I think the most plausible meta-ethical view grounds objective moral value in preferences (which presuppose people/​sentient creatures with preferences), so there’s no non-circular way of solving the non-identity problem (and I would bite the bullet). The corollary is that mere addition isn’t atemporally good.
In other words, the benefits/​costs of depopulation is entirely in the impact of the people who would exist anyway, and there’s a pretty clear economic case (e.g. need to maintain a stable working age to dependent ratio, and to avoid vicious cycles relating to escalating pension costs and gerontocracy)
I think the most plausible meta-ethical view grounds objective moral value in preferences (which presuppose people/​sentient creatures with preferences), so there’s no non-circular way of solving the non-identity problem (and I would bite the bullet). The corollary is that mere addition isn’t atemporally good.
In other words, the benefits/​costs of depopulation is entirely in the impact of the people who would exist anyway, and there’s a pretty clear economic case (e.g. need to maintain a stable working age to dependent ratio, and to avoid vicious cycles relating to escalating pension costs and gerontocracy)