I think the standard response by longtermists is encapsulated in Tarsney’s “The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism”: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04153-y Tarsney concludes: “if we simply aim to maximize expected value, and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule probabilities of astronomical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust. But on some prima facie plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational superiority of longtermist interventions depends heavily on these ’Pascalian’ probabilities. So the case for longtermism may depend either on plausible but non-obvious empirical claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism.” I don’t have time to compare the two papers at the moment, but—in my memory—the main difference to Thorstad’s conclusion is that Tarsney explicitly considers uncertainty about different models and model parameters regarding future population growth and our possibility to affect the probability of extinction.
Yes, one might say that, even if successful, Tarsney’s arguments don’t really negate Thorstad’s. It’s more that, using a more comprehensive modeling approach, we see that—even taking Thorstad’s arguments into account—fanatical longtermism remains correct and non-fanatical longtermism remains plausible given some/many/most plausible empirical assumptions. But I don’t remember exactly what all of Thorstad’s specific arguments in the paper were and how/whether they are accounted for in Tarsney’s paper, so someone better informed may please correct me.
I think the standard response by longtermists is encapsulated in Tarsney’s “The Epistemic Challenge to Longtermism”: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-023-04153-y Tarsney concludes: “if we simply aim to
maximize expected value, and don’t mind premising our choices on minuscule
probabilities of astronomical payoffs, the case for longtermism looks robust.
But on some prima facie plausible empirical worldviews, the expectational
superiority of longtermist interventions depends heavily on these ’Pascalian’
probabilities. So the case for longtermism may depend either on plausible but
non-obvious empirical claims or on a tolerance for Pascalian fanaticism.” I don’t have time to compare the two papers at the moment, but—in my memory—the main difference to Thorstad’s conclusion is that Tarsney explicitly considers uncertainty about different models and model parameters regarding future population growth and our possibility to affect the probability of extinction.
Interesting, the paper is older than Thorstad’s blogposts, but it could still be that people are thinking of this as “the answer”.
Yes, one might say that, even if successful, Tarsney’s arguments don’t really negate Thorstad’s. It’s more that, using a more comprehensive modeling approach, we see that—even taking Thorstad’s arguments into account—fanatical longtermism remains correct and non-fanatical longtermism remains plausible given some/many/most plausible empirical assumptions. But I don’t remember exactly what all of Thorstad’s specific arguments in the paper were and how/whether they are accounted for in Tarsney’s paper, so someone better informed may please correct me.