quoted remark was that, just as we can care for those we love in the face of cluelessness, we can likewise care for and benefit strangers.
Specifically in relation to this:
I think the “other values we hold dear” can and should also include a strong focus on helping strangers as well, even if challenges from cluelessness and the like were to prove devastating to standard versions of consequentialism. I mostly responded to what I saw as an overly exclusive focus on those we love versus others.
I’m not sure about this, though. As I wrote in a previous comment:
The concern I’ve tried to convey in our discussion so far is: Insofar as our moral reasons for action are grounded in “this thing out there in the world is horrible, and should be prevented wherever/whenever it is [or whoever causes it]”, then shining the spotlight of our active altruism on beings who happen to be salient/near to us is arbitrary. To me, active “altruism” per se[1] is pretty inextricable from anti-arbitrariness.
And I’m saying, suppose for a moment we’re no longer trying to be actively altruistic, and instead consider normative reasons that aren’t grounded in the above. Then, prioritizing those whom you actually have special relationships with isn’t arbitrary in the relevant sense. Because those relationships give you a reason to prioritize them. (Of course, if we started from an impartial altruistic perspective, this reason would be dwarfed by our duty to reduce large-scale suffering overall, insofar as that’s tractable! But the worry is that it’s not.)
Is your position something like, “We also have special relationships with strangers who are near to us”? I might be sympathetic to that, but it seems like it needs more unpacking.
Like I said, I do share the LAR intuition in some limited contexts, and it would be pretty sad if there’s no non-arbitrary way to make sense of active altruism at all. I find this situation unsettling. But I currently feel confused as to how much I honestly endorse LAR.
As opposed to deontological(-ish) prohibitions against harming strangers.