Five headaches among five people = 5 experientially independent experiences of what-it’s-like-of-going-through-1-headache. (Note the 5 experiences are experientially independent of each other because each is felt by a numerically different subject-of-experience, rather than all by one subject-of-experience.)
The fact that they are separate doesn’t mean that their content is any different from the experience of the one person. Certainly, the amount of pain they involve isn’t any different.
Ok, and after adding up the numbers, what does the final resulting number refer to in reality?
The total amount of suffering. Or, the total amount of well-being.
And in what sense does the referent (i.e. the thing referred to) involve more pain than a major headache?
Because are multiple people and each of them has their own pain.
You then add up the five ’2’s and get 10. Ok, now, what does the ’10′ refer to?
The amount of pain experienced among five people.
Ok, and in what sense do 5 of these shitty feelings involve more pain than 1 major headache?
In the sense that each of them involves more than 1⁄5 as much pain, and the total pain among 5 feelings is the sum of pain in each of them.
Clearly not in an experiential sense for only the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches is plausibly experientially worse than a major headache
Sure it’s experiential, all 10 of the pain is experienced. It’s just not experienced by the same person.
I CANNOT SEE HOW 5 what-it’s-like-of-going-through-1-minor-headache involves more pain than 1 major headache
In the same way that there are more sheep apparitions among five people, each of them dreaming of two sheep, than for one person who is dreaming of six sheep.
I don’t see how that “sum of pain” can involve more pain than 1 major headache because what that “sum of pain” is, ultimately speaking, are 5 what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-pain, and NOT 1 what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-pains.
But as far as cardinal utility is concerned, both quantities involve the same amount of pain. That’s just what you get from the definition of cardinal utility.
Because ultimately you’ll need an account of ‘involves more pain than’ on which 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people can involve more pain than 1 major headache. And in that situation, it is clearly the case that the 5 minor headaches are not experientially worse than the 1 major headache
That just means I need a different account of “involves more pain than” (which I have) when interpersonal comparisons are being made, but it doesn’t mean that my account can’t be the same as your account when there is only one person.
But when it’s distributed, you won’t have an overall shittiness that is shittier than the experience of 1 major headache, at least not when we understand “is shittier than” as meaning “is experientially worse than”.
But as I have been telling you this entire time, I don’t follow your definition of “experientially worse than”.
Your task, again, is to provide a different account of ‘involves more pain than’ or ‘shittier than’ on which, somehow, 5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache can somehow involve more pain than 1 major headache.
Well, I already did. But it’s really just the same as what utilitarians have been writing for centuries so it’s not like I had to provide it.
The fact that they are separate doesn’t mean that their content is any different from the experience of the one person. Certainly, the amount of pain they involve isn’t any different.
Yes, each of the 5 minor headaches spread among the 5 people are phenomenally or qualitatively the same as each of the 5 minor headaches of the one person. The fact that the headaches are spread does not mean that any of them, in themselves, feel any different from any of the 5 minor headaches of the one person. A minor headache feels like a minor headache, irrespective of who has it.
Now, each such minor headache constitutes a certain amount of pain, so 5 such minor headaches constitutes five such pain contents, and in THAT sense, five times as much pain. Moreover, since there are 5 such minor headaches in each case (i.e. the 1 person case and the 5 people case), therefore, each case involves the same amount of pain. This is so even if 5 minor headaches all had by one person (i.e. the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches) is experientially different from 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people (5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache).
Analogously, a visual experience of the color orange constitutes a certain amount of orange-ish feel, so 5 such visual experiences constitutes 5 such orange-ish feels, and in THAT sense, 5 times as much orange-ish feel. If one person experienced 5 such visual experiences one right after another and we recorded these experiences on an “experience recorder” and did the same with 5 such visual experiences spread among 5 people (where they each have their visual experience one right after the other), and then we played back both recordings, the playbacks viewed from the point of view of the universe would be identical: if each visual experience was 1 minute long, then both playbacks would be 5 minutes long of the same content. In this straight forward sense, 5 such visual experiences had by one person involves just as much orange-ish feel as 5 such visual experiences spread among 5 people. This is so even if the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-such-visual-experiences is not experientially the same as 5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-such-visual-experience.
Right? I assume this is what you have in mind.
I thus understand your alternative account or sense of ‘involves more pain than’. I can see how according to it, 5 minor headaches had by 1 person involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people.
But again, consider 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people vs 1 major headache. Here you claim that the 5 minor headaches involves more pain than 1 major headache, and I asked you to explain in what sense. Why did I do this? Because it is clearest here how your account fails to achieve what you think it can achieve.
So let’s carefully think about this for a second. Each minor headache constitutes a certain amount of pain—the amount of pain determined how shitty it feels in absolute terms. The same is true of the major headache. Since a major headache feels a lot shittier in absolute terms, we might use ‘6’ to represent the amount of pain it constitutes, and a ‘2’ to represent the amount of pain a single minor headache constitutes. IMPORTANTLY, both numbers—and the amount of pain they each represent—are determined by how shitty the major headache and the minor headache respectively FEEL. (Note: As I mentioned in an earlier reply, how shitty a pain episode feels is a function of both its intensity and duration).
Ok. Now, we have 5 experientially independent minor headaches. We have 5 such pain contents, and in THAT sense, 5 times as much pain. The duration of the playback would be 5 times as long compared to the playback of 1 minor headache.) Ok, but do we have something that we can appropriately call 10. Well, these numbers are meant to represent the amount of pain there is and we just said that the amount of pain is determined by how shitty something feels.
The question then is: Do 5 experientially independent minor headaches some how collectively constitute an amount of pain that feels like a 10. Clearly they don’t because only the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches can plausibly feel like a 10, and 5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache is not experientially the same as 1 what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches.
You might reply that 5 experientially minor headaches collectively constitute a 10 in that each minor headache constitutes an amount of pain represented by 2 and there are 5 such headaches. In other words, the duration of the playback is 5 times as long. There is, in that sense, 5 times the amount of pain, which is 10.
Yes, there is 5 times the amount of pain in THAT sense, which is why I would agree that 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves just as much pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people in THAT sense. BUT, notice that only the number 2 is experientially determined. The 5 is not. The 5 is the number of instances of the minor headaches. As a result, the number 10 is not experientially determined. So, the number 10 simply signifies a certain amount of pain (2) repeated 5 times. It does NOT signify an amount of pain that feels like a 10.
You might not disagree. You might ask, what is the problem here? The problem is that while you can compare a 10 and a 10 that are both determined in this non-purely experiential way, which in effect is what you do to get the result that 5 minor headaches had by one person involves just as much pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people, you CANNOT compare a 10 and a 6 when the 10 is determined in this non-purely experiential way and the 6 is determined in a purely experiential way. For when the numbers are determined in different ways, they signify different things, and are thus incommensurate.
I can make the same point by talking in terms of pain, rather than in terms of numbers. When you say that 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people, you are USING ‘amount of pain’ in a non-purely experiential sense. The amount of pain, so used, is determined by a certain amount of pain used in a purely experiential sense (i.e. an amount of pain determined by how shitty a minor headache feels) x how many minor headaches there are. While you can compare two amounts of pains, so used, with each other, you cannot compare an amount of pain, so used, with a certain amount of pain used in a purely experiential sense (i.e. an amount of pain determined by how shitty a major headache feels).
Of course, how many minor headaches there are will affect the amount of pain there is (used in a purely experiential sense) when the headaches all occur in one person. For 5 minor headaches all had by one person results in the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, which feels shittier (i.e. is experentially worse) than a major headache and thus constitutes more pain than a major headache. Thus, when I say 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves an amount of pain that is more than the amount of pain of a major headache, I am using both “amount of pain” in a purely experiential sense. I am comparing apples to apples. But when you say that 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people involves an amount of pain that is more than the amount of pain of a major headache, you are using the former “amount of pain” in a non-purely experiential sense (the one I described in the previous paragraph) and the latter “amount of pain” in a purely experiential sense. You are comparing apples to oranges.
In this response, I’ve tried very hard to make clear why it is that even though your account of ‘involves more pain than’ can work for 5 minor headaches all had by one person vs 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people (and get the result you want: i.e. that the amount of pain in each case is the same), your account cannot work for 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people vs 1 major headache. Thus, your account cannot achieve what you think it can achieve.
I worry that I haven’t been as clear as I wish to be (despite my efforts), so if any part of it comes off unclear, I hope you can be as charitable as you can and make an effort to understand what I’m saying, even if you disagree with it.
I just wanted to say I thought this comment did a good job explaining the basis behind your moral intuitions, which I had not really felt a strong motivation for before now. I still don’t find it particularly compelling myself, but I can understand why others could find it important.
Overall I find this post confusing though, since the framing seems to be “Effective Altruism is making an intellectual mistake” whereas you just actually seem to have a different set of moral intuitions from those involved in EA, which are largely incompatible with effective altruism as it currently practiced. Whilst you could describe moral differences as intellectual mistakes, this does not seem to be a standard or especially helpful usage.
The comments etc. then just seem to have mostly been people explaining why they don’t find your moral intuition that ‘non-purely experientially determined’ and ‘purely experientially determined’ amounts of pain cannot be compared compelling. Since we seem to have reached a point where there seems to be a fundamental disagreement about considered moral values, it does not seem that attempting to change each others minds is very fruitful.
I think I would have found this post more conceptually clear if it had been structured:
EA conclusions actually require an additional moral assumption/axiom—and so if you don’t agree with this assumption then you should not obviously follow EA advice.
(Optionally) Why you find the moral assumption unconvincing/unlikely
(Extra Optionally) Tentative suggestions for what should be done in the absence of the assumption.
Where throughout the assumption is the commensuratabilitly of ‘non-purely experientially determined’ and ‘purely experientially determined’ experience.
In general I am not very sure what you had in mind as the ideal outcome of this post. I’m surprised if you thought most EAs agreed with you on your moral intuition, since so much of EA is predicated on its converse (as is much of established consequential thinking etc.). But equally I am not sure what value we can especially bring to you if you feel very sure in your conviction that the assumption does not hold.
(Note I also made this as a top level comment so it would be less buried, so it might make more sense to respond (if you would like to) there)
Just because two things are different doesn’t mean they are incommensurate. It is easy to compare apples and oranges: for instance, the orange is healthier than the apple, the orange is heavier than the apple, the apple is tastier than the orange. You also compare two different things, by saying that a minor headache is less painful than torture, for instance. You think that different people’s experiences are incommensurable, but I don’t see why.
In fact, there is good reason to think that any two values are necessarily commensurable. For if something has value to an agent, then it must provide motivation to them should they be perceiving, thinking and acting correctly, for that is basically what value is. If something (e.g. an additional person’s suffering) does not provide additional motivation, then either I’m not responding appropriately to it or it’s not a value. And if my motivation is to follow the axioms of expected utility theory then it must be a function over possible outcomes where my motivation for each outcome is a single number. And if my motivation for an outcome is a single number, then it must take the different values associated with that outcome and combine them into one figure denoting how valuable I find it overall.
Just because two things are different doesn’t mean they are incommensurate.
But I didn’t say that. As long as two different things share certain aspects/dimensions (e.g. the aspect of weight, the aspect of nutrition, etc...), then of course they can be compared on those dimensions (e.g. the weight of an orange is more than the weight of an apple, i.e., an orange weighs more than an apple).
So I don’t deny that two different things that share many aspects/dimensions may be compared in many ways. But that’s not the problem.
The problem is that when you say that the amount of pain involved in 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people is more than the amount of pain involved in 1 major headache (i.e., 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people involves more pain than 1 major headache), you are in effect saying something like the WEIGHT of an orange is more than the NUTRITION of an apple. This is because the former “amount of pain” is used in a non-purely experiential sense while the latter “amount of pain” is used in a purely experiential sense. When I said you are comparing apples to oranges, THIS is what I meant.
you are in effect saying something like the WEIGHT of an orange is more than the NUTRITION of an apple.
No, I am effectively saying that the weight of five oranges is more than the weight of one orange.
This is because the former “amount of pain” is used in a non-purely experiential sense while the latter “amount of pain” is used in a purely experiential sense
That is wrong. In both cases I evaluate the quality of the experience multiplied by the number of subjects. It’s the same aspect for both cases. You’re just confused by the fact that, in one of the cases but not the other, the resulting quantity happens to be the same as the number provided by your “purely experiential sense”. If I said “this apple weighs 100 grams, and this orange weighs 200 grams,” you wouldn’t tell me that I’m making a false comparison merely because both the apple and the orange happen to have 100 calories. There is nothing philosophically noteworthy here, you have just stumbled upon the fact that any number multiplied by one is still one.
As if that isn’t decisive enough, imagine for instance that it was a comparison between two sufferers and five, rather than between one and five. Then you would obviously have no argument at all, since my evaluation of the two people’s suffering would obviously not be in the “purely experiential sense” that you talk about. So clearly I am right whenever more than one person is involved. And it would be strange for utilitarianism to be right in all those cases, but not when there was just one person. So it must be right all the time.
You’ll need to read to the very end of this reply before my argument seems complete.
In both cases I evaluate the quality of the experience multiplied by the number of subjects. It’s the same aspect for both cases. You’re just confused by the fact that, in one of the cases but not the other, the resulting quantity happens to be the same as the number provided by your “purely experiential sense”.
Case 1: 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people
Case 2: 1 major headache had by one person
Yes, I understand that in each case, you are multiplying a certain amount of pain (determined solely by how badly something feels) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication), and then you are comparing the total amount of pain in each case.
For example, in Case 1, you are multiplying the amount of pain of a minor headache (determined solely by how badly a minor headache feels) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). Say each minor headache feels like a 2, then 2 x 5 = 10. Call this 10 “10A”.
Similarly, in Case 2, you are multiplying the amount of pain of a major headache (determined solely by how badly a major headache feels) by the number of instances, in this case just 1, to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). Say the major headache feels like a 6, then 6 x 1 = 6. Call this latter 6 “6A”.
You then compare the 10A with the 6A. Moreover, since the amounts of pain represented by 10A and 6A are both gotten by multiplying one dimension (i.e. amount of pain, determined purely experientially) by another dimension (instances), you claim that you are comparing things along the same dimension, namely, A. But this is problematic.
To see the problem, consider
Case 3: 5 minor headaches all had by 1 person.
Here, like in Case 1, we can multiply the amount of pain of a minor headache (determined purely experientially) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). 2 x 5 = 10. This 10 is the 10A sort.
OR, unlike in Case 1, we can determine the final amount of pain not by multiplying those things, but instead in the same way we determine the amount of pain of a single minor headache, namely, by considering how badly the 5 minor headaches feels. We can consider how badly the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches feels. It feels like a 10, just as a minor headache feels like a 2, and a major headache feels like a 6. Call these 10E, 2E and 6E respectively. The ‘E’ signifies that the numbers were determined purely experientially.
Ok. I’m sure you already understand all that. Now here’s the problem.
You insist that there is no problem with comparing 10A and 6A. After all, they are both determined in the same way: multiplying an experience by its instances.
I am saying there is a problem with that. The problem is that saying 10A is more than 6A makes no sense. Why not? Because, importantly, what goes into determining the 10A and 6A are 2E and 6E respectively: 2E x 5 = 10A. 6E x 1 = 6A. So what?
Well think about it. 2E x 5 instances is really just 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E.
And 6E x 1 instance is really just 6E.
So when you assert 10A is more than 6A, you are really just asserting that
(2E, 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E) is more than 6E.
But then notice that, at bottom, you are still working with the dimension of experience (E) - the dimension of how badly something feels. The problem for you, then, is that the only intelligible form of comparison on this dimension is the “is experientially more bad than” (i.e. is experientially worse than) comparison.
(Of course, there is also the dimension of instances, and an intelligible form of comparison on this dimension is the “is more in instances than” comparison. For example, you can say 5 minor headaches is more in instances than 1 major headache (i.e. 5 > 1). But obviously, the comparison we care about is not merely a comparison of instances.)
Analogously, when you are working with the dimension of weight—the dimension of how much something weighs -, the only intelligible form of comparison is “weighs more than”.
Now, you keep insisting that there is an analogy between
1) your way of comparing the amounts of pain of various pain episodes (e.g. 5 minor headaches vs 1 major headache), and
2) how we normally compare the weights of various things (e.g. 5 small oranges vs 1 big orange).
For example, you say,
No, I am effectively saying that the weight of five oranges is more than the weight of one orange.
So let me explain why they are DIS-analogous. Consider the following example:
Case 1: Five small oranges, 2lbs each. (Just like 5 minor headaches, each feeling like a 2).
Case 2: One big orange, 6lbs. (Just like 1 major headache that feels like a 6).
Now, just as the 2 of a minor headache is determined by how badly it feels, the 2 of a small orange is determined by how much it weighs. So just as we write, 2E x 5 = 10A, we can similarly write 2W x 5 = 10A. And just as we write, 6E x 1 = 6A, we can similarly write 6W x 1 = 6A.
Now, if you assert that (the total amount of weight represented by) 10A is more than 6A, I would have NO problem with that. Why not? Because the comparison “is more than” still occurs on the dimension of weight (W). You are saying 5 small oranges WEIGHS more than 1 big orange. The comparison thus occurs on the SAME dimension that was used to determine the number 2 and 6 (numbers that in turn determined 10A and 6A): A small orange was determined to be 2 by how much it WEIGHED. Likewise with the big orange. And when you say 10A is more than 6A, the comparison is still made on that dimension.
By contrast, when you assert that (the total amount of pain represented by) 10A is more than 6A, the “is more than” does not occur on the dimension of experience anymore. It does not occur on the dimension of how badly something feels anymore. You are not saying that 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people is EXPERIENTIALLY WORSE than 1 major headache had by 1 person. You are saying something else. In other words, the comparison does NOT occur on the same dimension that was used to determine the number 2 and 6 (numbers that in turn determined 10A and 6A): A minor headache was determined to be 2 by how EXPERIENTIALLY BAD IT FELT. Likewise with the major headache. Yet, when you say 10A is more than 6A, you are not making a comparison on that dimension anymore.
So I hope you see how your way of comparing the amounts of pain between various pain episodes is disanalogous to how we normally compare the weights between various things.
Now, just as the dimension of weight (i.e. how much something weighs) and the dimension of instances (i.e. how many instances there are) do not combine to form some substantive third dimension on which to compare 5 small oranges with a big orange, the dimension of experience (i.e. how badly something feels) and the dimension of instances do not combine to form some substantive third dimension on which to compare 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people and 1 major headache had by one person. At best, they combine to form a trivial third dimension consisting in their collection/conjunction, on which one can intelligibly compare, say, 32 minor headaches with 23 minor headaches, irrespective of how the 32 and 23 minor headaches are spread. This trivial dimension is the dimension of “how many instances (i.e. how much) of a certain pain there is”. On this dimension, 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people cannot be compared with a MAJOR headache, because they are different pains, but 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people can be compared with 5 minor headaches all had by 1 person. Moreover, the result of such a comparison would be that they are the same on this dimension (as I allowed in an earlier reply). But this is a small victory given that this dimension won’t allow any comparisons between differential pains (e.g. 5 minor headaches and a major headache).
But then notice that, at bottom, you are still working with the dimension of experience (E) - the dimension of how badly something feels. The problem for you, then, is that the only intelligible form of comparison on this dimension is the “is experientially more bad than” (i.e. is experientially worse than) comparison
What I am working with “at bottom” is irrelevant here, because I’m not making a comparison with it. There are lots of things we compare that involve different properties “at bottom”.
But obviously, the comparison we care about is not merely a comparison of instances
And obviously the comparison we care about is not merely a comparison how bad it feels for any given person.
The comparison thus occurs on the SAME dimension
No it doesn’t. That is, if I were to apply the same logic to oranges that you do to people, I would say that there is Mono-Orange-Weight, defined as the most weight that is ever present in one of a group of oranges, and Multi-Orange-Weight, defined as the total weight that is present in a group of oranges, and insist that you cannot compare one to the other, so one orange weighs the same as five oranges.
Of course that would be nonsense, as it’s true that you can compare orange weights. But you can see how your argument fails. Because this is all you are doing; you are inventing a distinction between “purely experiential” and “non-purely experiential” badness and insisting that you cannot compare one against the other by obfuscating the difference between applying either metric to a single entity.
A minor headache was determined to be 2 by how EXPERIENTIALLY BAD IT FELT
But that isn’t how I determined that one person with a minor headache has 2 units of pain total.
Yet, when you say 10A is more than 6A, you are not making a comparison on that dimension anymore
You are right, I am comparing one person’s “non purely experiential” headache to five people’s “non purely experiential” headaches.
So I hope you see how your way of comparing the amounts of pain between various pain episodes is disanalogous to how we normally compare the weights between various things.
It’s not reasonable to expect me to change my mind when you’re repeating the exact same argument that you gave before while ignoring the second argument I gave in my comment.
hey kbog, I didn’t anticipate you would respond so quickly… I was editting my reply while you replied… Sorry about that. Anyways, I’m going to spend the next few days slowly re-reading and sitting on your past few replies in an all-out effort to understand your point of view. I hope you can do the same with just my latest reply (which I’ve editted). I think it needs to be read to the end for the full argument to come through.
Also, just to be clear, my goal here isn’t to change your mind. My goal is just to get closer to the truth as cheesy as that might sound. If I’m the one in error, I’d be happy to admit it as soon as I realize it. Hopefully a few days of dwelling will help. Cheers.
just as the dimension of weight (i.e. how much something weighs) and the dimension of instances (i.e. how many instances there are) do not combine to form some substantive third dimension on which to compare 5 small oranges with a big orange,
What?
It’s the dimension of weight, where the weight of 5 oranges can be more than the weight of one big orange. Weight is still weight when you are weighing multiple things together. If you don’t believe me, put 5 oranges on a scale and tell me what you see. The prior part of your comment doesn’t have anything to change this.
Sorry for taking awhile to get back to you – life got in the way… Fortunately, the additional time made me realize that I was the one who was confused as I now see very clearly the utilitarian sense of “involves more pain than” that you have been in favor of.
Where this leaves us is with two senses of “involves more pain than” and with the question of which of the two senses is the one that really matters. In this reply, I outline the two senses and then argue for why the sense that I have been in favor of is the one that really matters.
The two senses:
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that a person who experiences 5 minor toothaches is experientially just as badly off as someone who experiences a major toothache. This supposition, of course, makes use of my sense of “involves more pain than” – the sense that analyzes “involves more pain than” as “is experientially worse than”. This sense compares two what-it’s-likes (e.g., the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-toothaches vs the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-a-major-toothache) and compares them with respect to their what-it’s-like-ness – their feel. On this sense, 5 minor toothaches all had by one person involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person in that the former is experientially just as bad as the latter.
On your sense (though not on mine), if these 5 minor toothaches were spread across 5 people, they would still involve the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person. This is because having 1 major toothache is experientially just as bad as having 5 minor toothaches (i.e. using my sense), which entitles one to claim that the 1 major toothache is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches, since they give rise to distinct what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially just as bad. At this point, it’s helpful to stipulate that one minor toothache = one base unit of pain. That is, let’s suppose that the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-one-minor-toothache is experientially as bad as any of the least experientially bad experience(s) possible. Now, since there are in effect 5 base units of pain in both cases, therefore the cases involve the same amount of pain (in your sense). It is irrelevant that the 5 base units of pain are spread among 5 people in one case. This is because it is irrelevant how those 5 base units of pain feel when experienced together since we are not comparing the cases with respect to their what-it’s-like-ness – their feel. Rather, we are comparing the cases with respect to their quantity of the base unit of pain.
Which is the sense that really matters?
I believe the sense I am in favor of is the one that really matters, and that this becomes clear when we remind ourselves why we take pain to matter in the first place.
We take pain to matter because of its negative felt character – because of how it feels. I argue that we should favor my sense of “involves more pain than” because it fully respects this fact, whereas the sense you’re in favor of goes against the spirit of this fact.
According to your sense, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as one major toothache had by one person. But doesn’t this clearly go against the spirit of the fact that pain matters solely because of how it feels? None of the 5 people feel anything remotely bad. There is simply no experience of anything remotely bad on their side of the equation. They each feel a very mild pain – unpleasant enough to be perceived to be experientially bad, but that’s it. That’s the worst what-it’s-like on their side of the equation. Yet, a bundle of 5 of these mild what-it’s-likes somehow involve the same amount of pain as one major toothache. That can only be acceptable if the felt character of the major toothache (and of pain in general) is not as important to you as the sheer quantity of very mild pains (i.e. of base units of pain). But this is against the spirit of why pain matters.
The 5000 pains are only worse if 5000 minor pains experienced by one person is equivalent to one excruciating pain. If so, then 5000 minor pains for 5000 people being equivalent to one excruciating pain doesn’t go against the badness of how things feel; at least it doesn’t seem counterintuitive to me.
Maybe you think that no amount of minor pains can ever be equally important as one excruciating pain. But that’s a question of how we evaluate and represent an individual’s well-being, not a question of interpersonal comparison and aggregation.
Hey kbog, if you don’t mind, let’s ignore my example with the 5000 pains because I think my argument can more clearly be made in terms of my toothache example since I have already laid a foundation for it. Let me restate that foundation and then state my argument in terms of my toothache example. Thanks for bearing with me.
The foundation:
Suppose 5 minor toothaches had by one person is experientially just as bad as 1 major toothache had by one person.
Given the supposition, you would claim: 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person.
Let me explain what I think is your reasoning step by step:
P1) 5 minor toothaches had by one person and 1 major toothache had by one person give rise to two different what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially JUST AS BAD. (By above supposition)
(The two different what-it’s-likes are: the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-toothaches and the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-1-major-toothache.)
P2) Therefore, we are entitled to say that 5 minor toothaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P1)
P3) 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is 5 minor toothaches, just as 5 minor toothaches had by one person is 5 minor toothaches, so there is the same quantity of minor toothaches (or same quantity of base units of pain) in both cases. (Self-evident)
P4) Therefore, we are entitled to say that 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches had by one person. (By P4)
P5) Therefore, we are entitled to claim that 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P2 and P4)
C) Therefore, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P5)
As the illustrated reasoning shows, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person (i.e. C) only if 5 minor toothaches had by ONE person is equivalent to 1 major toothache (i.e. P2). You agree with this.
Moreover, as the illustrated reasoning also shows, the reason why 5 minor toothaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache (i.e. P2) is because they give rise to two different what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially just as bad (i.e. P1). I presume you agree with this too. Call this reason “Reason E”, E for “experientially just as bad”)
Furthermore, as the illustrated reasoning shows, the reason why 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothache had by one person is DIFFERENT from the reason for why 5 minor headaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. That is, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches had by one person (i.e. P4) because they share the same quantity of base units of pain, namely 5, irrespective of how the 5 base units of pain are spread (i.e. P3), and NOT because they give rise to two what-it’s-likes that are experientially just as bad (as they clearly don’t). Call this reason (i.e. P3) “Reason S”, S for “same quantity of base units of pains”
Argument:
So there are these two different types of reasons underlying your equivalence claims (I will use “=” to signify “is equivalent to”:
5 MiTs/5 people = 5 MiTs/1 person = 1 MaT/1 person
Now, never mind the transitivity problem that Reasons S and E create for your reasoning. Indeed, that’s not the problem I want to raise for your sense of “involves more pain.”
The problem with your sense of “involves more pain” is that it admits of Reason S as a basis for saying X involves more pain than Y. But Reason S, unlike Reason E, is against the spirit of why we take pain to matter. We take pain to matter because of the badness of how it feels, as you rightly claim. But Reason S doesn’t give a crap about how bad the pains on the two sides of the equation FEEL; it doesn’t care that 5 MiTs/1 person constitutes a pain that feels a whole lot worse than any anything on the other side of the equation. It just cares about how many base units of pain there are on each side. And, obviously, more base units of pain does not mean there is experientially worse pain precisely because the base units of pain can be spread out among many different people.
Maybe you think that no amount of minor pains can ever be equally important as one excruciating pain.
This an interesting question. Perhaps the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-an-INFINITE-number-of-a-very-mild-sort-of-pain cannot be experientially worse than the what-it’s-like-of-suffering-one-instance-of-third-degree-burns. If so, then I would think that 1 third-degree burn/1 person is morally worse than infinite mild pains/1 person. In any case, I don’t think what I think here is relevant to my argument against your utilitarian sense of “involves more pain than”.
the reason why 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothache had by one person is DIFFERENT from the reason for why 5 minor headaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person.
No, both equivalencies are justified by the fact that they involve the same amount of base units of pain.
But Reason S doesn’t give a crap about how bad the pains on the two sides of the equation FEEL
Sure it does. The presence of pain is equivalent to feeling bad. Feeling bad is precisely what is at stake here, and all that I care about.
In any case, I don’t think what I think here is relevant to my argument against your utilitarian sense of “involves more pain than”.
Yes, that’s what I meant when I said “that’s a question of how we evaluate and represent an individual’s well-being, not a question of interpersonal comparison and aggregation.”
the reason why 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothache had by one person is DIFFERENT from the reason for why 5 minor headaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person.
No, both equivalencies are justified by the fact that they involve the same amount of base units of pain.
So you’re saying that just as 5 MiTs/5 people is equivalent to 5 MiTs/1 person because both sides involve the same amount of base units of pain, 5 MiTs/1 person is equivalent to 1 MaT/1 person because both sides involve the same amount of base units of pain (and not because both sides give rise to what-it’s-likes that are experientially just as bad).
My question to you then is this: On what basis are you able to say that 1 MaT/1 person involves 5 base units of pain?
But Reason S doesn’t give a crap about how bad the pains on the two sides of the equation FEEL
Sure it does. The presence of pain is equivalent to feeling bad. Feeling bad is precisely what is at stake here, and all that I care about.
Reason S cares about the amount of base units of pain there are because pain feels bad, but in my opinion, that doesn’t sufficiently show that it cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels. It doesn’t sufficiently show that it cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels because 5 base units of pain all experienced by one person feels a whole heck of a lot worse than anything felt when 5 base units of pain are spread among 5 people, yet Reason S completely ignores this difference. If Reason S truly cared about pain-qua-how-it-feels, it cannot ignore this difference.
I understand where you’re coming from though. You hold that Reason S cares about the quantity of base units of pain precisely because pain feels bad, and that this fact alone sufficiently shows that Reason S is in harmony with the fact that we take pain to matter because of how it feels (i.e. that Reason S cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels).
However, given what I just said, I think this fact alone is too weak to show that Reason S is in harmony with the fact that we take pain to matter because of how it feels. So I believe my objection stands.
On what basis are you able to say that 1 MaT/1 person involves 5 base units of pain?
Because you told me that it’s the same amount of pain as five minor toothaches and you also told me that each minor toothache is 1 base unit of pain.
5 base units of pain all experienced by one person feels a whole heck of a lot worse than anything felt when 5 base units of pain are spread among 5 people, yet Reason S completely ignores this difference. If Reason S truly cared about pain-qua-how-it-feels, it cannot ignore this difference.
If you mean that it feels worse to any given person involved, yes it ignores the difference, but that’s clearly the point, so I don’t know what you’re doing here other than merely restating it and saying “I don’t agree.”
On the other hand, you do not care how many people are in pain, and you do not care how much pain someone experiences so long as there is someone else who is in more pain, so if anyone’s got to figure out whether or not they “care” enough it’s you.
Have we hit bedrock?
You’ve pretty much been repeating yourself for the past several weeks, so, sure.
Because you told me that it’s the same amount of pain as five minor toothaches and you also told me that each minor toothache is 1 base unit of pain.
Where in supposition or the line of reasoning that I laid out earlier (i.e. P1) through to P5)) did I say that 1 major headache involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor toothaches?
I attributed that line of reasoning to you because I thought that was how you would get to C) from the supposition that 5 minor toothaches had by one person is experientially just as bad as 1 major toothache had by one person.
But you then denied that that line of reasoning represents your line of reasoning. Specifically, you denied that P1) is the basis for asserting P2). When I asked you what is your basis for P2), you assert that I told you that 1 major headache involves the same amount of pain as five minor toothaches. But where did I say this?
In any case, it would certainly help if you described your actual step by step reasoning from the supposition to C), since, apparently, I got it wrong.
If you mean that it feels worse to any given person involved, yes it ignores the difference, but that’s clearly the point, so I don’t know what you’re doing here other than merely restating it and saying “I don’t agree.”
I’m not merely restating the fact that Reason S ignores this difference. I am restating it as part of a further argument against your sense of “involves more pain than” or “involves the same amount of pain as”. The argument in essence goes:
P1) Your sense relies on Reason S
P2) Reason S does not care about pain-qua-how-it-feels (because it ignores the above stated difference).
P3) We take pain to matter because of how it feels.
C) Therefore, your sense is not in harmony with why pain matters (or at least why we take pain to matter).
I had to restate that Reason S ignores this difference as my support for P2, so it was not merely stated.
On the other hand, you do not care how many people are in pain, and you do not care how much pain someone experiences so long as there is someone else who is in more pain, so if anyone’s got to figure out whether or not they “care” enough it’s you.
Both accusations are problematic.
The first accusation is not entirely true. I don’t care about how many people are in pain only in situations where I have to choose between helping, say, Amy and Susie or just Bob (i.e. situations where a person in the minority party does not overlap with anyone in the majority party). However, I would care about how many people are in pain in situations where I have to choose between helping, say, Amy and Susie or just Amy (i.e. situations where the minority party is a mere subset of the majority party). This is due to the strict pareto principle which would make Amy and Susie each suffering morally worse than just Amy suffering, but would not make Amy and Susie suffering morally worse than Bob suffering. I don’t want to get into this at this point because it’s not very relevant to our discussion. Suffice it to say that it’s not entirely true that I don’t care about how many people are in pain.
The second accusation is plain false. As I made clear in my response to Objection 2 in my post, I think who suffers matters. As a result, if I could either save one person from suffering some pain or another person from suffering a slightly less pain, I would give each person a chance of being saved in proportion to how much each has to suffer. This is what I think I should do. Ironically, your second accusation against me is precisely true of what you stand for.
You’ve pretty much been repeating yourself for the past several weeks, so, sure.
In my past few replies, I have:
1) Outlined in explicit terms a line of reasoning that got from the supposition to C), which I attributed to you.
2) Highlighted that that line of reasoning appealed to Reason S.
3) On that basis, argued that your sense of “involves the same amount of pain as” goes against the spirit of why pain matters.
If that comes across to you as “just repeating myself for the past several weeks”, then I can only think that you aren’t putting enough effort into trying to understand what I’m saying.
The fact that they are separate doesn’t mean that their content is any different from the experience of the one person. Certainly, the amount of pain they involve isn’t any different.
The total amount of suffering. Or, the total amount of well-being.
Because are multiple people and each of them has their own pain.
The amount of pain experienced among five people.
In the sense that each of them involves more than 1⁄5 as much pain, and the total pain among 5 feelings is the sum of pain in each of them.
Sure it’s experiential, all 10 of the pain is experienced. It’s just not experienced by the same person.
In the same way that there are more sheep apparitions among five people, each of them dreaming of two sheep, than for one person who is dreaming of six sheep.
But as far as cardinal utility is concerned, both quantities involve the same amount of pain. That’s just what you get from the definition of cardinal utility.
That just means I need a different account of “involves more pain than” (which I have) when interpersonal comparisons are being made, but it doesn’t mean that my account can’t be the same as your account when there is only one person.
But as I have been telling you this entire time, I don’t follow your definition of “experientially worse than”.
Well, I already did. But it’s really just the same as what utilitarians have been writing for centuries so it’s not like I had to provide it.
Yes, each of the 5 minor headaches spread among the 5 people are phenomenally or qualitatively the same as each of the 5 minor headaches of the one person. The fact that the headaches are spread does not mean that any of them, in themselves, feel any different from any of the 5 minor headaches of the one person. A minor headache feels like a minor headache, irrespective of who has it.
Now, each such minor headache constitutes a certain amount of pain, so 5 such minor headaches constitutes five such pain contents, and in THAT sense, five times as much pain. Moreover, since there are 5 such minor headaches in each case (i.e. the 1 person case and the 5 people case), therefore, each case involves the same amount of pain. This is so even if 5 minor headaches all had by one person (i.e. the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches) is experientially different from 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people (5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache).
Analogously, a visual experience of the color orange constitutes a certain amount of orange-ish feel, so 5 such visual experiences constitutes 5 such orange-ish feels, and in THAT sense, 5 times as much orange-ish feel. If one person experienced 5 such visual experiences one right after another and we recorded these experiences on an “experience recorder” and did the same with 5 such visual experiences spread among 5 people (where they each have their visual experience one right after the other), and then we played back both recordings, the playbacks viewed from the point of view of the universe would be identical: if each visual experience was 1 minute long, then both playbacks would be 5 minutes long of the same content. In this straight forward sense, 5 such visual experiences had by one person involves just as much orange-ish feel as 5 such visual experiences spread among 5 people. This is so even if the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-such-visual-experiences is not experientially the same as 5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-such-visual-experience.
Right? I assume this is what you have in mind.
I thus understand your alternative account or sense of ‘involves more pain than’. I can see how according to it, 5 minor headaches had by 1 person involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people.
But again, consider 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people vs 1 major headache. Here you claim that the 5 minor headaches involves more pain than 1 major headache, and I asked you to explain in what sense. Why did I do this? Because it is clearest here how your account fails to achieve what you think it can achieve.
So let’s carefully think about this for a second. Each minor headache constitutes a certain amount of pain—the amount of pain determined how shitty it feels in absolute terms. The same is true of the major headache. Since a major headache feels a lot shittier in absolute terms, we might use ‘6’ to represent the amount of pain it constitutes, and a ‘2’ to represent the amount of pain a single minor headache constitutes. IMPORTANTLY, both numbers—and the amount of pain they each represent—are determined by how shitty the major headache and the minor headache respectively FEEL. (Note: As I mentioned in an earlier reply, how shitty a pain episode feels is a function of both its intensity and duration).
Ok. Now, we have 5 experientially independent minor headaches. We have 5 such pain contents, and in THAT sense, 5 times as much pain. The duration of the playback would be 5 times as long compared to the playback of 1 minor headache.) Ok, but do we have something that we can appropriately call 10. Well, these numbers are meant to represent the amount of pain there is and we just said that the amount of pain is determined by how shitty something feels.
The question then is: Do 5 experientially independent minor headaches some how collectively constitute an amount of pain that feels like a 10. Clearly they don’t because only the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches can plausibly feel like a 10, and 5 experientially independent what-it’s-likes-of-going-through-1-minor-headache is not experientially the same as 1 what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches.
You might reply that 5 experientially minor headaches collectively constitute a 10 in that each minor headache constitutes an amount of pain represented by 2 and there are 5 such headaches. In other words, the duration of the playback is 5 times as long. There is, in that sense, 5 times the amount of pain, which is 10.
Yes, there is 5 times the amount of pain in THAT sense, which is why I would agree that 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves just as much pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people in THAT sense. BUT, notice that only the number 2 is experientially determined. The 5 is not. The 5 is the number of instances of the minor headaches. As a result, the number 10 is not experientially determined. So, the number 10 simply signifies a certain amount of pain (2) repeated 5 times. It does NOT signify an amount of pain that feels like a 10.
You might not disagree. You might ask, what is the problem here? The problem is that while you can compare a 10 and a 10 that are both determined in this non-purely experiential way, which in effect is what you do to get the result that 5 minor headaches had by one person involves just as much pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people, you CANNOT compare a 10 and a 6 when the 10 is determined in this non-purely experiential way and the 6 is determined in a purely experiential way. For when the numbers are determined in different ways, they signify different things, and are thus incommensurate.
I can make the same point by talking in terms of pain, rather than in terms of numbers. When you say that 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people, you are USING ‘amount of pain’ in a non-purely experiential sense. The amount of pain, so used, is determined by a certain amount of pain used in a purely experiential sense (i.e. an amount of pain determined by how shitty a minor headache feels) x how many minor headaches there are. While you can compare two amounts of pains, so used, with each other, you cannot compare an amount of pain, so used, with a certain amount of pain used in a purely experiential sense (i.e. an amount of pain determined by how shitty a major headache feels).
Of course, how many minor headaches there are will affect the amount of pain there is (used in a purely experiential sense) when the headaches all occur in one person. For 5 minor headaches all had by one person results in the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches, which feels shittier (i.e. is experentially worse) than a major headache and thus constitutes more pain than a major headache. Thus, when I say 5 minor headaches all had by one person involves an amount of pain that is more than the amount of pain of a major headache, I am using both “amount of pain” in a purely experiential sense. I am comparing apples to apples. But when you say that 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people involves an amount of pain that is more than the amount of pain of a major headache, you are using the former “amount of pain” in a non-purely experiential sense (the one I described in the previous paragraph) and the latter “amount of pain” in a purely experiential sense. You are comparing apples to oranges.
In this response, I’ve tried very hard to make clear why it is that even though your account of ‘involves more pain than’ can work for 5 minor headaches all had by one person vs 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people (and get the result you want: i.e. that the amount of pain in each case is the same), your account cannot work for 5 minor headaches spread across 5 people vs 1 major headache. Thus, your account cannot achieve what you think it can achieve.
I worry that I haven’t been as clear as I wish to be (despite my efforts), so if any part of it comes off unclear, I hope you can be as charitable as you can and make an effort to understand what I’m saying, even if you disagree with it.
I just wanted to say I thought this comment did a good job explaining the basis behind your moral intuitions, which I had not really felt a strong motivation for before now. I still don’t find it particularly compelling myself, but I can understand why others could find it important.
Overall I find this post confusing though, since the framing seems to be “Effective Altruism is making an intellectual mistake” whereas you just actually seem to have a different set of moral intuitions from those involved in EA, which are largely incompatible with effective altruism as it currently practiced. Whilst you could describe moral differences as intellectual mistakes, this does not seem to be a standard or especially helpful usage.
The comments etc. then just seem to have mostly been people explaining why they don’t find your moral intuition that ‘non-purely experientially determined’ and ‘purely experientially determined’ amounts of pain cannot be compared compelling. Since we seem to have reached a point where there seems to be a fundamental disagreement about considered moral values, it does not seem that attempting to change each others minds is very fruitful.
I think I would have found this post more conceptually clear if it had been structured:
EA conclusions actually require an additional moral assumption/axiom—and so if you don’t agree with this assumption then you should not obviously follow EA advice.
(Optionally) Why you find the moral assumption unconvincing/unlikely
(Extra Optionally) Tentative suggestions for what should be done in the absence of the assumption.
Where throughout the assumption is the commensuratabilitly of ‘non-purely experientially determined’ and ‘purely experientially determined’ experience.
In general I am not very sure what you had in mind as the ideal outcome of this post. I’m surprised if you thought most EAs agreed with you on your moral intuition, since so much of EA is predicated on its converse (as is much of established consequential thinking etc.). But equally I am not sure what value we can especially bring to you if you feel very sure in your conviction that the assumption does not hold.
(Note I also made this as a top level comment so it would be less buried, so it might make more sense to respond (if you would like to) there)
Just because two things are different doesn’t mean they are incommensurate. It is easy to compare apples and oranges: for instance, the orange is healthier than the apple, the orange is heavier than the apple, the apple is tastier than the orange. You also compare two different things, by saying that a minor headache is less painful than torture, for instance. You think that different people’s experiences are incommensurable, but I don’t see why.
In fact, there is good reason to think that any two values are necessarily commensurable. For if something has value to an agent, then it must provide motivation to them should they be perceiving, thinking and acting correctly, for that is basically what value is. If something (e.g. an additional person’s suffering) does not provide additional motivation, then either I’m not responding appropriately to it or it’s not a value. And if my motivation is to follow the axioms of expected utility theory then it must be a function over possible outcomes where my motivation for each outcome is a single number. And if my motivation for an outcome is a single number, then it must take the different values associated with that outcome and combine them into one figure denoting how valuable I find it overall.
But I didn’t say that. As long as two different things share certain aspects/dimensions (e.g. the aspect of weight, the aspect of nutrition, etc...), then of course they can be compared on those dimensions (e.g. the weight of an orange is more than the weight of an apple, i.e., an orange weighs more than an apple).
So I don’t deny that two different things that share many aspects/dimensions may be compared in many ways. But that’s not the problem.
The problem is that when you say that the amount of pain involved in 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people is more than the amount of pain involved in 1 major headache (i.e., 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people involves more pain than 1 major headache), you are in effect saying something like the WEIGHT of an orange is more than the NUTRITION of an apple. This is because the former “amount of pain” is used in a non-purely experiential sense while the latter “amount of pain” is used in a purely experiential sense. When I said you are comparing apples to oranges, THIS is what I meant.
No, I am effectively saying that the weight of five oranges is more than the weight of one orange.
That is wrong. In both cases I evaluate the quality of the experience multiplied by the number of subjects. It’s the same aspect for both cases. You’re just confused by the fact that, in one of the cases but not the other, the resulting quantity happens to be the same as the number provided by your “purely experiential sense”. If I said “this apple weighs 100 grams, and this orange weighs 200 grams,” you wouldn’t tell me that I’m making a false comparison merely because both the apple and the orange happen to have 100 calories. There is nothing philosophically noteworthy here, you have just stumbled upon the fact that any number multiplied by one is still one.
As if that isn’t decisive enough, imagine for instance that it was a comparison between two sufferers and five, rather than between one and five. Then you would obviously have no argument at all, since my evaluation of the two people’s suffering would obviously not be in the “purely experiential sense” that you talk about. So clearly I am right whenever more than one person is involved. And it would be strange for utilitarianism to be right in all those cases, but not when there was just one person. So it must be right all the time.
You’ll need to read to the very end of this reply before my argument seems complete.
Case 1: 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people
Case 2: 1 major headache had by one person
Yes, I understand that in each case, you are multiplying a certain amount of pain (determined solely by how badly something feels) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication), and then you are comparing the total amount of pain in each case.
For example, in Case 1, you are multiplying the amount of pain of a minor headache (determined solely by how badly a minor headache feels) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). Say each minor headache feels like a 2, then 2 x 5 = 10. Call this 10 “10A”.
Similarly, in Case 2, you are multiplying the amount of pain of a major headache (determined solely by how badly a major headache feels) by the number of instances, in this case just 1, to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). Say the major headache feels like a 6, then 6 x 1 = 6. Call this latter 6 “6A”.
You then compare the 10A with the 6A. Moreover, since the amounts of pain represented by 10A and 6A are both gotten by multiplying one dimension (i.e. amount of pain, determined purely experientially) by another dimension (instances), you claim that you are comparing things along the same dimension, namely, A. But this is problematic.
To see the problem, consider
Case 3: 5 minor headaches all had by 1 person.
Here, like in Case 1, we can multiply the amount of pain of a minor headache (determined purely experientially) by the number of instances to get a total amount of pain (determined via this multiplication). 2 x 5 = 10. This 10 is the 10A sort.
OR, unlike in Case 1, we can determine the final amount of pain not by multiplying those things, but instead in the same way we determine the amount of pain of a single minor headache, namely, by considering how badly the 5 minor headaches feels. We can consider how badly the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-headaches feels. It feels like a 10, just as a minor headache feels like a 2, and a major headache feels like a 6. Call these 10E, 2E and 6E respectively. The ‘E’ signifies that the numbers were determined purely experientially.
Ok. I’m sure you already understand all that. Now here’s the problem.
You insist that there is no problem with comparing 10A and 6A. After all, they are both determined in the same way: multiplying an experience by its instances.
I am saying there is a problem with that. The problem is that saying 10A is more than 6A makes no sense. Why not? Because, importantly, what goes into determining the 10A and 6A are 2E and 6E respectively: 2E x 5 = 10A. 6E x 1 = 6A. So what?
Well think about it. 2E x 5 instances is really just 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E.
And 6E x 1 instance is really just 6E.
So when you assert 10A is more than 6A, you are really just asserting that (2E, 2E, 2E, 2E, 2E) is more than 6E.
But then notice that, at bottom, you are still working with the dimension of experience (E) - the dimension of how badly something feels. The problem for you, then, is that the only intelligible form of comparison on this dimension is the “is experientially more bad than” (i.e. is experientially worse than) comparison.
(Of course, there is also the dimension of instances, and an intelligible form of comparison on this dimension is the “is more in instances than” comparison. For example, you can say 5 minor headaches is more in instances than 1 major headache (i.e. 5 > 1). But obviously, the comparison we care about is not merely a comparison of instances.)
Analogously, when you are working with the dimension of weight—the dimension of how much something weighs -, the only intelligible form of comparison is “weighs more than”.
Now, you keep insisting that there is an analogy between
1) your way of comparing the amounts of pain of various pain episodes (e.g. 5 minor headaches vs 1 major headache), and
2) how we normally compare the weights of various things (e.g. 5 small oranges vs 1 big orange).
For example, you say,
So let me explain why they are DIS-analogous. Consider the following example:
Case 1: Five small oranges, 2lbs each. (Just like 5 minor headaches, each feeling like a 2).
Case 2: One big orange, 6lbs. (Just like 1 major headache that feels like a 6).
Now, just as the 2 of a minor headache is determined by how badly it feels, the 2 of a small orange is determined by how much it weighs. So just as we write, 2E x 5 = 10A, we can similarly write 2W x 5 = 10A. And just as we write, 6E x 1 = 6A, we can similarly write 6W x 1 = 6A.
Now, if you assert that (the total amount of weight represented by) 10A is more than 6A, I would have NO problem with that. Why not? Because the comparison “is more than” still occurs on the dimension of weight (W). You are saying 5 small oranges WEIGHS more than 1 big orange. The comparison thus occurs on the SAME dimension that was used to determine the number 2 and 6 (numbers that in turn determined 10A and 6A): A small orange was determined to be 2 by how much it WEIGHED. Likewise with the big orange. And when you say 10A is more than 6A, the comparison is still made on that dimension.
By contrast, when you assert that (the total amount of pain represented by) 10A is more than 6A, the “is more than” does not occur on the dimension of experience anymore. It does not occur on the dimension of how badly something feels anymore. You are not saying that 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people is EXPERIENTIALLY WORSE than 1 major headache had by 1 person. You are saying something else. In other words, the comparison does NOT occur on the same dimension that was used to determine the number 2 and 6 (numbers that in turn determined 10A and 6A): A minor headache was determined to be 2 by how EXPERIENTIALLY BAD IT FELT. Likewise with the major headache. Yet, when you say 10A is more than 6A, you are not making a comparison on that dimension anymore.
So I hope you see how your way of comparing the amounts of pain between various pain episodes is disanalogous to how we normally compare the weights between various things.
Now, just as the dimension of weight (i.e. how much something weighs) and the dimension of instances (i.e. how many instances there are) do not combine to form some substantive third dimension on which to compare 5 small oranges with a big orange, the dimension of experience (i.e. how badly something feels) and the dimension of instances do not combine to form some substantive third dimension on which to compare 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people and 1 major headache had by one person. At best, they combine to form a trivial third dimension consisting in their collection/conjunction, on which one can intelligibly compare, say, 32 minor headaches with 23 minor headaches, irrespective of how the 32 and 23 minor headaches are spread. This trivial dimension is the dimension of “how many instances (i.e. how much) of a certain pain there is”. On this dimension, 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people cannot be compared with a MAJOR headache, because they are different pains, but 5 minor headaches spread among 5 people can be compared with 5 minor headaches all had by 1 person. Moreover, the result of such a comparison would be that they are the same on this dimension (as I allowed in an earlier reply). But this is a small victory given that this dimension won’t allow any comparisons between differential pains (e.g. 5 minor headaches and a major headache).
What I am working with “at bottom” is irrelevant here, because I’m not making a comparison with it. There are lots of things we compare that involve different properties “at bottom”.
And obviously the comparison we care about is not merely a comparison how bad it feels for any given person.
No it doesn’t. That is, if I were to apply the same logic to oranges that you do to people, I would say that there is Mono-Orange-Weight, defined as the most weight that is ever present in one of a group of oranges, and Multi-Orange-Weight, defined as the total weight that is present in a group of oranges, and insist that you cannot compare one to the other, so one orange weighs the same as five oranges.
Of course that would be nonsense, as it’s true that you can compare orange weights. But you can see how your argument fails. Because this is all you are doing; you are inventing a distinction between “purely experiential” and “non-purely experiential” badness and insisting that you cannot compare one against the other by obfuscating the difference between applying either metric to a single entity.
But that isn’t how I determined that one person with a minor headache has 2 units of pain total.
You are right, I am comparing one person’s “non purely experiential” headache to five people’s “non purely experiential” headaches.
It’s not reasonable to expect me to change my mind when you’re repeating the exact same argument that you gave before while ignoring the second argument I gave in my comment.
hey kbog, I didn’t anticipate you would respond so quickly… I was editting my reply while you replied… Sorry about that. Anyways, I’m going to spend the next few days slowly re-reading and sitting on your past few replies in an all-out effort to understand your point of view. I hope you can do the same with just my latest reply (which I’ve editted). I think it needs to be read to the end for the full argument to come through.
Also, just to be clear, my goal here isn’t to change your mind. My goal is just to get closer to the truth as cheesy as that might sound. If I’m the one in error, I’d be happy to admit it as soon as I realize it. Hopefully a few days of dwelling will help. Cheers.
What?
It’s the dimension of weight, where the weight of 5 oranges can be more than the weight of one big orange. Weight is still weight when you are weighing multiple things together. If you don’t believe me, put 5 oranges on a scale and tell me what you see. The prior part of your comment doesn’t have anything to change this.
Hi kbog,
Sorry for taking awhile to get back to you – life got in the way… Fortunately, the additional time made me realize that I was the one who was confused as I now see very clearly the utilitarian sense of “involves more pain than” that you have been in favor of.
Where this leaves us is with two senses of “involves more pain than” and with the question of which of the two senses is the one that really matters. In this reply, I outline the two senses and then argue for why the sense that I have been in favor of is the one that really matters.
The two senses:
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that a person who experiences 5 minor toothaches is experientially just as badly off as someone who experiences a major toothache. This supposition, of course, makes use of my sense of “involves more pain than” – the sense that analyzes “involves more pain than” as “is experientially worse than”. This sense compares two what-it’s-likes (e.g., the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-toothaches vs the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-a-major-toothache) and compares them with respect to their what-it’s-like-ness – their feel. On this sense, 5 minor toothaches all had by one person involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person in that the former is experientially just as bad as the latter.
On your sense (though not on mine), if these 5 minor toothaches were spread across 5 people, they would still involve the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person. This is because having 1 major toothache is experientially just as bad as having 5 minor toothaches (i.e. using my sense), which entitles one to claim that the 1 major toothache is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches, since they give rise to distinct what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially just as bad. At this point, it’s helpful to stipulate that one minor toothache = one base unit of pain. That is, let’s suppose that the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-one-minor-toothache is experientially as bad as any of the least experientially bad experience(s) possible. Now, since there are in effect 5 base units of pain in both cases, therefore the cases involve the same amount of pain (in your sense). It is irrelevant that the 5 base units of pain are spread among 5 people in one case. This is because it is irrelevant how those 5 base units of pain feel when experienced together since we are not comparing the cases with respect to their what-it’s-like-ness – their feel. Rather, we are comparing the cases with respect to their quantity of the base unit of pain.
Which is the sense that really matters?
I believe the sense I am in favor of is the one that really matters, and that this becomes clear when we remind ourselves why we take pain to matter in the first place.
We take pain to matter because of its negative felt character – because of how it feels. I argue that we should favor my sense of “involves more pain than” because it fully respects this fact, whereas the sense you’re in favor of goes against the spirit of this fact.
According to your sense, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as one major toothache had by one person. But doesn’t this clearly go against the spirit of the fact that pain matters solely because of how it feels? None of the 5 people feel anything remotely bad. There is simply no experience of anything remotely bad on their side of the equation. They each feel a very mild pain – unpleasant enough to be perceived to be experientially bad, but that’s it. That’s the worst what-it’s-like on their side of the equation. Yet, a bundle of 5 of these mild what-it’s-likes somehow involve the same amount of pain as one major toothache. That can only be acceptable if the felt character of the major toothache (and of pain in general) is not as important to you as the sheer quantity of very mild pains (i.e. of base units of pain). But this is against the spirit of why pain matters.
The 5000 pains are only worse if 5000 minor pains experienced by one person is equivalent to one excruciating pain. If so, then 5000 minor pains for 5000 people being equivalent to one excruciating pain doesn’t go against the badness of how things feel; at least it doesn’t seem counterintuitive to me.
Maybe you think that no amount of minor pains can ever be equally important as one excruciating pain. But that’s a question of how we evaluate and represent an individual’s well-being, not a question of interpersonal comparison and aggregation.
Hey kbog, if you don’t mind, let’s ignore my example with the 5000 pains because I think my argument can more clearly be made in terms of my toothache example since I have already laid a foundation for it. Let me restate that foundation and then state my argument in terms of my toothache example. Thanks for bearing with me.
The foundation:
Suppose 5 minor toothaches had by one person is experientially just as bad as 1 major toothache had by one person.
Given the supposition, you would claim: 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person.
Let me explain what I think is your reasoning step by step:
P1) 5 minor toothaches had by one person and 1 major toothache had by one person give rise to two different what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially JUST AS BAD. (By above supposition) (The two different what-it’s-likes are: the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-5-minor-toothaches and the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-1-major-toothache.)
P2) Therefore, we are entitled to say that 5 minor toothaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P1)
P3) 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is 5 minor toothaches, just as 5 minor toothaches had by one person is 5 minor toothaches, so there is the same quantity of minor toothaches (or same quantity of base units of pain) in both cases. (Self-evident)
P4) Therefore, we are entitled to say that 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches had by one person. (By P4)
P5) Therefore, we are entitled to claim that 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P2 and P4)
C) Therefore, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person. (By P5)
As the illustrated reasoning shows, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people involves the same amount of pain as 1 major toothache had by one person (i.e. C) only if 5 minor toothaches had by ONE person is equivalent to 1 major toothache (i.e. P2). You agree with this.
Moreover, as the illustrated reasoning also shows, the reason why 5 minor toothaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache (i.e. P2) is because they give rise to two different what-it’s-likes that are nevertheless experientially just as bad (i.e. P1). I presume you agree with this too. Call this reason “Reason E”, E for “experientially just as bad”)
Furthermore, as the illustrated reasoning shows, the reason why 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothache had by one person is DIFFERENT from the reason for why 5 minor headaches had by one person is equivalent to 1 major toothache had by one person. That is, 5 minor toothaches spread among 5 people is equivalent to 5 minor toothaches had by one person (i.e. P4) because they share the same quantity of base units of pain, namely 5, irrespective of how the 5 base units of pain are spread (i.e. P3), and NOT because they give rise to two what-it’s-likes that are experientially just as bad (as they clearly don’t). Call this reason (i.e. P3) “Reason S”, S for “same quantity of base units of pains”
Argument:
So there are these two different types of reasons underlying your equivalence claims (I will use “=” to signify “is equivalent to”:
5 MiTs/5 people = 5 MiTs/1 person = 1 MaT/1 person
........................(Reason S).................(Reason E).......................…
Now, never mind the transitivity problem that Reasons S and E create for your reasoning. Indeed, that’s not the problem I want to raise for your sense of “involves more pain.”
The problem with your sense of “involves more pain” is that it admits of Reason S as a basis for saying X involves more pain than Y. But Reason S, unlike Reason E, is against the spirit of why we take pain to matter. We take pain to matter because of the badness of how it feels, as you rightly claim. But Reason S doesn’t give a crap about how bad the pains on the two sides of the equation FEEL; it doesn’t care that 5 MiTs/1 person constitutes a pain that feels a whole lot worse than any anything on the other side of the equation. It just cares about how many base units of pain there are on each side. And, obviously, more base units of pain does not mean there is experientially worse pain precisely because the base units of pain can be spread out among many different people.
This an interesting question. Perhaps the what-it’s-like-of-going-through-an-INFINITE-number-of-a-very-mild-sort-of-pain cannot be experientially worse than the what-it’s-like-of-suffering-one-instance-of-third-degree-burns. If so, then I would think that 1 third-degree burn/1 person is morally worse than infinite mild pains/1 person. In any case, I don’t think what I think here is relevant to my argument against your utilitarian sense of “involves more pain than”.
No, both equivalencies are justified by the fact that they involve the same amount of base units of pain.
Sure it does. The presence of pain is equivalent to feeling bad. Feeling bad is precisely what is at stake here, and all that I care about.
Yes, that’s what I meant when I said “that’s a question of how we evaluate and represent an individual’s well-being, not a question of interpersonal comparison and aggregation.”
So you’re saying that just as 5 MiTs/5 people is equivalent to 5 MiTs/1 person because both sides involve the same amount of base units of pain, 5 MiTs/1 person is equivalent to 1 MaT/1 person because both sides involve the same amount of base units of pain (and not because both sides give rise to what-it’s-likes that are experientially just as bad).
My question to you then is this: On what basis are you able to say that 1 MaT/1 person involves 5 base units of pain?
Reason S cares about the amount of base units of pain there are because pain feels bad, but in my opinion, that doesn’t sufficiently show that it cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels. It doesn’t sufficiently show that it cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels because 5 base units of pain all experienced by one person feels a whole heck of a lot worse than anything felt when 5 base units of pain are spread among 5 people, yet Reason S completely ignores this difference. If Reason S truly cared about pain-qua-how-it-feels, it cannot ignore this difference.
I understand where you’re coming from though. You hold that Reason S cares about the quantity of base units of pain precisely because pain feels bad, and that this fact alone sufficiently shows that Reason S is in harmony with the fact that we take pain to matter because of how it feels (i.e. that Reason S cares about pain-qua-how-it-feels).
However, given what I just said, I think this fact alone is too weak to show that Reason S is in harmony with the fact that we take pain to matter because of how it feels. So I believe my objection stands.
Have we hit bedrock?
Because you told me that it’s the same amount of pain as five minor toothaches and you also told me that each minor toothache is 1 base unit of pain.
If you mean that it feels worse to any given person involved, yes it ignores the difference, but that’s clearly the point, so I don’t know what you’re doing here other than merely restating it and saying “I don’t agree.”
On the other hand, you do not care how many people are in pain, and you do not care how much pain someone experiences so long as there is someone else who is in more pain, so if anyone’s got to figure out whether or not they “care” enough it’s you.
You’ve pretty much been repeating yourself for the past several weeks, so, sure.
Where in supposition or the line of reasoning that I laid out earlier (i.e. P1) through to P5)) did I say that 1 major headache involves the same amount of pain as 5 minor toothaches?
I attributed that line of reasoning to you because I thought that was how you would get to C) from the supposition that 5 minor toothaches had by one person is experientially just as bad as 1 major toothache had by one person.
But you then denied that that line of reasoning represents your line of reasoning. Specifically, you denied that P1) is the basis for asserting P2). When I asked you what is your basis for P2), you assert that I told you that 1 major headache involves the same amount of pain as five minor toothaches. But where did I say this?
In any case, it would certainly help if you described your actual step by step reasoning from the supposition to C), since, apparently, I got it wrong.
I’m not merely restating the fact that Reason S ignores this difference. I am restating it as part of a further argument against your sense of “involves more pain than” or “involves the same amount of pain as”. The argument in essence goes: P1) Your sense relies on Reason S P2) Reason S does not care about pain-qua-how-it-feels (because it ignores the above stated difference). P3) We take pain to matter because of how it feels. C) Therefore, your sense is not in harmony with why pain matters (or at least why we take pain to matter).
I had to restate that Reason S ignores this difference as my support for P2, so it was not merely stated.
Both accusations are problematic.
The first accusation is not entirely true. I don’t care about how many people are in pain only in situations where I have to choose between helping, say, Amy and Susie or just Bob (i.e. situations where a person in the minority party does not overlap with anyone in the majority party). However, I would care about how many people are in pain in situations where I have to choose between helping, say, Amy and Susie or just Amy (i.e. situations where the minority party is a mere subset of the majority party). This is due to the strict pareto principle which would make Amy and Susie each suffering morally worse than just Amy suffering, but would not make Amy and Susie suffering morally worse than Bob suffering. I don’t want to get into this at this point because it’s not very relevant to our discussion. Suffice it to say that it’s not entirely true that I don’t care about how many people are in pain.
The second accusation is plain false. As I made clear in my response to Objection 2 in my post, I think who suffers matters. As a result, if I could either save one person from suffering some pain or another person from suffering a slightly less pain, I would give each person a chance of being saved in proportion to how much each has to suffer. This is what I think I should do. Ironically, your second accusation against me is precisely true of what you stand for.
In my past few replies, I have:
1) Outlined in explicit terms a line of reasoning that got from the supposition to C), which I attributed to you.
2) Highlighted that that line of reasoning appealed to Reason S.
3) On that basis, argued that your sense of “involves the same amount of pain as” goes against the spirit of why pain matters.
If that comes across to you as “just repeating myself for the past several weeks”, then I can only think that you aren’t putting enough effort into trying to understand what I’m saying.